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ABSTRACf 
The Union ofNonhem Worke~ known as the Northwest Territories Public 
Service Association prior to 1987, is the largest labour union in the Northwest Territories. 
Northern labour is a little explored field in Canadian history, and as such, this work 
surveys new ground. Trade unionism in the North's private sector began at the close of 
the Second World War. The UNW, however, like most public sector unions in Cana~ 
had its roots in the 1960s. This study examines issues pertaining to the union's leadership 
and staff from 1967, when correctional workers in Yellowknife first organized. until the 
1996 convention, when the union took steps to divide into two separate unions in 
anticipation of the creation ofNunawt in 1999. 
From its start~ the union's geographic jurisdiction distinguished the UNW as 
unique among Canada's public service unions. It and its predecessor, the NWTPSA 
represented workers in Canada's most northern reaches. The challenges of life in the 
North were as real for the union as they were for its members. A relatively small 
membership spread across such a huge land mass presented obstacles with regards to 
leadership and service. Also, cultural factors differentiated the organization from others. 
With an increasing native membership, mostly Inuit, lnuktitut became the union's second 
language. Distinguishing the union institutionally was its component status within the 
u 
Public Service Alliance of Canada. 1 The quality of the relationship between these two 
bodies regularly fluctuated between excellent and belligerent. Similarly, the union's 
relationship with the Nonhwest Territories Federation of Labour degenerated from 
founding member to pariah status, in spite of the UNW comprising the overwhelming 
majority of the Federation's membership. 
As the union grew from a ufty-by-night, seat-of-the-pants" organization of less 
than 100 members at its inception, to over 5,000 when it divided, leadership and staffing 
gained increasing importance. To meet the challenges of representing northern workers, 
the union increasingly attempted to professionalize its leadership cadre. The effect of this 
was an increasing distance between members and leaders which ultimately resulted in the 
secession of the Nunawt membership. 
1Technically speaking, the PSAC is not a union itself as much as it is a 
confederation of 1 S smaller component unions. 
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INTRODUCI10N 
Most federal and provincial civil servants in Canada became unionized in the 
1960s. The Northwest Territories was no exception to this tren~ and in 1967 territorial 
workers began to organize. Securing legal recognition in 1969 with the passage of 
enabling legislatio~ by 1970 the Northwest Tenitories Public: Service Association 
[NWTPSA] was a component union of the Public Service Alliance of Canada [PSAC], 
and had signed its first collective agreement with the Government of the Nonhwest 
Territories. Expanding in both membership and staff throughout the 1970s, the 
Association began to organize and represent workers other than government employees in 
the 1980s. In 1987 it changed its name to the Union ofNonhem Workers [UNW] to 
reflect this new membership structure. When the territories divided in 1999 with the 
creation ofNunawt~ so too did the union break into two separate unions. This was the 
result of a decision made at the UNW' s 1996 convention. This MA thesis will examine 
the history of the UNW from its beginnings in 1967, to the 1996 decision to divide the 
union. 
During much of this period the NWTPSA/UNW demonstrated itself to be a 
dynamic: union within the Canadian labour movement. This dynamism is seen in its growth 
from approximately one hundred territorial government employees in 1967, to a 
membership in excess of6,000 at the time the Nunawt union seceded. Initially made up 
largely of administrative and correctional staff employed in Yellowknife and the NWT' s 
regional tentres, by 1996 the UNW was represented in every community of the Northwest 
Territories and active in all areas of northern working fife including mines, hospitals. 
power plants, and community colleges. as well as the territorial civil service. 
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Distinguishing the UNW from other unions was the increasing number of 
aboriginal members throughout this period. Although aboriginal people were active in the 
union from its stan, from 1967 to 1996 the anion's leadership was composed of 
predominantly non-native men. As the northern public service became more 
representative of the Northwest Territories' population, the union's ranks were 
increasingly made up of men and women of Inuit, Metis, and Dene ancestry. Of these 
three groups, the Inuit were by far the most prominent, especially in the eastern Arctic. 
The use of Inuktitut grew in importance within the union. By the 1990s the union's 
newsletter Sulijuq [lnuktitut for Truth] was a unique bilingual union paper publishing in 
English and lnuktitut. 
The geographic region which the UNW represented during this period made the 
union exceptional in that it had by far more members nonh of the Arctic Circle than any 
other union in Canada. With much of its membership in remote, isolated communities 
which could only be accessed by air, organizing and servicing the membership was 
problematic and expensive. To members in many of these communities, Yellowknife, 
which housed the union's headquarters, is a large and distant urban center. Ottawa, where 
the UNW's parent body made its home, was in tum more distant. 
Physical distance was accompanied, especially in the 1990s. by an increasing 
isolation from the broader labour movement. Whale this is seen most clearly in its 
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relationship with PSAC, it is also apparent in its interaction with other labour 
organizations, for instance the Northwest Tenitories Federation of Labour. On one level 
the sources of discontent with the Alliance stemmed from what the UNW often perceived 
as an insufficient level of services received, specifically grievance and arbitration handling. 
in exchange for dues paid. However, there were also issues of power and control, not 
only between the UNW and other labour organizations, but particularly within the UNW 
itself, ultimately leading to the division ofthe union in 1996. 
This thesis shows how these issues of power and control within the union 
pertained to staff and leadership. Specifically, it will be shown that the structure of the 
union changed from one where a volunteer leadership gave direction to a full-time 
professional staff, to one in which the elected leaders, increasingly full-time salaried 
officers, displaced the union's cadre of professional organizers, and proceeded to write 
their own orders. The priorities of the union's leadership changed from representing the 
concerns of northern workers to furthering the interests of themselves, ultimately resulting 
in the permanent division of the union. 
Before commencing a discussion of public sector bargaining in the Northwest 
Tenitories, it is first necessary to provide some background. This is done by first 
establishing what distinguishes the Northwest Tenitories politically from the provinces. 
Secondly, a brief history of the organization of civil servants in Canada is presented to 
provide a national context in which the Northwest Territories Public Service Association 
arose. Third, a look at the activities of the International Union ofMine, Mill and Smelter 
Workers in the Northwest Territories shows the economic, social, and political roles that 
organized labour played in the North prior to the arrival of public sector unions. Finally, 
the impact of the 1966 Carrothers Commission is examined to show how the need for a 
territorial civil service union emerged. 
The primary difference between a province and a territory is one of political 
power. While sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act1 delineate the respective powers 
of the federal and provincial governments, the legislation defining the powers of the 
Northwest Territories is the Northwest Territories Act. As an Act of Parliament, the 
Northwest Territories Act can be amended or repealed at any time. Frances Abele has 
argued that the Northwest Territories Act as amended in 1905 established the framework 
within which the territorial government still operates, except that until the 19SOs these 
powers were exercised by a small group of bureaucrats in Ottawa. 2 In 19S I the Act was 
amended to allow for limited input from the non-aboriginal and Metis population of the 
Mackenzie Valley.3 The Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, appointed by the 
Minister responsible for Northern Affain and National Resources, had final decision-
making authority. A gradual series of amendments to the Act following the report of the 
1Prior to 1980 the British North America Act. 
lfrances Abele, "Canadian Contradictions: Forty Years of Northern Political 
Development," Arctic, 40:4 (1987), 310-320, 312. 
11nuit could not vote in elections until 1954, status Indians were not enfranchised 
until1960. 
4 
5 
Carrothers Commission, led to an important change: by 1974 all ofthe councillors were 
elected. Since then native people have held the majority of seats in what is now called the 
Legislative Assembly. 
While most of the rights that provinces enjoy are shared with the Northwest 
Territories., there are significant exceptions. Territories are not guaranteed full, but merely 
observer, status at first ministers' meetings. Also, unlike provinces, the Northwest 
Territories does not have ultimate control over lands and resources:• In addition, the 
Government of the Northwest Territories has no authority to establish legislation 
governing labour except for matters pertaining to health and safety, minimum wages, and 
its own civil service. For this reason, private sector unions in the Northwest Territories 
are governed by the Canada Labour Relations Act, which governs workers other than civil 
servants not covered by provincial legislation. 
Trade unionism across Canada began its period of most substantial growth during 
the Second World War when the federal government gave legal sanction to private sector 
collective bargaining by Order-in-Council. Union growth in post-war Canada up to the 
early 1960s was mostly confined to workers other than government employees. It was 
only in the ten year period 1963 to 1973 that provincial and federal civil servants gained 
4Dickerson, Whose, 9. While there are efforts being made to establish a northern 
accord which would give the Northwest Territories control over this domain, the federal 
government still has the final say. The exception to this is in the case of settled aboriginal 
land claims where in certain portions of the claim the oVr-ner group enjoys sub-surface 
rights. 
the right to bargain collectively. The exception to this was Saskatchewan, where in 1945 
the recently elected CCF government granted bargaining rights to its employees. 5 Figure 
I shows when the civil servants of each province acquired c:ollec:tive bargaining rights. 
The most important factor in understanding the later development of civil service 
unions relates to numbers. During the Second World War, the state began to play an 
ever-increasing role in providing for the needs of Canadians, requiring a drastically 
enlarged workforce. According to Craig Heron. as the state's workforce grew, it 
unionized.6 The weakness in Heron's argument is that it assumes that militancy is a 
6 
function of workforce size, thereby discounting the existence of both small militant unions 
and large unorganized workforc:es. Desmond Monon argues that barring the oc:c:asional 
partisan inspired civil service purge, civil servants did so well for themselves, there was no 
need for unions. 7 Bryan Palmer has pointed out that public: sector workers in Canada 
made several attempts to organize prior to the 1960s. the earliest being in 1889, but each 
attempt was suppressed by the state. 1 Increasing civil servant militance in the 1960s was 
'J.C. Hodgetts and O.P. Dwivedi, Provincial Governments as Employers: A 
Survey of Public Personnel Administration in Canada's Provinces, (Montreal: MeGill-
Queen's University, 1974), 65-66. 
6Craig Heron, The Canodian Labour Movement: A Brief History, Second Edition 
(Toronto: Lorimer, 1996), 86. 
'Desmond Monon, Working People, fourth edition (Montreal: McGill-Queen' s 
University, 1998), 2SS. 
'Bryan D. Palmer, Warlcing-C/ass Experie11ce: 11Jt? Rise and Reconstitution of 
Canadian Labour, 1800- 1980 (Toronto: Butterworth, 1983}, 264. 
7 
Fipre 1 
Recognition or Provincial Civil Service Orpaizations as Barpining Agents 
Year Civil Service 
Province Organization 
Granted Collective 
Bargaining Rights 
Saskatchewan 1945 
Ontario 1963 
Alben a 1963 
Quebec 1965 
Manitoba 1965 
Nova Scotia 1967 
New Brunswick 1968 
Prince Edward Island 1972 
British Columbia 1973 
Newfoundland 1973 
Source: Hodgetts and Dwivc:di, Provincial, 63-71. 
likely a function of an increase in the number of employees less "professional" in the 
nature of their work- postal workers, prison guards, highways workers, skilled trades-
people who saw themselves more as workers and more inclined to see the need for 
workers' organizations. 
Hodgetts and Dwivedi consider three socio-political factors in accounting for the 
later development of public sector trade unionism. The first of these is what they refer to 
8 
as the "social club function of staff associations. '99 Public sector unions often arose from 
pre-existing staff ~iations whose concerns were primarily non-economic. Beginning as 
social clubs concerned about standards of qualification, performance, and requiremellts for 
entry into the professions, these groups gradually took on the role of employee pressure 
groups. In the post-war period, as the number of civil servants began to increase 
dramatically, their collars increasingly changing from white to blue and pink, these existing 
organizations served as the nuclei of emerging bargaining agents. Under growing 
pressure, provinces simply passed the pertinent enabling legislation to certify these old 
organizations as new unions. Joseph Rose states that while private sector unions had to 
organize, fight for reoognition, and then fight for contracts, public servants were handed 
their collective agreements on silver platters. The weakness with this argument is that 
quite often there were gaps of two to three years between the passage of enabling 
legislation and the signing of initial collective agreements, indicating that agreements were 
not automatically granted with the acquisition ofbargaining agent status. 10 
The second reason Hodgetts and Dwivedi offer to explain the later development of 
civil service unions is that the existing staff' organizations were conservative in their nature 
owing to the preponderance of senior management within these organizations. 11 As long 
'Hodgetts and Dwivedi, Provincial, 61 . 
10 Ibid, 109. 
11Hodgetts and Dwivedi, Provincial. 61. For examples of the roles of senior civil 
servants in the civil servants' associations ofNova Scotia and Newfoundland respectively, 
9 
as management controlled the workers' organizations, it would be unlikely that the 
workers' organizations would challenge management. This challenge came in the 1960s, 
according to Craig Heron, because of the large number of"baby boomers" entering the 
civil service at the time, with higher expectations of their employers than their 
predecessors. These workers were more educated, a "product of their rebellious times," 
and more willing to challenge both management and conservative union leadership. "12 
The third reason that Hodgetts and Dwivedi offer to account for the late 
development of unions amongst civil servants is the inherently political nature of unions. 
They assert that politically active public servants are as undesirable to the public as they 
are to the government. 13 When the employer is the state, the union must, from time to 
time, not only question the decisions of the government, but on occasion take action 
against it. Public sector unions are therefore often perceived as a threat to the ultimate 
authority of the state. Peter Warrian poses that this perceived threat to state sovereignty 
results in the state placing limits on what can and cannot be negotiated. 14 All three points 
see Gordon Burnham and Roben Vaison, Civil Servants by the Sea, (Halifax: Nova Scotia 
Employees' Association, 1976), 2S, and Robert Marshall Greenwood, "The 
Newfoundland Association ofPublic Employees, 1936-1973, The Transition from Civil 
Servants to Trade Unionists," BA Thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1984, 
4445. 
12Jieron, Canadian, 92-93. 
13Hodgetts and Dwivedi, Provincial, 61. 
14Peter Warrian, Hard Bargain: Transforming Public Sector Labour-Management 
Relations, (Toronto: McGilli~ 1996), 45. See also Dwivedi and Hodgetts, Provit~eial, 
165, who argue that the concept of state sovereignty is waning in its influence over 
10 
raised by Hodgetts and Dwivedi were factors affecting the organizing of civil servants in 
the Northwest Territories. The historic "social club" function of staff associations, 
membership and leadership positions held by management, and the inherent political nature 
of a union in contrast to the concept of state sovereignty, all came into play at different 
times. However, because the NWT civil service devolved from the federal government, it 
is also necessary to look at the history of collective bargaining at the federal level to 
appreciate the distinctly northern factors associated with the origins of the Union of 
Northern Workers. 
With the exception of postal workers, federal civil servants' organizations followed 
the same pattern as their provincial counterparts. Evolving from social clubs to 
professional associations, then pressure groups and finally unions, federal civil servants 
were granted the right to collective bargaining in 1967 with the passage of the Public 
Service StaffRelations Act. While writers such as Heron and Morton credit the work of 
the 1965 Heaney Report in preparing the ground for federal collective bargaining, 15 Bryan 
Palmer, along with Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, also recognize the efforts of the 
postal workers. While the larger movement was born of legalism, they assert, the postal 
workers' unions were born of struggle. Breaking away from the larger civil service 
provincial collective bargaining in recent years. 
15Morton, Working, 2S8, also Robert Deslaurier, ''First Collective Agreements in 
the Public Service of Canada," Civil Service Review, VoL XLI, No. 2. June 1968, 34-35 
and Heron, Cantldian, 93-96. 
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movement in the late 1950s, postal workers initiated a series of illegal walkouts in the 
mid-1960s that amounted to recognition strikes, forcing the government to come to tenns 
with public employees by bargaining with them. 16 Representing the majority of the 
workers left behind by the postal workers was the Public Service Alliance of Canada. 
The PSAC was fonned by the merger of the Civil Service Association and the Civil 
Service Federation at the Alliance's founding convention in November, 1966. The CSA 
had a membership of25,000 direct members employed in the national capital area. The 
CSF had 80,000 affiliated members of 16 separate staff associations roughly 
corresponding to the various departments of govemment.17 The merger was a direct 
result of acquiring collective bargaining rights. As government departments commonly had 
members of both organizations within their employ, the two organizations were faced with 
fighting a series of battles for the membership of each department or merging.11 They 
chose the latter option, forming the PSAC, maintaining the federal structure of the CSF 
with its 14 original component member unions. 19 At the head of this new union was 
16falmer, Working-Class, 264-65; also Leo Panitch and Donald Swanz. The 
Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Wage Controls to Social Contract (Toronto: 
Garamond Press, 1993) 17. 
11Civil Service Review, Vol. xxxix, No. 3, September 1966, 2. Also Lemelin, 
Public, 61 and Monon, Wor/cing, 264-265. 
1
'Lemelin, Public, 108, 152, and Morton, Working, 261. 
1
'Tbese were Canada Manpower and Immigration, Customs Excise Union, 
Department of Agriculture Component, Department ofFinance Component, Department 
of Transpon Component, Department of Veterans' Affairs Component, Economic 
Security Employees' National Association, National Component, National Health and 
12 
Claude Edwards. 
With collective bargaining rights secured~ the Alliance quickly asserted itself. The 
first collective agreements were signed with the federal government on 29 April 1968.20 
In the first two years ofcertificatio~ 9S per cent ofthe membership ofPSAC's 14 
components won collective agreements. 11 In 1967 the Alliance officially entered the house 
of labour when its 93,000 members affiliated with the Canadian Labour Congress.12 It 
was only with the affiliation of the PSAC that Canada's largest labour central established a 
presence in the Northwest Territories. There was, however, a labour movement already 
established in the North which had been active for over twenty years prior to the arrival of 
the Alliance. 
Collective bargaining in the private sector did not begin in the Northwest 
Territories until after World War Two. Prior to 1920, the major economic activity in the 
Northwest Territories was the fur trade, which relied upon a dispersed and unorganized 
aboriginal work force. Even with the importation oflarge numbers of non·aboriginal 
workers with the discovery of oil, and the subsequent development of a petroleum 
Welfare Component, Post Office Component, Public Works Component, Solicitor General 
Component, Taxation Division Componen~ and the Union ofNational Defense 
Employees Labour Organizations in Canada, 1967, vii. 
20Civil Service Review, Vol. XLI, No.2, June 1968, 2. 
21Finkelman and Goldenberg, Collective, xxxi., xxxix. 
22Labour Organizations in Canatla, 1967, vii. 
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industry, at Nonnan Wells beginning in the 1920s, labour remained unorganized.23 
Although the reasons for this are not clear, William Morrison and Kenneth Coates, in their 
study of the Second World War defense projects of the Northwest, attribute the virtual 
absence of unions in the North to subsidized travel. high wages with ample opportunity for 
overtime, cheap room and board, and high mobility. If workers felt themselves to be 
unjustly treated, ''they tended to leave, rather than go on strike. "24 These factors were 
likely at work in Nonnan Wells. 
Organized labour in the Northwest Territories had its beginnings in the gold 
mining industry that developed around the Yellowknife area starting in 193 5. By the late 
1930s six mining camps were established with other explorations ongoing. By the 1940s 
23Kenneth Coates, Canada's Colonies: A History of the Yukon and Northwest 
Te"itories, (Toronto: Lorimer, 1985), lOS. Although drilling began in 1920 at Norman 
Wells, the actual discovery of oil occurred in 1914. The industry itself did not become 
viable until the mining development that occurred around Great Bear Lake and Great 
Slave Lake in the 1930s. See L.S. Bourne, "Yellowknife, N.W.T.: A study of its urban 
and regional economy," Northern Co-ordination and Research Centre, Department of 
Northern AfFairs and National Resources, September, 1963, 26-27. The terms aboriginal 
and native are used interchangeably in this discussion to refer collectively to the Dene,. 
Metis, and Inuit peoples of the Northwest Territories. The term first nation is often 
avoided as it is a term not generally used by Inuit peoples. Indian is used only in this paper 
when it is the choice of the respective writer being discussed or in reference to 
government related topics such as the Indian Act or Indian Affairs. The term Dene refers 
to the five Athapaskan first nations indigenous to the Northwest Territories: Gwich'in,. 
Chipewyan, Dog Rib, Sahtu or North Slavey, and Deb Cho or South Slavey. Metis are 
those of mixed First Nation and European background. 
2Wdliam R. Morrison and Kenneth A. Coates, Wot'king the North: Labor and the 
Northwest Defense Projects, 1942-1946 (Fairbanks: University of Alaska~ 1994), li, 
240-245. 
14 
the three largest gold mines in operation were the Con, Negus, and Giant mines 
respectively.25 It was not until 1944, however, that attempts were made to organize the 
Yellowknife miners. That responsibility was taken on by the International Union of Mine, 
Mill, and Smelter Workers. 
The IUMMSW, more popularly known as Mine Mill, began as the Western 
Federation ofMiners (WFM) in Butte, Montana on 5 May 1893.26 The first WFM locals 
25Boume, "Yellowknife," 26-28. See also Coates, Colonies, 105. Also John 
David Hamilton, Arctic Revolution: Social Change in the Northwest Territories, 1935-
1994 (Toronto: Dund~ 1994) 29. Taking its name from its original owner, the 
Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company, the "Con" mine has had a variety of owners 
since first opening but has retained its original name. 
~What is Unionism?" North Star, December 1952, 3. It is unclear how many 
times the North Star published. There are only two issues in the Nonhwest Territories 
Archives: December 1952 and January/February 1953. They have been mistakenly 
accessioned with a completely unrelated newspaper, the Northem Star which published in 
the early 1990s. Both this article, and the one subsequently cited, "The History of the 
Yellowknife District Miners' Union," were both authorized for publication by the 
Yellowknife District Miners' Union. For published work on Mine Mill in Canada see Mike 
Solski and John Smaller, Mine Mill: The History of the International Union of Mine, 
Mill. and Smelter Workers in Canada Since 1895, (Ottawa: Steel Rail, 1984); AI King, 
Red Bait: Struggles of a Mine Mill Local, (Vancouver: Kingbird, 1998); the chapter on 
organizing for Mine Mill in Bryan D. Palmer, ed., A Communist Life: Jack Scon mid the 
Ctmadian Workers• Movement. 1927-1985, (St. John's: Canadian Committee on Labour 
History, 1988); Mercedes Steedman, Peter Sushnigg, and Dieter K. Buse, eds. Hard 
Lessons: The Mine Mill Union in the Canadian Labour Movement~ {Toronto: Dundum, 
1995); Robert H. Carlin, I Know Mine Mill ... Do You? {Toronto: United Steelworkers of 
America, 1961 ); and the chapter on Mine Mill in Irving Manin Abella's Nationalism, 
Communism, and Canadian Labour: The CIO. the Communist Party, and the Canadian 
Congress of Labour. 1935- 1956, (Toronto: University ofToronto, 1973). John Lang, "A 
Lion in a Den of Daniels: A Histocy of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter 
Workers in Sudbury, Ontario: 1942- 1962," MA Thesis, University ofGuelph, 1970, 
concentrates on Mine Mill's battle with the United Steelworkers of America in Sudbury. 
Similarly, Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "Remember Kir/cland Lake •: The History and Effects 
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appeared in Canada in the Rosslan~ BC area in 1895, but was virtually extinct by 1920.21 
Reinvigorated in the 1930s with the emergence ofthe CIO. Mine Mill's Canadian ranks 
were swelled, largely by the organizing eft"ons of Communist activists. Irving Abell~ in 
his study of the CIO in Canad~ emphasizes Mine Mill's high proportion of Communist 
leaders. 21 It was hostility towards its Communist Party influence that led the Canadian 
Congress of Labour to expel Mine Mill in 1949, leaving the union subject to raiding by the 
United Steelworkers of America who promptly launched an aggressive and protracted war 
against Mine Mill. 29 
of the Kirkland Lake Gold Aliners' Strike, 1941-42, (Toronto: University ofToronto, 
1983) gives an in depth ofMine Mill's activities in the Kirkland Lake area. Ellen 
Schrecker, Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism ill America, (Boston: Little Brown, 
1998), offers a very complete chapter on Mine Mill in the United States for the period 
from the 1930s to the 1960s. Morris Wright, Takes More than Guns: A Brief History of 
the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, (Denver: International Union 
ofMine, Mill and Smelter Workers, 1944) offers a surprising amount of the early history 
of the union in Canada. 
21Solski, Mille Mill, 19-37, also Abella, Nationalism, 86 and Carlin, I Know, iii. 
21 Abella, Nationalism, 3, 45. 
29Abella, Nationalism, 95-110. There is no doubt that at the root ofthe CCL's 
attack on Mine Mill was anti-oommunism. AI King. himself a Party member during this 
period, is insistent that the CCF played an equally important role in the attack on Mine 
Mill. See King, Red Bait, 74-75. For a particularly biased account of the struggle between 
the Communist Party and the CCF for control of the labour movement during this period, 
see David Lewis, The Good Fight: Political Memoirs, 1909-1958, {Toronto: MacMillan, 
1981). In the same year that Mine Mill was expelled, so was the United Electrical Workers 
with 25,000 members. In addition, the Canadian Seamen's Union was expeUed that year 
from the TLC with its 6~000 members. All three of these unions were Communist 
dominat~ indicating an orchestrated attack on Communists in the Canadian labour 
movement. See Union Growth in Canadtl: 1921 - 1967~ Economic and Research Branch, 
Canada Department ofLabour~ Ottawa, 1970,21. The question must be asked though, 
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Massive membership losses moved Mine Mill to sue for peace with Steel. In 1967, 
the Canadian members voted three to one in favour of merging with Steel in a membership 
wide referendu~ and on New Year's Day 1968, with the exception of local 598 in 
Sudbury which refused to be bound by the referendum results and remained the only Mine 
Mill local in existence, the International Union ofMine, Mil~ and Smelter Workers ceased 
to exist, all of its locals becoming locals of the United Steelworkers of America, 30 
including its five locals in the Northwest Territories.31 
Mine Mill's first organizing attempt in the Northwest Territories was in 1944. In 
that year two members of the union came to work at Yellowknife's Negus mine with the 
intention of organizing the workers there. Although they were successful in signing a 
how much were these expulsions and the raiding that followed them genuinely motivated 
by ideological reasons, and how much of it was an attempt by unions such as Steel simply 
to increase membership, and therefore revenues from dues, by cashing in on current anti-
communist hysteria? 
lOJcing, Red Bait, 1 SO-l 52. 
310ne of the difficulties of researching the history of organized labour in the 
Northwest Territories is that more often than not in their collection of data regarding 
labour statistics for nonhero Canada, the Economic and Research Branch of the 
Department ofLabour groups the Yukon and Northwest Territories together and it is not 
possible to separate the statistics for each territory. Other times they are reported 
separately. This problem is common with their various publications including Labour 
Organizations, Strikes and Loclrouts, Union Growth in Canada, and Union Growth in 
Canada in the Sixties. In 1966 Labour Canada reported Mine Mill with four locals in the 
Yukon and five in the Northwest Territories. In 1967 there were II locals in both, but it 
is not indicated how many were in each. The two additional locals were probably in the 
Yukon, but it is impossible to say based on information ftom Labour Canada. See Labour 
Organizations in CtlllfJda, Economic and Research Branch, Canada Department of 
Labour, Ottawa, 1966 & 1967. 
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majority of the workers and were chartered by the international as the Yellowknife District 
Miners' Union, Local802, on 23 June 1944, the local at Negus was broken when the 
management fired its leading members and established a company union in its place. It is 
not clear if the two members who attempted to organize Mine Mill at Negus had been sent 
by the union or they simply made the effort on their own. It is significant, though, that 
without any professional staff on site it simply took the dismissal of the leadership to halt 
the organizing drive. It was not be until 194 7 that Mine Mill was firmly established in the 
Northwest Territories, and then it would be at the Con and Giant mines and with the 
assistance of a paid organizer. 32 
Although the post-war era saw the development of substantial transport and 
freshwater fishing industries in Hay River,33 the major economic activity in the North 
remained mining. While the area around YeUowknife was dotted with small gold mines 
which only produced for a few years, the Discovery mine operated well into the 1960s; 
Giant and Con remain operational. 34 Until the merger with Steel, the employees of all 
3z.'History ofthe YeUowknife District Miners' Union," 5. By 1952 Negus had 
ceased production. (See Bourne, "Yellowknife," 31 ). 
»see John Campbell Wallace, "Hay River, N.W.T.," MA Thesis, Department of 
Geography, University of Alberta, 1966. 
:u Although Giant is no longer producing it was purchased by Miraman (the current 
owner of Con mine) which continues to use Giant's smelter. 
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three were represented by Mine Mill. The opening of the Tungsten15 and Pine Point36 
mines, and the concomitant development of respectively named communities in the early 
1960s, continued to illustrate the North's reliance on mining as well as Mine Mill's 
commitment to organizing nonhem miners. It was at Pine Point that the IUMMSW 
successfuUy fought off a raid by the International Union of Operating Engineers in 1964.n 
When the merger with Steel took place in 1968 the Steelworkers inherited five locals in 
the NWT. 31 In later years, long time members of these locals would complain of the 
apathy of their younger members toward the union and that they had no appreciation of 
their union because they had no idea what conditions had been like before there was a 
union in place. 39 This can be explained as the result of changing conditions in the Nonh 
and the changing role of the union in the lives ofNonhemers, especially after the merger 
35NWT Data Boo/c:/986-87: A Complete Information Guide to the Northwest 
Territories and its Commut.•ities (Yellowknife: Outcrop, 1986), 216-217. 
36Data Boolc, 188-189, see also Janet E. McPherson, "The Pine Point Mine" in 
Everett B. Peterson and Janet B. Wright, eds., Northem Transitions: Volume One: 
Northem Resource and Land Use Policy Study (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources 
Committee, 1978), 6S- 110. 
37King, Red Bait, 13 S. Interestingly, despite the protracted war between Mine MiD 
and Steel for members, there is no evidence of the Steelworkers attempting to raid Mine 
Mill locals in the Nonh. 
31LDbour Organimtions in Canada: /966, 34. This is the last year that Labour 
Canada reponed the number ofMime MiD locals in the NWT separately. In 1967 the 
NWT was again ~mbined with the Yukon for a total of II locals. At the same time the 
United Steelworkers did not represent a single worker in either territory. 
190rvik and V anderhaden, Interest Groups, 42. 
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with Steel. 
From its earliest days in the Northwest Territorie~ Mine Mill was active in the 
social affairs of the community. It is difficult to discuss the role of Mine Mill in northern 
communities outside of Yellowknife due to a lack of source material, but in the NWT's 
largest community the union kept a high profile. By the early 1950s Mine Mill activists 
had participated in establishing the community's first hospital, annually electing one of its 
members to the facility's board of governors. In addition, local 802 regularly contributed 
to "worthy causes" and hosted an annual Labour Day picnic to which the entire 
community was invited. 40 The union produced radio programs and organized community 
groups such as the Elks. "1 Josie Gould, a long time resident of Yellowknife, moved to the 
community in 1965 with her husband who was employed at the Con mine. She fondly 
remembers the social value of attending membership meetings with him: 
I guess I saw the camaraderie whenever they had a general meeting at the 
Con Mine Rec Hall. The whole family was involved, whether you were a 
member or not. The whole family went because it affected you, even if you 
were not the member. And that, I guess. was basically the first family I 
had. I thought it was great. "2 
Gould's participation in the activities of her husband's union, and her observations of 
other wives' participatio~ helps illustrate the role of women in northern Mine Mill locals. 
401~story," North, S. 
"
1Selleck, Dying, 7. 
"
2Personal interview, 26 August, 1999. Gould would later distinguish herself as an 
activist with the NWTPSAIUNW. 
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It is significant that Gould equated the union with family for it certainly must have played 
more of an intimate role in remote, isolated, northern communities where everyone was far 
from friends and family and living in a community often devoid of some of the most basic 
of diversions available in southern communities. 
The union was also active in the recreational life of the community. Dale Johnson 
is another long term Yellowknife resident and local entrepreneur. He came to Yellowknife 
in 1974 from Cobalt, Ontario [itself an old Mine Mill stronghold] and worked at Giant 
mine where he became involved with the union there and acquainted with its veterans. 
According to Johnson, the union was active in establishing curling and hockey teams, 
children's parties, and women's sewing clubs on Saturday nights. "The union," Johnson 
echoes Gould, "was a family atrair."43 
Mine Mill also played a political role in the Northwest Territories and was 
consistently vocal on political issues in the North. In 1945, loca1802 members Rocky 
Palmer and Barney McGuire, realizing the role they had both personally played in the 
nuclear bombing of Hiroshima as former empJoyees of the Eldorado uranium mine on 
Great Bear Lake, were responsible for the Yellowknife Miners' Union being the first union 
local in Canada to enter the post-war peace movement by passing a resolution urging the 
federal government to "avoid becoming involved in an atomic axis.".,. In the same year, 
43Dale Johnson, personal interview, 24 August 1999. 
"McGuire, "Yellowknife," 8. 
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stealing the slogan from the United States' War of Independence, "No taxation without 
representation," the miners were able to unite a broad cross section of Yellowknife society 
in its campaign for an elected town council and elected representatives for the Northwest 
Territories. 45 In early 19S 3 local 802 boasted that "[ c ]ontinual representation to the 
government has brought about a good deal of improvement in Workmen's Compensation 
in the Territories .... "46 It was not until the 1960s, though, that the union participated in 
the most significant development in northern politics to that time, a complete overhaul of 
the political structure of the Northwest Territories. 
By 1966 government in the Northwest Territories was in need of significant 
change. Still headquartered in Ottawa after almost one hundred years, the territorial "head 
of state" was the Commissioner, appointed by the minister responsible for Nonhem 
Affairs and National Resources. 47 Advised by a territorial council comprised of eight 
members - three elected by residents of the Northwest Territories, and five appointed by 
the minister - the Commissioner was not responsible to it. His statf consisted of 56 
individuals, most of them resident in Ottawa. 41 With the implementation of many of the 
45/bid, 7. 
'"''History," North, 5. 
47 At the time, Indian Affairs had only recently been transferred to this portfolio 
from Citizenship and Immigration on the recommendation of the recent Royal Commission 
on Government Organimtion. 
41Gurston Dacks, Ed. Devolution and Constitutional Development in the 
Cantldian North (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1990), 27. 
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recommendations of the Carrothers Commission that year, government in the Northwest 
Territories was significantly changed.•' 
Officially known as the Advisory Commission on the Development of Government 
in the Northwest Territories, the commission took its unofficial name from its chair: Alfred 
William Rooke Carrothers, a specialist in labour law and Dean of law at the University of 
Western Ontario. 50 The Carrothers Commission was the culmination of a series of 
political events occurring in both Ottawa and the Northwest Territories throughout the 
early 1960s. In 1961 many of the non-Native population in the Mackenzie Valley were 
agitating for political reform in the North. They were able to gamer the support of the 
territorial council in their bid to have the NWT divided into two separate territories: an 
eastern, largely Inuit51 one which would continue to be administered from Ottawa, and a 
., A W. R. Carrothers, Report of the Advisory Commission on Development of 
Government in the Northwest Temtories. vols. 1, 2, and summary (Ottawa: 1966). 
50Who 's Who in CantJtia: /966-68: An Illustrated Biographical Record of Men 
and Women of the Time (Toronto: International, 1966), 421. 
"Before proceeding with a discussion involving the Inuit, it would be wise to first 
explain a few areas of confusion relating to nomenclature. Although the Inuit have always 
referred to themselves as Inuit, non-Inuit have generally referred to the Inuit as Eskimos, a 
term which is considered offensive by many Inuit. It should also be pointed out that Inuit 
peoples live not only in what was the eastern Northwest Territories and is now Nunawt, 
but also in northern Quebec, Labrador, Greenland, Russia, Alaska and the western 
Northwest Territories. While the people of each locality all have different names for 
themselves, speak different languages, and have differing cultural practices, they are 
collectively known as Inuit peoples. This is contUsing because the people in Canada's 
eastern Ardic call themselves Inuit. The Inuit people of the western Northwest Territories 
are known as Inuvialuit. 
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west~ self-governing Mackenzie Territory that would have the mechanisms of 
responsible government devolved to it and eventually be admitted into confederation as 
the eleventh province. This movement for territorial division gained further momentum 
when it gained the support ofthe Conservative government. 52 
The Mackenzie Territory, as envisioned in 1961, never materialized. 53 Instead, 
two years after the fall of the Diefenbaker government, the Liberal government of Lester 
Pearson established the Carrothers Commission in June 1965.54 The commission solicited 
input from respondents on issues such as the location of the capital, division of the 
territories, provincial versus territorial status, and government structure. As well, it 
addressed questions pertaining to economic development. Carrothers took submissions 
'l(:arrothers, Report, 145-6; also Kirk Cameron and Graham White, Northem 
Governments in Transition: Political and Constitutional Development in the Yulcon, 
Nunavut and the Westem Northwest Te"itories, (Ottawa: Renouf, 1995), 48-50. 
KeMeth Coates, CQIIQl/Q's Colonies: A History of the Yukon and Northwest Te"itories, 
(Toronto: James Lorimer, 1985), 191-227. John David Hamilton, Arctic Revolution: 
Social Change in the Northwest Temtories:/935-1994, {Toronto: Dundum, 1994), 90-
91, Morris Zaslow, The Northward Expansion ofCanoda, 1914-1967, (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 363-365. 
53While most writers suggest that the idea died on the order paper when the 
Conservatives were defeated in the 1963 election [see Cameron and White, Northem, 48-
SO; also Coates, Canada's, 191-227; and Zaslow, Northward. 363-365], journalist John 
David Hamilton states that when the Conservative member for the Mackenzie River 
riding, Gene Reaume, became aware that the indigenous population had no input into the 
process, he took his concerns to other members of the House of Commons and generated 
enough backing to force the shelving of the proposed legislation. [See Hamilton, Arctic, 
91]. 
s.carrothers, Report, vol.1, 1. 
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and held hearings in communities throughout the North as well as in Ottawa, hearing from 
individuals representing their own personal views as weD as representatives of churches, 
businesses. and community councils. Yellowknife, Hay River, and Fort Smith all made 
presentations for the purposes of being considered for the new capital. In additio~ one 
trade union made a presentation to the commission: the International Union of Mine, Mill, 
and Smelter Workers. 
The issues that Mine Mill argued for clearly illustrated the progressive and 
democratic nature of the union. Among the issues that Mine Mill were in favour of 
included the following: 
- development and continued federal control of natural resources; 
- incentives to permanent residency; 
- continuation of federal grants with territorial control over finances; 
- employment and subsidized housing for Natives as well as negotiation of treaties; 
- preservation of cultural heritage; 
- a fully elected territorial council; 
- the establishment of the capital at Yellowknife; and 
- the popular election of the NWT Commissioner. 
In addition, the union argued that provincial or territorial status should be decided by a 
referendum.'' 
"Carrothe~ Report. vol. 2, B21. 
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Mine Mill opposed division of the territories. Its reasoning was likely the same as 
that of the commission itsel( which recommended against division for two reasons. The 
first was the argument of strength in unity. Carrothers believed that the people of the 
Northwest Territories would be better served in their dealings with Ottawa if they spoke 
with one voice. Secondly, the commission perceived division as being driven by, and for, 
the benefit of non-natives. The fear was expressed that the residual eastern territory 
would remain in perpetuity a politically underdeveloped appendage of the Department of 
Northern Affairs and National Resources. "Division," the report stated, "could have the 
accidental and unintended effect of gerrymandering the indigenous peoples in the north 
out of effective participation in territorial self government. " 56 
Participation in the Carrothers Commission was the last significant political activity 
of Mine Mill regarding the Northwest Territories. Active in the economic, social, and 
political life of the North since 1944, the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter 
Workers had enjoyed a monopoly over organized labour in the territories since it first 
attempted to organize the Negus mine. The implementation of many of Carrothers' 
recommendations coincided with the merger ofMine Mill into the United Steelworkers of 
"Carrothers, Report, Summary, S-6. Carrothers' final reason in recommending 
against division was paternalistic, bordering on racist. He argued that by keeping east and 
west together, the east had much to benefit. It was the stated opinion of the commission 
that in remaining together the people of the eastern Arctic would continue to have their 
"level of political sophistication" elevated through interaction with their neighbours in 
west. The commission was essentially saying that the Inuit still had a lot to learn from 
non-natives about politics. See vol. 1, 14 7. 
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America on 1 January 1968. This not only saw the union's disappearance [with the 
exception of local 598 in Sudbury], but also overlapped with the decline in prestige of 
private sector unions in Canada's nonh. Unlike Mine MiD, the Steelworkers were never 
the preeminent union in the North. Even before the capital was moved to Yellowknife, 
the first unionized public servants had made their appearance in the Nonhwest Territories. 
With the continued implementation of Carrothers' recommendations, the labour 
movement "Nonh of 60" was soon overwhelmingly made up of public servants. 
The Carrothers Commission not only affected the political boundaries of the 
Nonhwest Territories, but also its political structure. In addition to recommending against 
divisio~ the commission recommended devolving of greater political powers from 
Nonhem Affairs and National Resources to the Government of the Nonhwest 
Territories, 57 an increased democratization of the territorial government, and the transfer 
ofthe capital to Yellowknife. This process began in earnest 18 September 1967 when the 
staff and families of the Government of the Nonhwest Territories, totaling 75 people, 
boarded a single plane in Ottawa bound for Yellowknife. 51 In order to address the 
growing needs of a modem, northern society, the federal government had steadily 
5~ven today this is somewhat bureaucratically confusing as even though the 
Govennent of the Nonhwest Territories exercises a considerable degree of autonomy and 
employs its own staff: it is still technically within the purview of the successor ofNonhem 
Affairs and National Resources, the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. 
5~ 0. Dickerson, Whose North? Political Change, Political Development, 
anJ Se/j-Govenune111 i11tlle Northwest Territories (Vancouver: University ofBritish 
Columbia, 1992), 89. 
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increased the number of civil servants in the North in the post-war period. As early as 
1963 the number of people employed in the civil service in Yellowknife was already 
greater than those employed by the mines. 59 With government located in the North after 
1967, with expanding responsibilities and services, the territorial staff grew exponentially. 
By 1970 the Government ofthe Northwest Territories employed 1,285 people.60 The vast 
majority of these employees were members of the Nonhwest Territories Public Service 
Association. It is this unio~ particularly its internal dynamics, which is the subject of the 
following chapters. 
Chapter one of this thesis outlines briefly the emergence of the NWTPSA from its 
initial organizing efforts to the signing of its first collective agreement in 1970. The 
themes explored include factors playing upon the new organization both as a public sector 
and a northern union. These factors include the elitism of the teachers' organization which 
acted to keep the "professionals" apart from the rest of the territorial union, the role 
played by the Commissioner ofNorthwest Territories in facilitating the fonnation of the 
unio~ and the factors which led northern civil servants to organize. Vital to this proc:ess 
was the interaction of nonhem workers with the staff and leadership of the Alliance. 
Chapter two concentrates on the 1970s, documenting the exponential growth of 
the northern civil service and its conflict ridden relationship with the employer subsequent 
"Bourne, "Yellowknife," 54-55, 87. 
~acks, Devolution. 27. 
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to the expiry of its first collective agreement. Of particular concern is the inability of the 
union to retain either elected leaden or stafF. Especially in the period prior to 1977, 
presidents, vice-president~ and regional vice-presidents [R VPs] carne and went with 
dizzying regularity. It was only by establishing the president's position as fuJI-time in 
1978 that the top leadership position gained a degree of stability. Maintaining a small staff 
throughout this period, the top staff position. that of executive secretary treasurer was 
filled and refilled continually as one by one every incumbent was tired by the executive. It 
was only near the end of the decade with the unionizing of the staff and the hiring of a 
professional from outside of the Nonhwest Territories that the regular turnover in this 
position ended. Also examined is the NWTPSA' s relations with other labour 
organizations during that time, particularly the union's role in laying the groundwork for a 
Nonhwest Territories Federation ofLabour, and its early attempts to disaffiliate from 
PSAC. 
Chapter three looks at the 1980s. For the NWTPSAIUNW this period represents 
a golden age. Although volunteer vice-presidents and regional vice-presidents continued 
to tum over regularly, the presidency remained stable. Representing an ever-growing 
government workforce, with the assistance of the PSAC, the NWTPSA began to represent 
other workers. Largely organized by the professional staff' of both organizations, this 
growing proportion of non-government employees, increasingly aboriginal, enjoyed and 
sometimes exercised the right to strike. This fundamental change in the character of the 
organization led directly to the 1987 change of name to the Union ofNonhem Worken. 
This period also saw the union rise and fall in prestige within the Northwest Territories 
Federation ofL1bour. 
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Chapter four, the final chapter of this thesis, shows the increasing isolation and 
division ofthe Union ofNonhem Workers during the 1990s. Growing animosity towards 
both the Northwest Territories Federation of Labour and the Alliance was coupled with 
increasing internal divisions, caused by the continuing professionalization of the union's 
executive. In 1990, in an unpopular decision, the union established regional vice-
presidents as full-time officers, assigning to them in addition to their historic political 
functio~ responsibilities previously performed by professional staff. Subsequently, the 
first vice-president was added to the union's pay roll contrary to the decision of the 1993 
convention. Coinciding with this was the president's decision to allow three executive 
officers to retain their positions (and salaries) within the union despite having ceased to be 
members of UNW bargaining units. When these officers were dismissed following the 
intervention of the Alliance's National Board ofDirectors, there followed shonly the 
resignations of three more executive officers, including the president, at a time when the 
union was most in need of leadership. 
For the first time ever, government workers were in a possible strike situation due 
to recent legislative changes. When the government's final offer, designed to split the 
union east and west was successfUl, events were set in motion that quickly saw the tearing 
apart of the union. Had there been experienced leadership in place, committed to the 
fundamental ideal of trade unionism - solidarity - a secessionist movement would not have 
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been provided such fertile conditions in which to take root. The bifurcation of the Union 
ofNonhem Workers resulted ftom a crisis of leadership caused by an historic trend in 
which professional union staff were displaced by the creation of a union elite which no 
longer served its members. 
CHAPTER I 
The Origins of the Northwest Territories Public Sen-ice Association 
The emergence of a civil service union in the Northwest Territories in the late 
1960s parallels the emergence of the territorial civil service. Just as power devolved from 
the federal government to the embryonic Government of the Northwest Territories in 
1967, so too, union representation of northern civil servants shifted from Ottawa to 
Yellowknife. This transition was made possible by three factors: the pre-existence of civil 
servants' organizations in the Nort~ the efforts of northern workers in organizing their 
own union, and the munificence of the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories. The 
relationship established in the late 1960s between the Public Service Alliance of Canada 
and territorial employees provided the foundation upon which the majority of northern 
workers' quality oflife depends today. The birth of the Northwest Territories Public 
Service Association in 1969, and its affiliation with the Public Service Alliance of Canada 
the foUowing year, resulted from the interaction oftenitorial workers in their endeavours 
to organize a union, and the efforts of the staff and leadership of the PSAC to retain their 
membership in the North. The result of these converging forces was a uniquely northern 
union. The territorial government quickly indicated to its employees, by its maltreatment, 
that there was a need for a territorial public servants' union. As more positions continued 
to move from one government to the other, this need increased. Significandy, devolving 
employees did not fight to keep their PSAC membership. The Alliance attempted to retain 
its jurisdiction over these workers, but was unsuccessful. Rather, correctional officers, 
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members of a small group of employees who were already employed by the Government 
of the Northwest Territories prior to the report of the Carrothers Commission, initiated 
early organizing efforts. When approached for support in these efForts, the PSAC 
responded with immediate and sustained assistance. The Commissioner of the Northwest 
Territories, essentially a benevolent autocrat with a favourable predisposition towards 
organized labour helped facilitate efforts by not only not opposing unionization efforts, but 
also by using his political power to recognize the union both officially and unofficially. The 
importance of the Commissioner's role is seen most clearly when compared to his 
counterpart in the Yukon who actively resisted the organization of the territory's civil 
servants. Territorial teachers are also looked at as they provide the antithesis to the 
NWTPSA. The teachers severed their ties to the PSAC soon after devolving to territorial 
jurisdiction. Like their colleagues in the Sout~ they remained outside of the larger 
Canadian labour movement. After securing collective bargaining rights the Northwest 
Territories Public Service Association was granted component status within the Alliance. 
As a part of the PSAC, territorial workers were unique in that not only were they the only 
component that did not represent federal employees, but also the only civil service union 
among the provinces and territories with the backing of a national union. The chapter 
concludes with the successful negotiation of a first collective agreement, negotiated jointly 
by the NWTPSA and the PSAC. 
Employment patterns in the Nonh were rapidly changing in the 1960s. As noted 
earlier, by 1963 federal civil servants outnumbered miners in Yellowknife. In the wake of 
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the Carrothers Report, many of these government positions were in the process of being 
devolved to the Government of the Northwest Territories. Incumbents of these positions 
were given a choice of three options: stay in their position and accept their new employer, 
possibly at reduced wages and benefits; transfer to another federal position elsewhere in 
Canada and the possibility of demotion; or resign. Although no numbers are available as to 
how many employees chose each option, many chose to remain in their positions and take 
their chances with the new employer. To fill new positions, as well as those being left 
vacant by those who chose to leave the North at this time, hiring was done by the 
Government of the Northwest Territories in southern centers. 1 
New hires ofthe territorial government were not members of a union. However, 
those federal employees who were slated for devolution, 2 but still employed by the federal 
government, were, by virtue of that employment, members of the PSAC, which had only 
recently acquired collective bargaining rights with the passage of the Public Service Staff 
Relations Act in 1967. The passage of the act established the Alliance as the second 
11nterview with Harold Franklin, Item 0194A, "The Formation of the NWTPSA," 
Union ofNorthem Workers CoUection, Northwest Territories Archives. There are two 
audio cassette recordings of Franklin, the second one accessioned as item 01958. Both 
are hereinafter referred to as Franklin interview A and B. Neither are dated, but the first 
one is marked 1987 and is more an oral memoir as Franklin is the only person on the 
recording. The second cassette is an actual interview, though the identity of the 
interviewer is unknown. Both recordings contain a wealth of information on the early life 
of the union. 
2The term transfer is not used here as employees were not transferring, but rather 
taking on new employment. 
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certified union in the Nonhwest Territories foUowing Mine Mill. 
By the time the capital was moved to Yellowknife, the PSAC was well established 
in the North. Nils Orvik and Gary Vanderhaden., in their study of interest groups in the 
North, reported the Alliance's combined membership for the Yukon and Northwest 
Territories in 1967 at 3,500.3 The Alliance's National Component• and the Depanment of 
Finance Component both had functioning locals in the NWT. John Scott, president of the 
National Component and member of the PSAC National Board of Directors, was a 
resident ofHay River.' With the devolution of many of these positions from the federal 
government, about 2,000 individuals entered employment with the two territorial 
governments.' Significandy, once territorial workers began to organize and receive active 
30rvik and Vanderhaden, Interest, 54. 
4Unlike most of the Alliance's components which were generally established 
according to government depanment, the National Component is more of a '6catch all" 
component for employees not falling within the jurisdiction of the other components. For 
example, the Northwest Territories Teachers' Association and the Yukon Territory Public 
Service Association held local status within the National Component at different times. 
'lAbour Organizations in Canada, 1967,23-28. As is typical of this publication 
at the time, National Component locals of the NWT and Yukon are grouped together for a 
total of four. The Finance Component on the other hand specified one local in the NWT. 
'Orvik and Vanderhaden, Interest, 54. Unfortunately Labour OrganizatiotlS in 
Canada lists the membership numbers for the PSAC at this time by component rather than 
province or territory. These numbers are either inflated or the majority of these employees 
were in the Yukon as the Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Northwest 
Territories, 1969, 25, indicates that the Government of the Northwest Territories had 356 
employees as of 31 March 1969. Orvik and Vanderhaden attribute their numbers to an 
interview they conducted with "NWTPSA President Charlie Parks." Parks was the PSAC 
Regional Representative and NWTPSA Executive Secretary Treasurer; he was never 
president. According to an interview with NWTPSA past president Peter Dyck on 11 
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assistance from the Alliance, that support did not come &om its officers and members in 
the North, but rather from professional staff brought up from the South. 
No sooner was the PSAC on the ground in the North, however, than it began to 
diminish in size. As employees moved from federal to territorial employment they lost 
their status as members of federal bargaining units and therefore their status as union 
members. As there was no bargaining relationship between the Government of the 
Northwest Territories and the Alliance, no dues were deducted from these employees. 
Given the intention of the federal government, following the recommendations of the 
Carrothers Commission, to continue to devolve more positions to the territories, the 
development of an ever expanding territorial government had the inadvertent affect of 
removing from northern workers their only recently acquired right to union representation. 
To prevent further losses, the Alliance would have to come to terms with the government. 
Late in 1967, PSAC Vice-President T. F. Gough contacted Commissioner 
Hodgson, claiming government employees as members of the PSAC and requesting 
automatic dues check-off- the practice of the employer automatically deducting union 
dues from the employee's earnings and forwarding them on to the union.7 Responding to 
him in a letter dated 14 December 1967, Hodgson denied the request, stating: 
August 1999, Parks resigned his position after being reprimanded for spending too much 
ofhis office hours at the neighbourhood bar. These numbers should be considered 
accordingly . 
., Although Gough's original request for check-offwas not in the UNW Collection, 
Hodgson's subsequent response cited, was. 
I am, of course, most anxious that employees of the Government of the 
Northwest Territories receive every advantage possible from employee 
organizations. I mu~ however, deal with the organization representing the 
majority of our employees and until such a time as there is an indication 
that there is actually a staff organization, I will defer the granting of check-
off facilities for organization dues. 1 
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Hodgson was politically astute to deny the request for two reasons. First, he was asserting 
the sovereignty of the Government of the Northwest Territories. The PSAC's request for 
automatic check-off of government employees indicated indirectly that the union did not 
recognize the territorial government as sovereign. but rather as another department of the 
federal bureaucracy. The Alliance had been formed to represent federal workers, which 
Hodgson clearly indicated through his refusal for check-off they were not. Second, 
Hodgson was undoubtedly aware by that time that certain employees of the government 
were actively involved in organizing their own union and its relationship with the PSAC 
was unclear. 
The absence of participation of northern workers in the PSAC's early attempts to 
represent them is significant. In considering territorial employees still to be federal civil 
servants. no effort had been made to organize a specifically northern employee 
organization, indicating that although the Alliance quickly demonstrated a willingness to 
continue to represent northern workers, no efforts were made to organize these workers 
as either a distinct local or component. Early etTons by the Alliance to reclaim their 
'Letter, 14 December 1967 ftom S.M. Hodgson, Commissioner of the Northwest 
Territories, to T.F. Gous' Vtce.President, Organization, ~fembership Education, Public 
Relations, and Research, Public Service Alliance of Canada. Box/file 23-2, UNW. 
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dwindling northern membership were missing a vital characteristic: the participation of 
northern workers. 
Hodgson's letter to Gough confirmed that employees moving from federal to 
territorial employment would lose the union protection they had only recently achieved. 
In a 1986 article, the Northwest Territories Public Service Association's Assistant 
Executive Secretary Treasurer Renee Jones inaccurately wrote in the union newspaper, 
Sulijuq, 9 that the union was formed in 1968 by federal government employees 
"transferring" to the territorial government which had just moved north from Ottawa. 
"Many of the~" wrote Jones, ·~ere concerned that they would lose their PSAC union 
representation. "10 Wbi)e the JOSS Of representatiOn must certainly have been 3 factor in 
moving government employees to form a unio~ a more tangible loss to them at the time 
was the Group Insurance rates that they enjoyed as members of the Alliance. 11 
Responsibility for initiating the formation of a civil service union for territorial employees, 
however, did not lie with devolving federal employees. Nor did the move towards 
'Inuktitut for truth. 
10J.enee Jones, "Assistant Executive Secretary Treasurer's Report: NWTPSA-
Past, Present, and Future," Sulijuq, Vol. S, No.8, December 1986, 12, Box 25 (outsize) 
Sulijuq, 1977-1989, UNW. The coUection contains the issues ofthis paper from its first 
publication in 1974 to the spring of 1993. Issues cited after that time were generously 
made available by the Union ofNorthem Workers at their headquaners in YeUowknife. 
11Letter, 11 June 1968 from Claude Edwards.. President, Public Service Alliance of 
Canada to S.M. Hodgso~ Commissioner of the Northwest Territories. Box/file 23-2, 
UNW. 
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organization begin in 1968 as Jones reported. but rather a year earlier. 12 
Territorial employees had their reasons for wanting a union. Some of these reasons 
were likely accentuated by Hfe in the North. Extremely cold. long, dark winters., isolation. 
the lack of amenities.. and a substantially higher cost of living were all factors unique to the 
North that must have added to employee unrest.13 But generally the reasons government 
employees desired a union were typical of any work place - the workers wanted better pay 
and improved treatment by the employer. In the case of Josie Gould, when asked about 
the circumstances surrounding her signing a union card, the reasons were far more 
personal than economic. It almost reduced to "I got a boss that was a bitch." It was not 
just the treatment that she received personally that got Gould involved with the union, but 
the treatment of others. In a 1999 interview she explained her reasons for getting involved 
12-Jbere is a certain degree of debate as to when the union began. One unsigned 
article. "UNW History: From Humble Beginnings," Sulijuq, Vol. 11, No.2, June 1992, 8-
11, Box/file 9-10, claims that the union began in 1969. From a purely legal perspective 
that is correct for that is when enabling legislation was passed by the GNWT recognizing 
the union. Both Jones' piece as well as another unsigned article, "25 Years ofLabour 
Peace," Sulijuq, Vol. 12, No. 3, Fall1993, (10-12) 10, assert the union was fonned in 
1968. However, former president Dann Crook, in a personal interview recorded 10 
August 1999, as weD as in an article he wrote, "UNW History - part 4 in a series: The 
Very Beginnings of the UNW;' Sulijuq, Vol. 12. No. 1, Spring 1993, 16, Box/file 9-12, 
states that organizing began in 1967. The most definitive account though is probably a 
letter to Sulijuq from Caroline G. Franklin-Dale, daughter of Harold Franklin. one of the 
key organizers of the union who passed away 25 June 1991. She takes exception to 
several statements made in the article "From Humble Beginnings... Caroline, who moved 
to Yellowknife with her family in 1967, insists that is the year her father and others began 
organizing the union. Sulijuq, Vol. 11, No.4, December 1992, 3-4, Box/file 9-10, UNW. 
13These factors take on greater significance in communities that are only accessible 
by air. 
with the union: 
I saw other things happening around and I wanted to take pan. And I took 
up the fight for one girl who I thought her boss was even worse than my 
boss. And it was very unfair. Every time she left his office she was in 
tears, and I thought "this will never do. Let's go get signed up and we'll 
see what we can do about it."14 
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Though Gould was not one of the initial organizers of the union, and did not actually sign 
a card until 1970, her sentiments were echoed by Orvik and V anderhaden, wtio stated that 
the government was not regarded as a good employer. 15 
Harold Franklin was one of the new employees recruited by the Government of the 
Northwest Territories in 1967. Hired in the South, he was accompanied by his family 
when he came from Chilliwack, BC, to Yellowknife to work at the new correctional 
institute. Along with Keith Mcinnes, he was a key activist in organizing territorial public 
servants. 16 As a direct hire, and not a devolving employee from the federal government, 
there was never any question about his membership in the PSAC. Ironically, he attributed 
the Alliance with some of the responsibility for creating the conditions in which nonhem 
workers felt the need for a union. Franklin complained about the uhaphazard" approach of 
14Gould interview. There is a cenain ambiguity to Gould's comments for later in 
the interview she makes clear a great fondness for former Deputy Commissioner John 
Parker, who, she stated would get rid of any manager who was mistreating employees. 
Franklin on the other hand remembered Parker as ua hard nut to crack". (Franklin 
interview A). Parker became Commissioner in 1979 when Hodgson retired. 
150rvik and Vanderhaden, Interest, SS-56. 
·~ranklin interview A. 
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the various PSAC components with regard to employee classification in the Nonh prior to 
devolution. The Alliance. Franklin claim• had forgotten about the northern members, 
not giving them the attention they deserved.17 As a result. when the territories took over 
responsibility for these positions, not only were there no classifications in place adequately 
to address the unique needs of a northern workforce, neither was there a union to 
represent concerns of such a nature to the new employer. 
The primary complaint that employees had with the government. again according 
to Franklin. was that they felt cheated. Prior to arriving in the North9 new hires were 
promised housing, wage packages, and a cost of living allowance. Once employees were 
on·site, however, they were, in Franklin's words, "thrown to the wind." For many 
employees there was no housing upon their arrival in the Nonh. Many had to stay in 
motels for up to two weeks, others had to live in the correctional institute where they 
worked.11 To make matters worse for the new hires, they had been ill-advised, if advised 
at all, about the high costs of northern living. Recalling his early career with the 
government years later, Harold Franklin espoused a sense of betrayal as to the treatment 
of southern hires: 
We didn't get what we was promised in the interview. I didn't, and many 
of them [new hires] didn't. We only got what we was promised- free 
housing and oil - free. gratis, for the first six months or a year. Well we 
found out we had to pay rent. And the oil - within a year we had to stan 
11Jbid 
11lbid 
buying our own oil ... Many people left at that time ... Hydro was 
tremendous ... We found we was paid about half of what we should have 
got. 
Employer-employee relations soured rapidly under such conditions. For employees 
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outside of Yellowknife, in the remote communities, these conditions were exacerbated by 
inadequate settlement allowances and exorbitant food costs. 19 Employees quickly 
established a distrust of the employer. 
In 1968 the PSAC was again active in the organizing of territorial employees. This 
time, however, it was supporting the efforts of northern workers active in unionizing the 
territorial civil service. In panial response to a request for assistance from Mcinnes and 
Franklin, the Alliance sent Alberta and Northwest Territories Regional Representative J. 
0. North to investigate conditions in Yellowknife. Reponing his observations of territorial 
employees in June, he told his superiors of the state of affairs prevailing: 
There is considerable unrest of the employees. Most feel that they are 
receiving less than when they worked uoutside." Turnover is terrific. In 
one section [Treasury] eight of the eleven employees have their 
resignations in for July. Wages and salaries are incorporated with northern 
allowance and isolation pay to form a composite salary. Accommodation is 
subsidized to some extent, but employees have to pay utilities. Most 
employees are of the opinion that their composite salary is not adequate 
enough to cover the extra cost of living in Yellowknife [estimated at 33 per 
cent more than Edmonton]. They have less dollars to save after all living 
costs are paid for and they feel that to work and to stay in the north [sic] 
there should be some cash incentive to compensate for living in less than 
1
'Franklin interview B. 
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approved modes of living similar to the outside. 20 
Both Franklin and North emphasized the high financial costs of living in the Northwest 
Territories, compounded by the sense of having been cheated by the employer. They also 
both stated that these factors led to a high turnover rate. 
High turnover, or transiency as it is sometimes referred to, is historic to labour in 
the North. However, in the case of civil servants, and in light of the poor treatment they 
received from the employer, the commonly negative characterization of southern workers 
in the North by writers such as Ken Coates must be considered. As one of the very few 
historians of Canada's north, Coates' work is replete with references to non-native 
southerners in the North as "transients,n whose "primary goal was to make money," and 
demonstrating "little commitment to the North."z1 While employee turnover among civil 
servants in the North was indeed high, it appears to be more the result of workers being 
taken advantage of and misled by the employer, rather than as a result of more mercenary 
motives as Coates states. Like the miners before them, many soon understandably left the 
North. That many chose to stay and organize a union is testament to the resiliency of 
these workers. 
~eport ofTrip to Yellowknife, 4 June 1968, from J.O. North, PSAC Regional 
Representative, Alberta and NWT, Box/tile 23-2, UNW. 
21For examples of this characterization see Ken Coates, Best Left as Indians: 
Native White Relations in the Yukon Temtory. 1840- 1973, (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's 
University, 1991), xxii, 246; also Coates, Camda"s, 13; and Coates and Powell, Modem, 
16. 
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It is difficult to determine the exact nature of the early organizing of government 
employees in 1967 and 1968, but there were certainly two separate forces at work 
organizing civil servants in the Northwest Territories. As already mentioned, the PSAC 
made an unsuccessful attempt to have dues deducted from them in late 1967. After that 
point, the Alliance played a more supporting role for those workers who took the initiative 
to organize. According to Harold Franklin, the initial push for a union came from 
correctional workers. 22 This is significant. as corrections was one of the few departments 
that the territorial government administered prior to the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Carrothers Report. A correctional facility was opened in 
Yellowknife in the fall of 1966 with the hiring done in Ottawa. The facility had difficulty 
keeping staff as the government was continuously recruiting employees well after the 
opening ofthejail, indicating a level of frustration with the employer.23 As territorial 
employees, these workers were part of a small group within the burgeoning community of 
civil servants in Yellowknife whose positions had never been represented by the PSAC. 
Franklin, who had previous union experience in the South, arrived in February 1967. at a 
time when many of the initial hires for the jail had begun to leave. Not surprisingly, when 
22franklin interview B. 
~ehabilitation Stressed at Jail Opening." News, I 5 September 1966, 1. A full 
page add for corrections officers for the Yellowknife facility appeared in this same 
publication ( 25 August 1966, 1 0) offering ''very attractive salaries, relocation expenses, 
superannuation, Group Surgicai-Medi~ Annual Sick Leave, Added Special Benefits." 
The same ad appeared in the next issue and variations of it continued to appear 
throughout the next year. 
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organizing did begin, it was in Franklin's words, "the correctional staff that got the ball 
rolling." They quickly realized that they would have to organize other government 
workers as well, and found a lot of support among federal employees moving into 
territorial positions. 2• 
There is no reason to believe that correctional workers were more predisposed 
towards unionization than other government employees. While the territorial civil service 
did not really begin to dramatically increase in size until the transfer of the capital to 
Yellowknife in 1967, correctional workers had been on the ground and dealing with the 
employer for a full year before most other employees devolved from the federal 
government. Thus they had been dealing with the territorial government as an employer 
longer than others, and had more time to organize. Added to this was the reality that while 
most other workers were scattered throughout various offices, mostly in Yellowknife and 
Fort Smith, correctional workers were concentrated at the correctional facility and the 
correctional camp, both in Yellowknife. 
Organizing began in earnest when Franklin began to work with Keith Mcinnes, 
another former union activist. 25 Mcinnes had recently moved to Yellowknife from the 
department of local government in Fort Smith.26 "We both realized it was necessary to 
24Franklin interview B. 
lSfranklin interview A. 
~er, Franklin-Dale. Also Franklin inten.iew A. It is not clear which 
department Mcinnes worked in once he moved to Yellowknife. 
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have a union," Franklin recalled. Together the two of them began a program of research, 
finding out about the issues facing territorial workers across the North: 
We got together weekends and every night to wee hours of the momin& 
studying contracts, proposals; trying to find out the cost of living in other 
parts of the territories, talking to people in the street, talking to people by 
the phone, even paying it out of our own pockets making these calls, 
getting information. It was very hard getting the feedback ftom a lot of 
these places ... Fort Smith, Inuvik, Frobisher Bay ... . 21 
Although it is unclear as to exactly when the process of card signing began, 21 Franklin and 
Mcinnes must have early realized the daunting task that lay ahead of them in organizing a 
small civil service that stretched over the largest and most inaccessible reaches of Canada. 
Significantly, MciMes and Franklin soon made contact with the PSAC, 
presumably for assistance in exchange for future affiliation: 
We contacted Claude Edwards in Ottawa [at] the Public Service Alliance 
of Canada and told him what we had done and he said yes, before we could 
go anywhere we would have to get fifty per cent plus one [of government 
employees to sign union cards] ... before the Commissioner would even 
talk to us. 29 
Judging from Edwards' emphatic response regarding "fifty per cent plus one, n it is 
probable that Franklin's and Mcinnes's contact with Edwards took place after 
Commissioner Hodgson's 14 December 1967 refusal to grant check-otT to the PSAC for 
21Franklin interview A. Like many communities in the North, Frobisher Bay has 
since taken on an aboriginal name; it is now called lqaluit. 
liMuch of the early history of the NWTPSA relies on the two Franklin interviews. 
As is common with such materials, there is very rarely mention made of specific dates. 
Ztfranklin interview A. 
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territorial employees. 
Edwards offered more than just advice. He sent the two organizers $200 to help 
defray the costs of out-of-pocket expenses such as long distance calls, postage and such.30 
Later, J.O. North, was sent to Yellowknife to make his report on the conditions of 
government employees and to assist in their organization. In his report, North informed 
the Alliance's leadership that he had held three meetings with "employees and/or 
committees" in addition to visiting with run-of-the-mill employees. Discussions were held 
with an impromptu steering committee and a "general meeting" was held which elected an 
executive consisting of Mr. B. Komichuk as president, Mr. DeGrandment as first vice-
president, Mr. C. Elliot, second vice-president, Miss D. Kluke, secretary, and Mr. Sparks 
as treasurer. 11 It is curious that neither Mcinnes nor Franklin, as key organizers, were on 
the original executive. In fact, of the original five executive members, the only one that 
Franklin recalled was the president, Brian Komichuk, who left the North soon afterwards. 
Those who Franldin remembered as being active in organizing government workers were 
Saul Deitch of the purchasing depanment, and Stanley Mercredi, who Franklin recalled as 
"a great help to us." Mercredi came up with the idea ofraftling off bottles of liquor at the 
weekly meetings in order to help out with postal expenses. In addition, Marge Porter, 
lOfranklin interview A. Also "It Was 20 Years Ago Today," Update, Vol. 2, No. 
I, 6 January 1989, Box/file 9-3, UNW. While Sulijuq usually published on a quanerly 
basis, Update was usually a one sheet newsletter which was issued more regularly. 
11North, Trip Report. 
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ftom the department of education acted as secretary for the budding union.32 
The Alliance immediately pursued recognition from the employer. A week after 
North filed his report, Claude Edwards wrote to Commissioner Stuart Hodgson 
requesting that9 when the Northwest Territories Council convened 26 April 1968, it 
formally recognize the Northwest Territories Government Employees' Associatio~ initiate 
dues check-off, and enact territorial legislation similar to the PSSRA.33 Hodgson's official 
response was non-committal, stating that as there was no territorial labour law on the 
books, he was unclear as to how to proceed with the request and was therefore referring 
the matter to the Deputy Attorney General of Canada. J.a 
While Edwards lobbied the Commissioner, Franklin and his comrades worked on 
getting cards signed. Given that the organizing drive was based out of Yellowknife, and 
many prospective members were spread across the North in centres such as Inuvi~ 
Churchill,35 Cambridge Bay, and Frobisher Bay, acquiring 50 per cent plus one was a 
difficult task. High rates of transiency among government workers, however, made it 
almost impossible. Workers would sign cards and soon afterwards move on. Franklin 
recalled the union having to go back to the same communities five or six times for this 
32f'ranklin interview, A. 
nLetter, Edwards to Hodgson, II June 1968. 
J.aLetter, 4 July 1968, S.M. Hodgso~ Commissioner of the Northwest Territories9 
to C.A. Edward~ President9 Public Service Alliance of Canada. Box/file 23-29 UNW. 
35 Although Churchill is in Manitob~ it was the regional service centre for the 
Keewatin region well into the 1970s. 
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reason. "It was an ongoing thing," he remembered.16 It was largely through the good 
graces of the Commissioner that this hurdle was overcome. 
In the late 1960s a territorial commissioner held very real power and exercised it 
daily. When Edwards originally informed Franklin and MciMes that u50 per cent plus 
one" of government employees would first have to sign cards in order for the union to be 
recognized, he did so based on his own previous communications with Hodgson, whose 
own interpretation of established labour practice at the time was quite liberal. The more 
common practice at the time was that after SO per cent plus one had signed cards, a 
certification vote would be held. Hodgson was offering automatic certification based on 
this criterion. Compared to his counterpart in the Yukon, Hodgson was generous. 
It is worthwhile briefly explaining the process which Yukon civil servants went 
through to secure collective bargaining rights in order to show not only what a key role 
the commissioner chose to play, but also to appreciate fully the depth of Hodgson's 
generosity towards the emerging northern union. The Yukon Territory Public Service 
Association was more similar to federal and provincial civil service unions in its 
development than it was to its emerging counterpart in the Northwest Territories. By 
1965 it was a loose-knit staff association affiliated with the Civil Service Federation with a 
fluctuating membership and without collective bargaining rights. 37 Two civil servants, Kurt 
16Franklin interview A. 
31/bid, 54-55. See also Civil Service Review from this time which lists the YTPSA 
as an affiliate of the CSF until its merger with the CSA in 1966. 
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Koken and Ken Kroeker, attempted to organize the YTPSA into a union and presented a 
position paper to the Yukon Commissioner who rejected it. Next, a senior civil servant 
prepared a highly statistical paper outlining the need for a union within the civil service 
which the Commissioner also rejected. Kroeker and Koken then launched an enrollment 
drive and presented a membership list to the Commissioner who rejected it. Their labours 
were finally successful on their fourth attempt, despite having only 3 5 per cent of the 
Yukon Government employees signed. This su~s is attributed to the two organizers 
having contacted the Public Service Alliance. It is believed that Claude Edwards put 
pressure on the minister responsible for the Department ofNonhem Affairs and National 
Resources who in tum pressured the Commissioner. Not surprisingly, the Commissioner 
carried out the wishes of his immediate superior and enacted enabling legislation granting 
bargaining rights to the YTPSA which affiliated with the PSAC as a local of the National 
Component.31 That the Commissioner, was able singlehandedly to block the first three 
organizing attempts of Yukon public servants shows the full, arbitrary political power of a 
territorial commissioner. That it was only with pressure from the federal ministerial level 
that bargaining rights were granted not only shows the suppon that Yukon government 
employees enjoyed from the federal government, but also the effectiveness ofEdwards as 
a back room negotiator. Compared to the Yukon public servants, Nonhwest Territories 
employees certainly had a mend in Commissioner Stuart Hodgson. 
310rvik and Vanderhaden, Interest, 54-55. 
so 
In many ways, Hodgson could be expected to be a friend of labour in the North. 
Mustering out of the navy in 1945, Hodgson resumed his career as a lo88er. Almost 
immediately he became active in the International Woodworkers of America in 
Vancouver. Quoted in News of the North on the occasion of the tenth anniversacy of his 
appointment as Commissioner, he described his early days with the IW A: "I joined local 
217, the bi88est local in the Pacific Northwest forest industry on a Monday ... On a 
Wednesday I became a shop steward, on Friday, a plant committee member, and on 
Sunday, chairman of Local 217. "39 In the spring of 1949 Hodgson was elected financial 
secretary for the local and held that position for the next 16 years. During this time he 
spent six years on the CCL' s executive committee40 and was a delegate to the 
International Labour Organization in Geneva.41 In 1964 the minister responsible for 
Northern Affairs and National Resources, Arthur Laing, appointed him to the Northwest 
Territories Council to represent labour, and the following year Hodgson became Deputy 
39Craig Mcinnes, <&Hodgson Completes 10 Years in the North: A Remarkable Man 
in a Difficult Job," News, 7 September 1977, 33. See also ·~rve Got the Best Job in 
Canada," Canadian Magazine, 6 January 1973, 20; Robert Tyre, "Stuart Milton Hodgson: 
Commissioner ofthe Northwest Territories," Trade and Commerce, November 1973, 25; 
"Common Sense Was Goal for Retiring N.W.T. Commissioner," Ottawa Citizen, 14 April 
1979, 64; Stuart Lake, uEx-Labour Leader: Hodgson Appointed NWT Cornrnissioner," 
Ottawa Journal, 3 March 1967, 25; and "Good Luck Sir, Despite Mr. Laing,'' Edmo11ton 
Journal, 3 March 1967, np. All ofthe above pieces have been assembled into a clipping 
file under the title "Stuan Hodgson" at the NWT Archives. 
40/bid 
41Hamilton, Arctic, 104. 
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Commissioner. With the resignation of Commissioner Ben Sivertz early in 1967, Hodgson 
moved up to the top territorial position. 42 Thus, when Franklin described Hodgson as ••an 
old union man," he was not exaggerating. 43 
Franklin, in fact, remembered Hodgson as being supportive of a union for 
territorial workers - all of them: 
The Commissioner made clear that he would like to see a union formed to 
take in everybody in the public service, including the teachers. In the 
·~clnne~ "Hodgson Completes," 33 and Hamilton, Arctic, 104. 
43Franklin interview A. Hodgson's appointment to the territorial council in 1964 
to represent labour raises serious questions about labour in the North. Prior to 1960, the 
appointed positions on the council were held by civil servants. The decision to open up 
these positions as political appointees outside the civil service effectively made them 
patronage positions. (See Hamilton, Arctic, 104.) One question that must be asked is 
what had Hodgson, as a labour leader, done to endear himself to a Liberal government to 
garner such a position? The other question that is asked here is what was expected of 
Hodgson in his capacity as a ''representative of labour"? The answers to both of these 
questions relate to Hodgson's involvement with the IW A. Irving Abella has described the 
BC labour movement prior to I 948 as "almost the personal fiefdom of the Communist 
Party," with the IW A figuring prominently in its leadership. Abella, as well as Jerry 
Lembcke and William Tauam., describe the vicious battle for control of the IW A in BC 
between the Communist controlled left and a right wing "White Bloc." The CIO, and 
their Canadian affiliate the CCL, in conjunction with "the resourceful combination of 
corporate and state power'' led to the eradication of the Communist Party ftom the IW A 
by 1949,[see Abella, Nationalism, I 11, 113, 127, 138; and Jerry Lembcke and William M. 
Tauam, One Union in Wood: A Political History of the International Woodworkers of 
America. (New York: International. 1984) viii, 81, 113, 133.) the year Hodgson was 
elected financial secretary to the largest local (and not coincidentally the year Mine Mill 
was expelled ftom the CCL). What role, if any, did Hodgson play in the anti-communist 
fight for the BC section of the lW A and the BC labour movement in general? Funher, 
appointed in 1964 to represent labour on the NWT Council, there was only one union in 
the NWT at the time and that was Mine Mill, a union with a long history of involvement 
with the Communist Party. The question that begs to be asked is was there an anti-
communist agenda at work in the appointment ofHodgson to the NWT Council in 1964? 
meantime, the teachers, they was [sic] with us and then all of a sudden they 
fell out; they didn't want no pan of us because they felt, to put it bluntly, 
that they was better than what the rest of us was ... It wasn't the teachers; it 
was the executive that was formed. 44 
As Franklin observed, unlike the rest of the territorial employees, who essentially had to 
build their organization from the ground up, teachers in the Northwest Territories 
foUowed a more classic model of civil service union development. Different from most 
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other jurisdictions in Canada where their colleagues worked for semi-autonomous school 
boards, teachers in the NWT were employed by Northern Affairs and National Resources, 
and then by the Government of the Northwest Territories upon devolution in the late 
1960s. Teachers organized the Northwest Territories Teachers' Association in 1953 as an 
affiliate of the Civil Service Federation. Its leadership was historically dominated by 
principals and vice-principals, essentially lower management positions within the 
educational bureaucracy. The stated goals of the NWTT A were "1) to promote 
cooperation among members of teaching staff, 2) To improve the efficiency and welfare of 
our teachers; 3) To facilitate worthwhile solutions to the education problems of the 
Northwest Territories."45 As with other civil servants in the North, teachers began to 
show resentment towards their employer early in 1967 and by the fall of that year were 
44Fnnklin interview B. 
"'Norman John Macpherson, Dreams alld Visions: Education in the Northwest 
Temtories From Earliest Days to 1984, Roderick Duncan Macpherson, ed., 
(Yellowknife: Department ofEducation, Government of the Northwest Territories, 1991) 
18, 21-22, 78, 161, 192·193. 
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beginning to demonstrate a movement towards a more union-like organization.46 
Although northern teachers were members of the Alliance prior to the territorial 
government taking over responsibility for education, there is no indication that teachers 
wished to retain their membership in the organization once they changed employers. Nor 
is there any indication that the PSAC made any special etrons to keep them. In his history 
of education in the Nonhwest Territories, N.J. Macpherson, himself a former teacher as 
well as senior bureaucrat in the territorial depanment of education, described the 
government's 1969 passage of the NWTT A enabling legislation and subsequent bargaining 
in terms of independence from the PSAC, as if membership in the Alliance had somehow 
deprived teachers of their freedom .• , It might be argued that the resentment between the 
teachers' association and the Alliance stemmed from the teachers' organization predating 
the Alliance by over 20 years and perceiving it as an unwelcome intruder. But the same 
could be said of the original 14 components of the PSAC, which evolved from much older 
staff associations affiliated with the Civil Service Federation. There is no record of 
antagonism between any of these organizations and the Alliance. It could also be argued 
that the teachers' sense of exceptionalism was based on geography, as the components of 
the PSAC were based on government depanment rather than geographic locality. This 
argument does not hold either as the NWTT A distanced itself from other government 
4617eachers Unhappy," News, 30 March 1967, 1; and "Teachers Form a Local," 
News. 19 October 1967, 1. 
•'Macpherson, Dreams, 192-193. 
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workers in the Northwest Territories. Most likely it was a matter of the professional 
elitism that Franklin referred to, combined with a leadership heavy with management, and 
a perception of themselves as a better educated elite, that kept teachers isolated from 
other northern workers, a phenomenon that continues to this day. With the decision of the 
NWTf A to go it alone, Hodgson was forced to deal with both organizations. 
The NWTf A continued to retain its "professional" staff association character. 
Assisting the government in an 18 month investigation of education in the North in the 
early 1970s, the official message to their membership was "get on the bandwagon or get 
on the bus, "41 meaning that if their members were not in support of the government's new 
policies, their association suggested they find new jobs. As late as 1977, Orvik and 
V anderhaden stated that the main priority of the teachers' association was professional 
development. 49 Owing to its existence as an organization when devolution began, the 
teachers were able to secure enabling legislation and their first contract only slightly ahead 
of the NWTPSA. 50 It can only be speculated though, as to how much the teachers 
benefitted in these regards in terms of••spin-ofl" ftom the efforts of the organizers of the 
NWTPSA and their supporters in the Alliance. 
41/bid, 21-22. 
490rvik and Vanderhaden, Interest, 64-65. 
50Annua/ Report, 1969, 10; also 1970, 65. 
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As the teachers consolidated their own position, the nascent civil service union 
continued its efforts for recognition. After a meeting with Claude Edwards in 
Yellowknife, largely to address the problems posed to organizing by the inordinately high 
rates of transiency, Hodgson agreed to recognize the civil servants' union even though 
only 20 to 25 per cent of government employees had signed cards. 51 This recognition was 
unofficial, however, as certain legal requirements needed to be met. 
First, there had to be an official organization in existence. The organization and its 
exec:utive that J.O. North had left in place when he departed for Edmonton in the spring of 
1968 had no legal status. In order for Hodgson to recognize the union officially, a 
founding convention had to take place. Accordingly, on 6 January 1969, about a dozen 
people, delegates and observers combined, gathered at the old Legion hall in Yellowknife 
for the founding convention of the Northwest Territories Government Employees' 
Association. Harold Franklin descnbed the event:" ... it was more or less [take] the bull 
by the horns and appoint each other to act as what and who ... trying to get anyone to take 
an active part in union affairs was just about impossible to achieve." Nonetheless, by the 
end of the meeting a structure had been adopted and an executive elected. Keith Mcinnes 
was elected president with Fnnklin as vice-president. Saul Deitch was elec:ted second 
vice-president and Marge Potter secretary-treasurer. Yellowknife was chosen as 
headquarters for the union and also as one of the regions in the organization t s federal 
51Franklin interview A. 
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structure. The regional structure of the union mirrored that of the territorial government. 
The other regions included Fort Smith, which ranged from the lower Mackenzie Valley, 
taking in the entire Great Slave Lake area with the exception of Yellowknife, and 
extending to Cambridge Bay in the central Arctic. 52 The Inuvik Region included the 
northern Mackenzie Valley, as weD as the Delta and Beaufort Sea communities. The 
Churchill and Frobisher Bay Regions took in the Keewatin and Baffin areas respectively. 
Each region was to be represented by a regional vice-president (R VP), though at this early 
stage only the Fort Smith Region had elected one- James Washee of the community of 
Rae. 53 
With the organization in place, a legal framework next needed to be established to 
allow for autonomous bargaining agents within the public service. This followed in two 
stages. In early 1969, the 39* session of the Northwest Territories Council passed 
'ZCambridge Bay was later added as a sixth region taking in the central Arctic area. 
'
1Franklin interview A. The presence ofWashee on this early executive is 
significant. Later that year Washee would be the founding president of the Indian 
Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories which later changed its name to the Dene 
Nation and rose to national prominence during the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline inquiry in 
the mid 1970s. Washee quickly disappeared from the union and he must not have 
considered his participation in it very important. In an in-depth biographical interview in 
the Native Press in 1971 he makes no mention of his involvement with the union. Neither 
is any mention made of it in Sarah Pocklington' s study of the Dene Nation, nor in the 
Dene Nation's own official history. See "Interview: James Washee," Native Press, 23 
May 1971, 3; Sarah Lynne Pocklington, '1lene Leadership Styles," MA Thesis, Trent 
University, 1993; and Dene Nation, Denendeh: A Dene Celebration, (Yellowknife: Dene 
Nation, 1984). Nor is any mention made ofWashee's short lived involvement in the 
labour movement in the voluminous quantity of literature on the Mackenzie Valley 
Pipeline inquiry (see chapter two). 
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legislation amending the Public Service Ordinance to allow for collective bargaining. The 
bill passed through all three readings as weD as the committee stage virtually without any 
discussion. 54 Later that year, during the foUowing session, the Northwest Territories 
Public Service Employees' Association Ordinance was passed. The legislation itself did 
not recognize the government employees union per se, but rather established the legal 
framework for the NWTPSA to operate within as the exclusive bargaining agent for 
government employees other than teachers should it ever be recognized by the 
Commissioner. The bill empowered the Commissioner to recognize such an organization 
if in his opinion it met the criteria set out in the ordinance. Questions were raised at the 
committee stage regarding voluntary membership, the absence of the right to strike, and 
the Commissioner's arbitrary power to exclude persons he deemed as holding confidential 
or supervisory positions. Two members were quite vocal in their opposition to the bill as 
they saw a unionized public service as a threat to the operation of government. These 
same two members were allowed by the committee chair to digress into an unrelated 
attack on southern workers coming to the Northwest Territories, making a fast dollar, and 
leaving, all allegedly at the expense of the local community. Their perceptions of a 
possible civil service union as a group of outsiders taking advantage of vulnerable 
northerners is significant in that it expressed, perhaps, a common but often unarticulated 
view of civil servants in the North. Once the chair got the hearings back on track, the bill 
54~Vorthwest Territories Debates, 39* Session, Yellowknife, 1969, 18, 99, 558-559, 
Ill. 694. 
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was voted on clause by clause and proceeded to third reading without amendment, 
whereupon it was passed and given assent.'' FoUowing passage of the legislation, as per 
his prerogative, Hodgson quietly recognized the Northwest Territories Public Service 
Association as the bargaining agent for territorial employees other than teachers. Although 
they would remain without the right to strike until 1996, after two years of efforts, 
territorial employees at last had a union. 
In order to prepare for their first negotiations, the new union had to rely again on 
the Alliance for support. As membership dues had yet to start coming into the union 
treasury from the employer, the Alliance loaned the NWTPSA funds to cover expenses to 
get them through their first negotiations. 56 In addition, the PSAC sent two of their staff, 
Stu Scott and Warren Edmondson, to Yellowknife for two weeks to assist in putting 
bargaining proposals together. The major issues were classifications, job descriptions, and 
wages. 57 
As there was still no official relationship between the PSAC and the NWTPSA, it 
seems likely that was also pan of Scott and Edmondson's agenda. In a strictly legal sense, 
the relationship between the two was simply a case of one union helping another. On the 
"Debates, 40* Session, 1969, Baker Lake, 13, 16-17,24-41, &. 299; also Annual 
Report, 1969, 10-11; and Jones, uAssistant," 12. 
56Franklin interview A states the amount loaned to have been $2000. However, in 
interview 8 Franklin is not as definite, stating the amount was anywhere from $1000 to 
$5000. SeealsouTwentyY~" Update, 1. 
57Franklin interview A; also "Twenty Years," Update, 1. 
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weekend of 15·16 May, 1970, just two days prior to the start of negotiations, the first 
concrete steps were taken to remedy the situation. In accordance with the PSAC 
Constitution, the NWTPSA convened a special convention for the purposes of affiliating. 
Bylaws, in conformity with those of the Alliance and with a slightly revised regional 
structure were adopt~ a motion to seek component status was carried, and a new 
executive was elected, this time being sworn in by PSAC Vice· President Andrew Stewart. 
The table officers Mcinnes, Franklin and Deitch remained the same, Washee was gone, 
and a full complement of regional vice-presidents were elected which included Miss L. 
Williams, (Yellowknife), Edward Bird, (Mackenzie), Douglas Bailey, Onuvik), Mrs. 
Margaret Evans, (Keewatin), and David Swan, (Baffin). Upon the closing of the 
convention Mcinnes wrote to Claude Edwards informing him of the convention's results 
and formally requesting component status within the PSAC for the NWTPSA. He also 
expressed his thanks to the Alliance in general, and Edwards in particular for the 
assistance they had received to date: 
Without your personal etlbn with the Commissioner in obtaining the 
legislation which provides for collective bargaining we would not be able to 
write this letter today. Further, without the assistance of the staff of the 
Alliance we would not have been able to meet with management and 
commence collective bargaining on Wednesday next." 
Mcinnes' letter in effect recognized the consistent suppon that the Alliance had provided 
"Letter, Mcinnes to Edwards, 16 May 1970. Franklin also heaps praise upon 
Edwards and the PSAC for their assistance in getting the NWTPSA off the ground. See 
Franklin interview A. 
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for the territorial union since he and Franklin first began to organize. The provision of 
funding and influential lobbying, as well as professional staff to assist in research, 
organizing, and facilitating the development of the organization were all essential 
contributions the PSAC provided that were necessary for the union to be recognized. 
Edwards responded to Mcinnes' letter of 19 May 1970 granting component status, a mere 
three days after the close of the convention. 59 
Component status within the Alliance was a unique blessing for the NWTPSA. As 
a full partner, nonhem workers were able to draw upon resources and suppon outside of 
the territories. As the bargaining agent for territorial employees, it was the only 
component within the Alliance that did not represent federal employees. Unlike the 
Yukon Territory Public Service Association, which at the time was only organized as a 
local of the National Component, full component status gave the NWTPSA a seat on the 
Alliance's National Board of Directors. Also distinguishing the NWTPSA was that it was 
the only union in Canada representing civil servants [other than federal employees] to be 
affiliated with a larger labour body other than the Canadian Labour Congress. While 
provincial civil service unions would later form the National Union of Provincial 
Government Employees in 1976,60 in 1970 the Northwest Territories Public Service 
~tter, Edwards to Mcinnes, 19 May 1970, Box/file 23-2, UNW; also uA New 
Component," Civil Service Review, Vol. XLm, No.2, June 1970, 72. 
-rhe original provincial civil service unions to found NUPGE in 1976 were those 
representing the employees of the governments of Alberta, British Columbia, ~fanitoba, 
Newfoundland, Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island. Eventually all provincial 
61 
Association was the only union representing civil servants outside of the federal 
government to have the backing of a national union. Thus, with the exception of the 
teacherSy territorial employees became members of what would become the third largest 
union in Canada. For some, it was a recovery of membership that had been lost with the 
devolution of their positions to the Government of the Northwest Territories. For others, 
membership in the Public Service Alliance of Canada was entirely new. 
Bargaining for the first contract began with the government on 20 May 1970. 
Representing the employees were Mcinnes, Franklin and Deitch.61 Joining them at the 
table was Stu Scott of the Alliance. Negotiations lasted ten days and on 8 June 1970 the 
first collective agreement between the Government of the Northwest Territories and the 
Northwest Territories Public Service Association was signed. According to Franklin, its 
terms were very fair and the contract was commended by many unions in the South. 62 
Thu5y by the summer of 1970 employees ofthe Government of the Northwest 
Territories had made great strides for themselves since the Carrothers Commission made 
its repon three years earlier. Emerging at a time of increasing civil servant militancy 
across Canada, the Northwest Territories Public Service Association was the product of 
government civil service unions except in Quebec affiliated. As NUPGE expanded in later 
years to represent workers other than civil servants, it changed its name to National Union 
of Public and General Employees. (See Randall Litchfield, "New labor union formed: 
NUPGE," Financial Post, 22 May 1976, 78; and www. nupge.ca./components.html. 
61Franklin interview A. Also A~r~mal Report, 1970, 65. 
6lf"ranklin interview A. 
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factors sometimes typical of any_ workplace, and at other times unique to the Northwest 
Territories. The impetus in establishing the union was not a function of devolving federal 
responsibilities to the territorial government, but rather grew out of a perception among 
government workers that they had been deceived by the employer and were being unjustly 
treated. This, combined with the unique realities of life in the Nort~ led to a high 
turnover in staff, but also created the conditions in which a union movement could take 
root. Upon this foundation was added a rapidly expanding territorial work force as a 
result of devolution from the federal government. As these workers became territorial 
employees the Public Service Alliance of Canada attempted to retain them as members, 
but was unsuccessful. The PSAC's attempt was of a "top down," bureaucrat to bureaucrat 
nature and did not involve northern workers in the process. Once northern workers began 
to organize themselves, however, and requested the assistance of the Alliance, sustained 
support was immediately forthcoming. This support took the form ofboth monetary and 
professional assistance. Early in the process the PSAC sent in professional staff to help a 
developing volunteer leadership among northern civil servants. Working together, staff 
and leaders conducted researc~ met with workers, facilitated meetings, and organized a 
union. Later they would work together to negotiate a first collective agreement. At a 
critical point in the organizing process the top leadership of the Alliance met with the 
territorial commissioner to help ensure the passage of enabling legislation. With the 
recognition of the Northwest Territories Public Service Association, and its subsequent 
afliliation with the Public Service Alliance of Canada, a truly unique union, both in regards 
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to other Alliance components as well as other provincial and territorial civil service 
associations, was born. This was ultimately the result of cooperative efforts between the 
staff and leadership of the PSAC and an arising volunteer leadership of nonhero workers. 
CHAPTER2 
Government Espansion and Union Growth in the 1970s 
The 1970s represented a period of continuous growing pains for the Northwest 
Territories Public Service Association. The organization increased in membership as a 
result of the burgeoning state apparatus of the Northwest Territories. As the government 
hired an increasing number of aboriginal workers to fill these positions, many of them, 
particularly Inuit, became active trade unionists. Staffing needs, however, were such that 
the government found it n~ssary to continue recruiting large numbers of sou the~ non-
aboriginal people to fill these positions. Turnover rates, hence, remained high. This too 
was mirrored in the NWTPSA which experienced an extremely high turnover in both 
leadership and stati: creating a problem of having a perpetually inexperienced leadership 
and staff that only began to stabilize towards the end ofthe decade. From 1970 to 1979 
the NWTPSA was led by a total of five presidents and administered by five executive 
secretary treasurers. During this period, relations between the union and the employer 
steadily deteriorated from reasonably cordial early in the decade to the point in 1978 when 
both parties seemed perpetually locked in legal matters with each other. The government 
began using its legislative power to achieve goals it was not able to attain at the bargaining 
table. In response, the union used the courts to fight back. The 1970s was also a period 
of further internal development for the union, marked by the launching of a regularly 
publishing journal, and the establishment ofthe president,s position as full-time. The 
NWTPSA's constant turnover in executive secretary treasurers ended at the close of the 
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decade with the hiring of an experienced political activist from southern Canada. 
The NWTPSA's relationships with other unions remained ambivalent at best. 
Although the formation of a northern federation of labour was discussed throughout most 
of the 1970s, the priorities of unions in the North would prevent it from becoming a reality 
until the 1980s. While the PSAC continued to service its NWT component, relations 
between the two organizations deteriorated to such a point that three unsuccessful 
attempts were made to disaffiliate from the Alliance. 
The years from 1970 to 1973 can be characterized as something of a honeymoon 
period for the NWTPSA. Enjoying cordial relations with the employer, the PSAC, and 
other unions, 1 the northern component experienced tremendous growth during this period. 
With a membership in 1970 of only 500 in six locals2 spread out from Baffin Island to the 
Mackenzie Delta to the Alberta border, the NWTPSA was a small union with a very large 
jurisdiction. Even, as the territorial civil service and union membership continued to grow, 
total numbers remained small. Although the union doubled in size by 1974, it still had less 
1The ex~eption to this peace in the house of northern labour is the Northwest 
Territories Teachers' Association, who in 1972 attempted to raid classroom assistants 
from the membership of the NWTPSA The source of this infonnation is supplied in the 
background information of a 1975 article at which time the teachers' union launched its 
second raid on the civil servants. See 'W.W.T.T.A wants higher salaries for assistants," 
News of the North, 9 Aprill97S, 9; and "Classroom Assistants," News of the North, 16 
April197S, 15. 
2Labour Organizations in Canada, 1970. 
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than 1,000 members. 1 
The greatest challenges to servicing this relatively small membership in an 
expansive territory were internal, particularly with regards to retaining staff and 
leadership. As the union grew, it continued to experience problems with the retention of 
its executive secretary treasurer and its executive. Although the executive were all 
volunteers, the president received a small honorarium. 4 In the wake of the 1970 
convention, an office was rented in Yellowknife, and Walter Heeney of Pine Point was 
hired as executive secretary treasurer to service the membership on a full-time basis. It is 
not clear as to why, but at some point prior to March 1972 Heeney was let go because he 
"wasn't working out." By September he had been replaced by Wayne Peterson.s Although 
1Labour Orgallizations in Canada, 1974-75. 
4TIUs was decided at the founding convention in 1970 which was recorded, with 
the tapes being sent to the PSAC in Ottawa for transcription. The PSAC, however, lost 
these tapes and Harold Franklin had to later swear out an affidavit to this effect in order to 
collect his honorarium in 1973. A copy ofthis affidavit, dated 28 September 1973, is 
found in Box/file 4-16, UNW. 
5Franklin interview A. Heeney, coming ftom Pine Point, a company town of 
Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company which had changed its name to Cominco in 
the mid 1960s, likely gained his union experience with either the United Steelworkers, 
Mine Mill, or possibly both. Although Franklin does not use Heeney's name in the 
interview, referring only to him as a "staff person," he is listed as executive secretary 
treasurer for the NWTPSA in the PSAC's quanerly journal from March to December of 
1971, with the position being listed as vacant in March of 1972 and occupied by Wayne 
Peterson by the September issue. Franklin indicates, however, that Peterson assisted in the 
negotiations for the 1972 collective agreement and the collective agreement was signed in 
early May, (see Annual Report, 1972, 30) Peterson must have been on strength by late 
May at least. Nothing is known ofPeterson·s background. See "'Officers and Components 
ofthe PSAC," Civil Service Review, Vol. XLIV, No.I, March 1971, 70; No.2, June 
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Peterson proved helpful in the 1972 negotiations, he too was let go some time prior to 
September 1973.6 
The turnover in the executive in this early period was even more dramatic. In the 
fall of 1970 Franklin developed bean problems and was forced temporarily to discontinue 
union activity. The union's president, Keith Mcinnes, accepted a job offer in southern 
Canada less than a year after taking office. Further complicating matters, second vice-
president Saul Deitch, who became first vice-president when Franklin assumed the 
presidency, tendered his resignation, feeling that union activism was standing in the way of 
his being promoted. Of the original regional vice-presidents listed in the Civil Service 
Review in June of 1970, not a single one remained going into the convention of 1972.7 
Although the reasons for such a high turnover among the early executives were not stated, 
likely it was related to the high turnover of employees in the North in general at this time, 
compounded by the amount of time and aggravation that any volunteer union position 
brought with it. 
Relations with the employer at this time were generally positive. The 1972 
collective agreement negotiations illustrate this. Taking only a week to negotiate, the two 
1971, 54; No. 4, December 1971, 57; Vol. XLV, No. 1, March 1972, 64-68; and No. 3, 
September, 1972, 60-64. 
'Franklin interview A. Also "Officers," CS/t Vol. XL VL No. 3, September 1973, 
64-68. 
;Franklin interview A. Also "''New," CSR, Vol. XLill, No. 2, June 1970, 72, and 
uOfficers," Vol. XLV, No. 3, September 1972, 60-64. 
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year agreement was descnbed by both Franklin and the government as successful. 1 
Perhaps most important for the union was the inclusion of the Rand Formula into the 
collective agreement, 9 which was of great financial benefit to the union. Amicable 
relations were strengthened when the government offered the union empty seats on 
chartered planes to communities outside of Yellowknife free of charge in order to service 
its remote membership. 10 
Dealings with other unions in the early 1970s were also friendly as is indicated by 
the NWTPSA's second convention in September 1972. In addition to 20 delegates, 
Yellowknife Mayor and former Mine Mill organizer Fred Henne was in attendance as were 
representatives of the Canadian Labour Congress, the United Steelworkers of America, 
the Alberta Federation of Labour, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America, and the Civil Service Federation of Alberta. Also attending was Claude 
Edwards, president of the PSAC. 11 
1Franklin interview A:, also Annual Report, 1972, 30. 
~ranklin interview A. Named after Justice Ivan Rand who brokered the 1946 
settlement ofthe UAW strike at the Windsor, Ontario Ford plant, the formula stipulated 
that although an employee would not be forced to become a member of the unio~ the 
employer would deduct dues from all employees and forward them on to the union 
because all employees benefitted from the union. 
1Dfranklin interview A. 
11These fraternal guests included Frank Chafe of the CLC, Messrs F. Rudolf and P. 
Stonehouse of the CAA, Bill Barowski (probably Bill Berezowsky, NWT Staff rep for 
Mine Mill, and later SteeL since 1962) of Steel, Cliff'Reid, president oflocal804 USWA 
at Pine Point, Gene Mitchell of the Albena Federation of Labour, and Mr. R. J. Dancer of 
the UBCJA. Minutes, Triennial Conventio~ September 1972, UNW. 
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One of the more significant items on the agenda was the proposal to form a 
Northwest Territories Federation ofLabour. It appears that the push for such a move was 
from outside the union as it was Claude Edwards of the Alliance, and Gene Mitchell of the 
Alberta Federation ofLabour who answered members' questions on the subject. By the 
end of the convention Franklin's recommendation calling on the NWTPSA to participate 
in the formation of such an organization was approved. 12 Franklin also expressed his 
gratitude to the Alliance, and in particular Edwards, for his assistance in getting the 
NWTPSA up and running. "Without the assistance of the Public Service Alliance of 
Canada,"said Franklin," we never would have achieved our position of today and with 
their further assistance we will be even stronger tomorrow."13 Thus by the close of the 
1972 convention, the NWTPSA was established within the Canadian labour movement, on 
its way to becoming a founding member of a northern labour federation, and a grateful 
component member of the PSAC. 
Although Franklin let his name stand for a second term, he was not re-elected. 14 
Given his past efforts in organizing and leading the union, as well as his participation in 
successfully negotiating the first two contracts, this is surprising. Perhaps these contracts 
were only successful for members based in Yellowknife. It is also possible delegates were 
1~ecutive President's Report, Ibid. 
13/bid 
14Franklin interview A. 
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weary of the union's leadership continuing to come from the capital. Komichuk, 
Mcinnes, and Franklin had all been from Yellowknife. Whatever the reason for Franklin's 
defeat, Charles Goddard was elected. Goddard, a mechanic, 15 had until recently been the 
regional vice-president for Frobisher Bay, but left the position when he transferred to 
Inuvik. In the position of first vice-president was Dave Colbeck who had taken over as 
Frobisher Bay RVP upon Goddard's transfer. The second vice-president was Brian White 
of Yellowknife. who until then had no experience on the executive. 16 There was a decided 
shift of power away from the capital. 
A union headquartered in Yellowknife with a volunteer president in lnuvik must 
have been a challenge. The need for officers to travel enormous distances by plane to 
carry out everyday business was another factor distinguishing the NWTPSA as a uniquely 
northern union. The NWTPSA was possibly the first union in Canada to be dependent on 
the airplane to service its members. As long as the president was a resident of 
Yellowknife he at least had ready access to the union's office, resources and staff as 
required. With Goddard in Inuvik, however, these distances had a profound impact on 
15Repon, Inuvik Regional Vice-President W. F. English, NWTPSA Third Triennial 
Convention. October 1975, Vol. 2, Box-file 4-18, UNW. 
1
"'0fticers," CSR, Vol. XLV, No.I, March 1972, 64-68; No. 3, September 1972, 
60-64. Brian White is listed as resident in Yellowknife. He is remembered by Peter Dyck, 
however, as being out of Fort Smith. It is quite possible that at one point he transferred 
from one community to the other. Harold Franklin went on to become president of local 
one in Yellowknife and later took over as RVP for the Yellowknife region. See Fr:mklin 
interview A. 
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leadership and staffing concerns of the union. Day·to-day workings of the NWTPSA fell 
to the executive secretary treasurer. By July 1973 that individual was Charlie Park. 17 
This de facto leadership by a non-elected staff person was reinforced by continuing 
fluctuations in union leadership. Park's position was further strengthened by the 
resignation of Goddard, and compounded by the previous resignations of first vice-
president Colbeck and Yellowknife R VP Bill Carpenter. Goddard had accepted a position 
in the South; the other two had been promoted into excluded positions. As the next 
convention was over two years away, the remaining executive members met on 23 July 
1973 to elect a new complement of table officers. As second vice-president and 
constitutionally in line for the position anyway, Brian White was elected president. Jim 
Fradsham of Frobisher Bay, and Harold Franklin were elected first and second vice· 
presidents respectively. 11 Once again, power had shifted back to elected leaders resident 
in Yellowknife. 
17In this light it is understandable why Orvik and Vanderhaden mistook Park for 
president of the union. It also appears that the union must have worked out an agreement 
with the PSAC on northern staffing issues as Park is simultaneously listed as the PSAC 
regional representative from September 1973 to September 1974. After that time he 
retained his position as NWTPSA secretary, but was no longer PSAC regional 
representative. See '•Officers.." CSR. XLVI, No.3, September 1973, 64-68 and subsequent 
issues to Vol. XLVU, No.4, December 1974, 68-72. Much ofthe archival material for 
this period is incomplete and contains large gaps. Park first appears in the position of EST 
in the archival material as a guest at a Hay River membership meeting.(Minutes, 
Membership Meeting, Hay River Sub...Branch, 5 July 1973, Box-file 8-5, UNW. 
11PSA News, July 1973, Box-file 8-24, UNW. 
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On assuming the presidency, White set about making structural changes to the 
union. He began by granting regional status to Hay River. Previous to this the South 
Slave community was a sub-branch of the Fort Smith region and as such not entitled to its 
own RVP on the executive. However, due to its high number of members and a 
comparatively high degree of union activism in the ar~ Hay River had always had its own 
representative attending executive meetings in Yellowknife. James Neville had performed 
that function since the union's founding convention. 19 At a meeting of the Hay River 
membership in January 1973, the members unanimously endorsed the inclusion of 
Enterprise, Fort Resolution, Fort Providence, Pine Point, Buffalo River and "Hay River 
proper within the proposed new region. "20 With the ascendency of White to the presidency 
in July 1973 the request of the Hay River membership was granted.l1 Another structural 
change initiated was in the Keewatin area west of Hudson Bay. While still under federal 
authority, Ottawa had established Churchill, Manitoba as the administrative centre for the 
Keewatin. The territorial government relocated government operations for the Keewatin 
to inside the territories in 1974 by moving to Rankin Inlet.22 White followed suit and 
1
'Franklin interview A. 
2CMinutes, Membership Meeting, Hay River Sub-Branch, 4 January 1973, Box-file 
8-5, UNW. 
21President's Repon, NWTPSA Third Triennial Convention, 2-S October 1975, 
Vol.1. Box-file 4-17, UNW. 
72Annual Report, 1974, 27, 33. 
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moved the union's regional operations from Churchill to Rankin as well.23 White also 
established Cambridge Bay, in the central Arctic, as a region. 
Unlike Hay River, union activism in the Cambridge Bay area was sporadic in the 
early 1970s, and often initiated by the leadership in Yellowknife. This was likely due to 
isolation and a greater turnover in government employees. Former Cambridge Bay RVP, 
and later NWTPSA president, Peter Dyck was of the impression that Cambridge Bay had 
just been organized as a branch when he moved there with his family in October 1974. 
Dyck explained that a letter was sent from executive secretary treasurer Charlie Park to 
government employees in Cambridge Bay, explaining what needed to be done to organize 
locally and a meeting was subsequently held that November. Dyck, a heavy equipment 
mechanic originally from Swift Current, Saskatchewan with no prior union experience, 
recalled the meeting as being very informal: 
A half dozen of us showed up at the meeting and that was the first time I 
ever attended any meeting, labour meeting. And they held the election and 
elected the local president, vice .. president, secretary and treasurer and then 
the election for R VP [was held] and nobody wanted to run for it. Nobody 
really knew what it was, so they said, "Well are you interested?" "Well," I 
said, "Well I don't know what it is or what it does, but well yeah. okay." 
That's how I got involved.24 
Dyck was completely unaware that Cambridge Bay had been organized a year earlier and 
that he was, in fact, the third RVP to represent the region. Charlie Park had met with 
23President's Report, NWTPSA Third Triennial Convention, 2-S October 1975, 
VoL I. Box-file 4-17. UNW. 
24Personal interview, Peter Dyck, 11 August 1999. 
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Cambridge Bay members in December 1973 to organize the region. Messrs. E. Kinsman 
and L. Lockwood were elected president and vice-president respectively. Ms. M. Draeger 
was elected secretary treasurer. At the subsequent membership meeting on 2 January 
1974, President Kinsman informed the members that NWTPSA President Brian White had 
granted branch status.2' By March 1974 Kinsman had been elected RVP and by 
September had been replaced in this capacity by Lockwood. 26 That Dyck was completely 
unaware of this activity prior to his own election as R VP in November indicates that not 
only had the branch become completely inactive in less than a year, but, related to this, the 
high turnover in government staffing in the Arctic had a definite impact on union 
development. Again, because of uniquely nonhem conditions, the union not only had to 
adapt its structure, but also to focus more resources on keeping more remote areas active 
within the union. 
By the mid-1970s the "honeymoon" with the employer ended. The union had to 
focus less on organizational development and more on an increasingly belligerent 
employer. The Yom Kippur War of 1973, with its ensuing energy crisis and spiraling 
inflation, ushered in a deteriorating relationship between management and workers 
everywhere. Governments sought means of limiting their expenditures and looked at 
25Minutes, Membership Meeting, Local 7, Cambridge Bay, 11 December 1973 and 
2January 1974, Box-file 8-11, UNW. 
Z&'Officers," CSR, Vol. XLVD, No.I, March 1974, and No.3, September 1974, 
68-72. 
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labour costs. The response ofthe Northwest Territories was typical- "severe restrictions 
would have to be imposed." It restricted employee trave~ delayed purchases, and left 
vacant positions empty. 21 Not unexpectedly, the new economic climate strained the 
relationship between employer and union. "It is unfortunate," the union reported to its 
membership in February 1974, " that we have been forced to carry so many cases to 
arbitration, and it is hoped that we can get better cooperation from the Employer in the 
future as these forms of settlement are expensive, and in many cases unnecessary. "21 
In April of 1974 a new contract was negotiated which included wage increases 
averaging 22 per cent over two years. 29 Inflation quickly caught up, however, and a year 
later, using a clause in the collective agreement which allowed either party to re-open the 
agreement for fun her negotiations, Brian White did just that. An escalating cost of living 
had eroded the J 0 per cent increase that members had received in the first year of the 
contract. White requested a minimum of a $1,700 adjustment in all rates of pay, but the 
employer refused. "A complete waste of time and money" was how White described 
negotiations in News of the North. The government was described as "inflexible and 
unwilling to negotiate." Both parties agreed to refer the matter to arbitration. 30 When the 
21 A11nua/ Report, 1974, 16. 
21NWTPSA Newsletter, IS February 1974, Box-file 8-22, UNW. 
19/bid, 16, 25. 
3016Govemment and Public Service Ass'n take Salary dispute to arbitration,'' News, 
16 April197S, IS. 
arbitrator made his rulin& White received less than a third of what he sought - a SSOO 
across the board increase for all members for the 1975-76 bargaining year.l1 
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The next round of contract talks was set to commence in the spring of 1976. The 
government established the tone for the talks six weeks prior to negotiations when 
Commissioner Hodgson announced rents for employees in staff housing would rise 8 per 
cent to cover increased operation and maintenance costs. As the existing agreement 
prohibited an increase in rents, Hodgson was clear that the increase was not to take effect 
until after a new contract was signed with the NWTPSA. The union was furious and 
"slammed" the government, stating that its decision to increase rents "contravenes the 
bargaining process and once again points out the government of the NWT' s dictatorial 
attitude towards its employees and lack of faith in the bargaining process ... n The 
government's position was articulated in language that can only be described as Orwellian, 
stating it was "reaching an understanding of the government's goals to stimulate a greater 
degree of self-sufficiency by staff than was possible in earlier years. "33 
The two parties met to negotiate a new package later that spring. The union 
accepted the 8 per cent rent increase contingent upon a 12 percent increase in wages, 34 
31Annua/ Report, 1975, 63. 
ll£'Union raps gov't rent hike," News, 10 March 1976, 1. 
33 Annual Report., 1976, 89. 
14Significantly. items such as rents. utilities., settlement allowance and other non-
salary monetary items were technically no longer within the realm of collective bargaining, 
but under article 40 of the collective agreement the subject of "joint consultation," which 
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and sent the package out to the membership who ratified it in July. It was then sent on for 
approval to the Anti-Inflation Board which the Trudeau government had established to 
limit wages and prices in an attempt to curb inflation. The union did not expect any 
problems with the AlB, 35 but when the federal board reviewed the contract it reduced the 
wage increase from the negotiated 12 per cent to 9.8, leaving all other items the same. 
Initially the union was not overly concerned for they felt that they could compensate for 
this by making improvements to employee benefits. 36 The AlB and the employer both 
refused to support the union in this pursuit. It was the government's position that the 
agreement had already been ratified and if the AlB saw tit to reduce the agreed upon wage 
scale then so be it; everything else would remain the same. 37 The union felt more betrayed 
by the employer than it did by the AlB. Wally Firth, the NWT's NDP Member of 
Parliament, wrote to AlB chair Jean-Luc Pepin expressing his outrage.31 A week later the 
AlB softened its blow by raising the wage to 10.8 per cent which the union decided not to 
appeal.39 
was left undefined. They were still negotiated, but not actually written into the collective 
agreement. This would later come back to haunt both parties, but especially the union. 
35c'PSA agrees to 12% increase," News, 5 May 1976, 22; also "PSA ratifies 
contract-- 12% increase," News, 21 July 1976, 2. 
36&•To get around AlB: PSA seeks higher benefits," News, 22 September 1976, II. 
37
"Govemment won't back workers' wage appeals," News, 6 October 1976, 1-2. 
3
•'Firth shocked by rollback ofPSA increase." News. 20 October 1976. 19. 
391
'PSA accepts 10.8 percent raises approved by AlB," News, 21 October 1976, 19. 
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While the NWTPSA's relationship with the employer continued to deteriorate 
during the 1970s, its rapport with other unions in the North remained ambivalent. The 
commitment the union had made in the fall of 1972 to the establishment of a federation of 
labour remained only a statement on the books. It reponed to its members in August 1975 
that efforts were being made by participating unions to establish an NWT federation. 40 The 
topic, however, was not publicly discussed again by the NWTPSA until March of 1977 
when EST Bob Fry was interviewed in the Native Press at which time he credited the 
Steelworkers with being the driving force behind such an organization. 41 Likewise. 
according to former Yellowknife labour leader Dale Johnson, during the early to mid 
1970s there was "no relationship whatsoever" between the NWTPSA and other unions in 
the North. 42 By 660ther unions," Johnson was referring to miners' unions which until 1976 
were exclusively locals of the United Steelworkers of America. Peter Dyck, however, 
remembered Steel being preoccupied with the prospect of a union as large as the 
NWTPSA taking over such an organization, and that a "chicken dance" went on between 
his union and others for quite some time on this issue. 0 Probably the main reason why a 
federation did not come about during this period was that all of the major unions in the 
40Unio" News, Issue No.8, August 1975, Box-file 8-23, UNW. This was actually a 
short lived publication of local one in Yellowknife and is the only mention of the topic in 
the archival coUection for this period. 
41
"Are Unions Good for the N.W.T.?" Native Press, 18 March 1978, 16. 
42Johnson interview. 
0 Dyck, interview. 
79 
North at the time had other priorities. The NWTPSA was handling a record number of 
arbitrations and was almost perpetually negotiating; the Steelworkers were engaged in a 
war on several fronts, facing possibl'~ strike situations at both the Giant and Con mines as 
weD as trying to fight off a protracted raid by the Canadian Association of Smelter and 
Allied Workers; and the PSAC was organizing the unorganized. 
The mid 1970s saw the Alliance begin an organizing drive that took in various 
public servants outside the purview of both the federal and territorial governments. 
Another uniquely nonhem aspect of public sector unionism in the Northwest Territories 
stemmed from the PSAC's organization of employees ofthe City ofYellowknife. Unlike 
their southern counterpans, municipal workers unionized much later for the simple fact 
that municipalities developed later. One of the key recommendations of the Carrothers 
Commission had been the development of community government. 44 The territorial 
government actively pursued that goal, devolving to municipalities previously held 
responsibilities as quickly as it could. Between 1967 and 1977 the number of incorporated 
municipalities in the Nonhwest Territories rose from 4 to 49,•5 and with it the number of 
municipal employees. In the spring of 1975 the PSAC began signing up City of 
Yellowknife employees and by the end of June had applied to the Canada Labour 
Relations Board for certification. A lengthy legal battle ensued between the city, which 
44Carrothers, Report, Vol. I, 189. 
•!philip J. Airhart, Ed., JVorthwesl Territories: !Hoode of Progress, Depanment of 
Information, Government of the Northwest Territories, 1977, 73-76. 
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challenged the CLRB' s jurisdiction, and the Alliance. 46 In April 1977 the 18 month ordeal 
came to an end when the city of Yellowknife signed its first collective agreement with the 
PSAC after the Supreme Coun of Canada recognized the CLRB 's domain over municipal 
employees in the Northwest Territories. 47 
The PSAC did not confine its organizing efforts to Yellowknife municipal workers. 
Jim Neville, NWTPSA RVP for Hay River actively assisted the Alliance in organizing the 
shore workers at Northern Canada Transportation Company, in December 1975.41 
Neville's assistance in this organizing drive indicates a positive relationship in existence 
between the NWTPSA and the parent union at the time. Between June and August 1977, 
the PSAC also organized the non-medical staff at Stanton Yellowknife Hospital. "9 
Just as public sector unions in the North had their own priorities during the mid-
1970s that prevented them from concentrating on the formation of a labour federation, so 
461
'Labour Relations Board surprised by city council," News, 2 July 1975, 6-7; also 
"Yellowknife Employees join union," News, 3 September 1975, 3. 
4744City appeals certification ofPSAC," News, 10 September 1975, 1; usupreme 
court will decide if city workers are PSAC," News, 10 December 1975, 7; "City workers 
accept offer of 12% hike," News, 7 January 1976, 1-2,; "City and union sign first 
contract," News, 29 April 1977, 3. 
41Report, Hay River Regional Vice-President, 12 May 1975, NWTPSA Third 
Triennial Convention, October 2-5, 1975, Vol. 3, Box-file 5-1, UNW; also "PSAC 
certified to bargain for NTCL shore employees," News, 10 December 1975, 2. As is 
common practice for such events, executive reports are submitted several months prior to 
the convention in order to be copied, collated, and distributed to delegates prior to the 
convention; hence the discrepancy in dates. 
4
"'Union rights sought," News, IS June 1977, 45; "Hospital Workers vote for 
PSAC," ~Vcws. 10 August 1977, 38. 
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too did the Steelworkers. In August 1975 Steel was gearing up for a strike at the Con 
mine50 and about to begin negotiations at Giant when the Steelworkers' district office 
suspended Giant mine's local executive and placed local 803 under "administration," 
making area staff representative Ed McRae the sole person responsible for the affairs of 
the local. McRae, who had requested these actions, charged the local executive with 
mi5use of union funds, but it was later learned that McRae and the district office had 
fabricated the accusation to declare what amounted to a state of emergency in the face of 
a membership raid by the Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers (CASA W), 
a raid supponed by 803's executive. 51 
5Ck'Strike imminent at Cominco," News, 13 August 1975, 11. 
""Union prepared to bargain despite [sic] internal problems," News, 10 September 
1975, 1-2; ''New Union at Giant," News, 17 September 1975, 3; "Union to be 
investigated," News, 29 October 1975, 3; "Affairs ofLocal803 'Unsettled', union says 
funds not misused," News, 5 November 1975, 1-2. CASAW was founded at Kitimat, BC 
by employees at the Alcan aluminum smelter there in spring 1972. Originally represented 
by Steel, the workers received little assistance ftom the international in a strike in 1970, 
despite the strike being sanctioned by the union's head office in Pittsburg. After several 
months on strike the workers went back at the urging of the international for the same 
otTer the company had originally made. It was later learned that the strike at Kitimat had 
prevented imminent lay offs at an American smelter due to a current glut in the aluminum 
market. The end of the strike at Kitimat coincided with the end of that glut. These and 
other issues led the workers at Kitimat to conclude that Steel would willingly sacrifice the 
interests of its Canadian membership for the benefit of its American members. CASAW 
was assisted by the Confederation of Canadian Unions, a left-leaning and nationalist 
Canadian labour central set up in 1968 as an alternative to the international dominated 
Canadian Labour Congress. With this assistance, CASA W was able to replace Steel at 
Kitimat. See Klaus ~fueller, "C.AS.AW. History: The Early Days," unpublished paper 
generously made available to the author by former CCU president Jess Succamore. See 
also, Rick Salutin, Kent Rowley: The Organizer: A Canadian Union Life (Toronto: 
Lorimer, 1980), 110-115, 120-121. In the case ofthe Giant mine raid there was a cenain 
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Dissatisfaction with Steel was mostly over money. News of the North reported 
that discontent with the international had been caused by a recent dues increase. P-
Interviewed during the 1992-94 strike, CASA W local four president Harry Seeton, who 
had been employed at Giant since 1973, recalled "(t]here was a lot of dissatisfaction with 
how we were being represented by Steel," claiming "(t]here was a lot of money going 
south of the border. "53 In the wake of an investigation initiated by Steel, the international 
saw fit to appoint a new local executive, rather than risk the membership electing one.'" 
When Steel reached the point where the selection of local officers was too important an 
issue to be decided by the membership, it was apparent that it was fighting a losing battle. 
CASAW, however, failed to win certification at Giant on a technicality. It made a second 
attempt in November of the following year and was certified as the bargaining agent for 
the workers at Giant when they voted 77 per cent in favour of the new union. United 
Steelworkers of America local 803 became CASA W local 4. '' 
irony in CASAW' s membership in the CCU as one of its founding members was Mine 
Mill, local 598, the sole surviving local of the union that had first organized the Giant 
Mine in 1947. 
526
'Affairs," News, 1·2: also Rosemary Cairns, "Union battle lost but war goes on," 
News, ll January 1976, l-2. 
'Jo'Devine, "Hell," Arctic, 22. 
,.'Union names executive," News, 17 December 1975, IS; also uAffairs," News. 1-
2. 
''Cairns. "Union." News, 1·2; also "New Giant talks follow CASA W win in 
workers' vote;' News, 10 November 1976, 1-2. 
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In the meantime the NWTPSA experienced its own labour revolt. Albeit in a much 
smaller and less dramatic way, it too was initiated over an increase in dues. As members 
of a PSAC component they paid dues to both organizations. In the fall of 1975 the 
NWTPSA changed its dues structure from a flat rate to 1 per cent of employee earnings. 56 
The conservative Hay River membership complained, resenting what they considered 
"subsidizing" lower income members. In addition. they "felt they were not receiving 
enough service for the money paid to the union. "57 
Adding to their aggravation, the June PSAC convention in Winnipeg raised its 
dues. NWTPSA Local I in Yellowknife, the component's largest northern local, 
responded by calling into "doubt the future financial viability ofthe N.W.T.P.S.A .. " It 
also complained that dues were already high and caJled on the executive "to communicate 
with members on this very important issue. "'1 The reaction of the Hay River local was 
stronger; in September 1976 it voted to have the component disaffiliate from the Alliance. 
In April 1976 Local 6 held its annual elections and chief shop steward Darm Crook 
was elected president of the local." Crook, originally a Metis farm boy from Humboldt, 
Saskatchewan, had dropped out of school in 1962 and began work at the local saw mill 
"Minutes, Membership Meeting, NWTPSA Local 6, Hay River, 13 November 
1975, Box-file 8-6, UNW. 
51/bid., 8 January 1976. 
51Minutes, Membership Meeting, Local I, Yellowknife, 16 November 1976, Box-
file 7-10. 
"Minutes, Membership Meeting, Local 6, Hay River, I April 1976, Box-file 8-6. 
84 
where he became a member of the local building trades union, walking his first picket line 
at the age of 16 as a member of the carpenters' union. He went North in May 1970 as an 
employee of the territorial government with his wife and family and in 1972 became shop 
steward at the Department ofPublic Works in Hay River.60 The Hay River local met 14 
September to discuss the recent PSAC dues increase. Crook played a leading role in the 
local's decision to pass a motion to direct the union's executive to disaffiliate from the 
Alliance and subsequently wrote a letter to the executive in Yellowknife informing them of 
the motion passed by Local6.61 In his own words, u[w]e never heard boo back."62 
Crook's participation in this first attempted secession from the Alliance is significant as he 
would continue to lead such attempts into the 1990s. 
Crook recalled the next local meeting held in Hay River a month later: 
The meeting was called to order and here was three strangers. I didn't 
know who they were ... One was Peter Dyck, one was Bob Fry, who was 
the executive secretary treasurer of the NWTPSA, and one was an 
executive officer of the PSAC from Ottawa. And I called the meeting to 
order, and I forget which one of them rose and were telling us what they 
would do to the local and how the local would be disbanded and go into 
receivership and trusteeship for ever moving a motion of that nature and 
they were really coming down on us. And I said, "I take it you guys aren't 
members ofthis local?" "That's right." And I kicked them out. And I 
60personal interview, Darm Crook, 10 August 1999. 
61Minutes, S~ial Membership Meeting, Local6, Hay River, 14 September 1976, 
Box-file 8-6, UN\V. 
62(:rook interview. 
said, "We will decide whether you guys can come back in." WeD they got 
up and they had to go stand outside in the hallway and we debated it.63 
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Crook remembered the local spent the next 20 minutes discussing whether or not to seat 
their guests, while Dyck and company stood in the hall. Eventually a motion was carried 
to admit them and let them "say their piece." "But you'd be surprised by bow their 
attitude had changed, Crook continued: 
There was no more threats or anything of that nature. They, PSAC: 
"Here's how we can work with you to overcome these problems that you 
guys seem to be facing here." So at the end of the meeting we rescinded 
our motion to disaffiliate because now we had all our promises and what 
not.64 
Crook's narrative is likely embellished; Dyck recalls almost none of it. In fact, Dyck, who 
had been elected first vice-president at the 1975 convention and who had been transferred 
from Cambridge Bay to Hay River that spring, did not even recall the circumstances 
leading up to his first encounter with Crook as being the motion to disaffiliate from the 
PSAC. Nor does he recall the presence ofBob Fry nor that of a PSAC officer. He does 
recall the meetin& however, with a good deal of humour: 
I went to the union meeting, ... [ a]nd there was a young upstart there by 
the name ofDann Crook who didn't know who the hell Peter Dyck was. 
He's probably the first guy I locked horns with, not quite locked horns 
with, but found out there was a difference of opinion. 65 
63/bid 
"'Ibid 
'~ck interview. 
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Although Dyck remembered Crook in general as "an advocate of not cow-towing to 
Ottawa," he did not specifically remember Crook as an advocate of disaffiliation. 
Although the PSAC dues increase did much to alienate the members of the NWTPSA, 
only the locals at Yellowknife and Hay River appear to have taken any action to protest 
and it was only the Hay River local that went so far as to propose the severing of ties with 
the parent union. Either the union as a whole was still committed to the PSAC, or no 
other locals were active enough to issue a response. 
Aside from its locale, perhaps one characteristic that makes the NWTPSAIUNW 
unique as a northern union is its large number of aboriginal members. Although Dene 
leader James Washee was among the early leaders of the union, he did not stay with the 
union long and the union maintained a distinctly non-native character in its early days. As 
the territorial civil service continued to expand, and as training and educational 
opportunities increased for aboriginal peopley their numbers within the civil service and the 
NWTPSA increased. In 1973, when the membership of the union was less than 900, the 
government employed 101 native people as classroom assistants alone. 66 In addition, it 
was making efforts to recruit and train native people for mid-level positions such as 
assessors, auditors, councillors, and adult educators. 67 While many of these individuals 
were active with the union, historically there has been significantly more participation from 
"Labour Organizations in CmJDC!D, 1973. 
67 A11nual Report, 1973, 43, 70. 
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the Inuit than there has been from the Dene and Metis. During his time as R VP for 
Cambridge Bay, Peter Dyck noted "there was always Inuit involvement in everything," 
with some even taking training as shop stewards. 61 
Dyck's recollections of Inuit involvement in the Cambridge Bay local do not~ 
however, correspond with the general observations of Inuit involvement in the union made 
by Bob Fry, the union's executive secretary treasurer from 1975 to 1977. Fry was candid 
in his frustration in getting Inuit involved with the union. Indicating that 40 per cent of 
government employees at the time were native nonhemers, and that aboriginal employees 
were panicularly numerous in the eastern Arctic, Fry complained~ "We have a hard time 
getting them to understand the philosophy of what a union is. . . . The concept of a union is 
foreign to them." Fry went on to state that one of the challenges in getting native people 
involved with the union was a prevailing attitude that "the employer is always right. '769 
Given the historically low turnout for membership meetings in predominantly non-native 
locals, however, Fry's comments could apply equally to non-native members of the 
union.70 
"Dyck interview. 
~Are Unions," Native, 16. 
70 An examination of local minutes for the Hay River and Yellowknife locals show a 
consistently low turnout. The Yellowknife local, with over 1,000 members by the late 
1970s actually went into trusteeship at one time. with the local's affairs being run by the 
union executive because not enough people could be found to serve on the local 
executive. 
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Fry's observations have to be met with a certain degree of skepticism. At the time 
the executive secretary treasurer was the only full-time officer of the union; the entire 
elected executive, including the president, were volunteers. While Fry did get out to visit 
locals outside Yellowknife on occasio~ his work primarily involved managing the office in 
the capital, acting as a spokesperson for the union as a whole, and dealing with 
membership concerns on a full-time basis. It is doubtful that much of his time was spent in 
communities where the potential for aboriginal involvement was highest. Nor is there 
evidence that the union as a whole took specific measures to encourage native 
involvement. In later years the union would experience a degree of success in organizing 
Inuit workers when particular gestures were made, but in the mid 1970s the role of 
aboriginal people in the union was peripheral. Orvik and Vanderhaden assert that the 
union was mostly concerned with "shop floor" issues. Rather than using the union to 
pursue political goals, native people generally worked within their own organizations.71 
The role played by the NWTPSA in the inquiry chaired by Justice Thomas Berger 
into the federal government's decision to build an oil and natural gas pipeline through the 
Mackenzie Valley is illustrative of the union's ambivalent role towards the aboriginal 
population ofthe Northwest Territories at the time.12 Local3 in lnuvik conducted its own 
110rvik, Interest, 55-56. 
~o single event stands out in the post-war history of the North more than the 
decision of the federal government in the early 1970s to build an oil and natural gas 
pipeline through the Mackenzie Valley. Without consulting any of the northern aboriginal 
organizations, the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development actively courted 
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study of the pipeline proposal, and though expressing some reservations with regards to 
the environment, fully endorsed the project, reflecting more the interests of the local 
chamber of commerce than local native organizations.13 
Despite the independent actions ofLocal3, the Berger Inquiry did present the 
NWTPSA an opportunity to demonstrate solidarity with other northern labour 
organizations. Calling itself the NWT Labour Coordinating Committee, the NWTPSA, 
along with the teachers and the Steelworkers, submitted a brief to the inquiry opposing the 
American oil interests commencing in March of 1971. The ministry did not anticipate the 
exceptionally vocal protests of native people, particularly the Dene, over this issue, as well 
as those of a large church-based support coalition in the South. In response, the Trudeau 
government established the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, taking its unofficial name 
from the individual who was appointed to chair the proceedings, Mr. Justice Thomas 
Berger. Berger took a remarkably similar approach to that taken by Arnold Carrothers a 
decade earlier, conducting hearings in the South as well as traveling extensively 
throughout the communities of the western NWT. Unlike the Carrothers Commission, the 
fundamental issue was not related to the nature of government, but rather the building of 
the pipeline and, more importantly, who owned the land upon which it was to be built. 
Also in the intervening ten years native militancy had significantly increased. This 
combined with the media attention generated by the inquiry led one writer to refer to the 
process as "Tom Berger's Magic Circus." The end result of the inquiry was the 
publication of Berger's two volume report in 1977. Northern Frontiers, Northern 
Homeland which recommended a ten year moratorium on any pipeline development to 
enable aboriginal groups to settle all outstanding land claims. In addition to Berger's 
report, there is an exhaustive body of literature on this episode in northern history. While 
the work ofFrances Abele is the most complete- "The Berger Inquiry and the Politics of 
Transformation in the Mackenzie Valley," (PhD Thesis, York University, 1983)- the 
work of Alexander, Coates, Dene Nation, Dickerson, Dosm~ Hamilton, Miller, 
Pockington, Watkins, and Zaslow [see bibliography for full citations] all contain accounts. 
130rvik, Interest, 58, 60. 
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pipeline.14 The intensity of this opposition, however, must have been somewhat tepid, for 
an article appearing in the Native Press six months later suggested that the gist of the 
coalition's brief on the pipeline was "prepare for it." Interviewed for the article, executive 
secretary treasurer Bob Fry was quoted as saying, "[w]e're a non-political association, so 
you won't see us getting directly in politics. "15 That the union's senior staff officer 
perceived himself and the organization he represented as "non-political" revealed much in 
terms of how the union interacted in the world around it. Fry's replacement would have a 
much more sophisticated understanding of politics, as did his boss, Brian White. 
White led the union for the next four years, until that time a record for the union. 
Prior to the fall of 1973, the union averaged a president a year. Not a single president 
served a full, uninterrupted term of office. When White took over as president upon the 
resignation of Charles Goddard in June 1973, he had many challenges to face. There were 
also several factors in his favour. The first was that he had the benefit of the union being 
in existence for a few years and he did not have to organize it from the start. In addition, 
White brought with him a year's experience on the executive as second vice-president 
which was considerably more than any of his predecessors had brought with them to the 
office. 
74&0Northern labor against pipeline," News~ 8 September 1976. l . 
75~'Are Unions Good for the N.W.T.?: Part Two," Native Press, I Aprill977, 20. 
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Executive positions below the level of president, however, retained a high degree 
oftumover. In his annual repon to the lnuvik membership in 1974, RVP Bill English 
pointed out that of the current executive, only Brian White and Frobisher Bay RVP Jim 
Fradsham "had previous tenure and are still members." English pointed out that all other 
executive positions had experienced a "series of change in incumbents. "76 English 
continued to express these concerns at the union's third convention in October 1975, 
indicating that the high turnover rate resulted in a perpetually inexperienced executive. 77 
The union was able to maintain a degree of stability, however, following the convention as 
Brian White was re-elected. Peter Dye~ only recently the RVP for Cambridge Bay, was 
elected first vice-president, and Ian Milligan was elected second vice-president. 71 
On the staff side, conditions were equally unsettled. Charlie Park, 79 hired late in 
the summer of 1973 to fill the vacancy left by the dismissal of Wayne Peterson, 10 was fired 
in the spring of 1975. His position stayed vacant for some time, until the hiring of Robert 
76Annual Report, lnuvik RVP W.F. English, Box-file 7-25, UNW. Although 
English's report is undated, much of it is reiterated in his convention report cited below, 
indicating it was written about May of 1975 as that would have been the deadline for the 
submission of repons to the convention. 
77Repon, Inuvik RVP W.F. English, NWTPSA Third Triennial Convention, 
October 2-S 1975, Vol. IL Box-file 4-18, UNW. 
71
"0fticers," CSR Vol. XLVIU, No.4, December 1975, 60-64. 
"There is some confusion as to the Charlie's last name: Dyck remembers it as 
Parks, the CSR consistently spells it Park. 
»rrie reasons for Peterson's dismissal are unknown. 
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Fry in July of 1975.11 For two years, Fry held the position. He appears to have carried 
out his responsibilities and kept a low profile, but like his predecessors, he too was fired.12 
Taking over for Fry was his new assistant Ed McRae. Although the circumstances of 
McRae's departure from Steel are not known. he is remembered by that union for the role 
he played in the loss of Giant mine. The hiring of McRae could not have endeared the 
union to either Steel or CASAW, but led to innovations within the union leading to 
greater stability. 
Upon his hiring, McRae immediately launched a new union newsletter. Although 
the union had made several attempts at this in the past, the publication of a union journal 
11PSA News, July 1975, Box-file 8-24, UNW. 
12Jt is not clear what the circumstances were surrounding his departure from the 
union in the fall of 1977. It is possible that it was in some way related to the resignation 
ofBrian White, who had accepted a position in the Yukon, leaving first vice-president, 
Peter Dyck to assume the presidency. Fry's departure could also be related to the hiring 
ofEd McRae, recently of the Steelworkers, as an additional staff member for both these 
events seem to coincide. It is also possible that his departure was in some way related to a 
dispute between the union and the Alliance over the method of dues payment. Whatever 
the reaso~ like all his predecessors to date, Fry was fired. ''New President,, Sllliyilk, Vol. 
1, No.I, October 1977, 1. Note the spelling of this publication was changed to Sulijuq for 
its second and all subsequent issues. The minutes for the full executive meeting of 13, 14, 
&. 15 October list Fry as present in the position ofEST and McRae present as "staff' rep." 
A memorandum to the minutes of the FEM of21 December 1978 has McRae proposing a 
new staff structure in his position as EST [Box-file 1-1]. At a special meeting of the FE, a 
vague reference is made to a pay-out package for Fry being agreed upon [Minutes, Special 
Meeting, FE, 9 December 1977, Box-file 1-2], suggesting that he followed the union's 
tradition and was sacked. 
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had been erratic throughout the early and mid 1970s.13 Probably the greatest reason for 
the early failures to establish a lasting union paper was related to the factors that 
distinguished the union as distinctly northern: its small size and inexperience as a union, 
compounded by the high turnover of staff and executive, and the need to report on and 
distribute throughout a geographically huge area. As the size of the union's staff 
increased, McRae, presumably, was able to devote more time specifically to the paper. 
The first issue of Sulijuq, lnuktitut for truth, in October 1977, marked the start of a 
regular union press that continued until 1998. With the top of the mast head listing Ed 
McRae as editor, the paper published news items related to the union as well as reports 
from the various regions and executives. By its seventh issue the paper had doubled in 
size and continued to grow. In 1978 Sulijuq became a member of the Canadian 
Association ofLabour Media, essentially a wire service for Canadian union publications.14 
With membership in CALM, Sulijuq' s stories became much more political, especially with 
regards to the Trudeau government's anti-inflation measures, but also running the 
occasional article on international issues. While the regional reports reflected the concerns 
ofthe membership as evidenced in the minutes of local meetings, the stories originating 
with CALM were rarely reflective of issues being discussed at the local level. 
13The earliest surviving newsletter in the UNW Collection is dated October 1972 
[Box·file 8·24]. Another newsletter, dated 15 February 1974, expresses a certain 
exasperation with the opening line: "Once again, we shall try to stan, and keep rolling, a 
monthly newsletter [Box-file 8-22]. 
.... Sulijuq- CALM Member," Sulijuq. Vol. I, No.12, October 1978, 8. 
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Su/ijuq celebrated its first anniversary at the union's fourth triennial convention the 
first week of October 1978. President Peter Dyck submitted a 13 page report to the 
delegates. First among his concerns was a problem that had plagued the union for ten 
years: the continued turnover in executive members. While it is not clear if this in itself 
was a uniquely northern phenomenon within labour, or simply characteristic of 
organizations relying on volunteer officers, the problem was certainly exacerbated by 
employee turnover in the Northwest Territories. "During the course of the past three 
years," Dyck wrote, "there has been a total of nine resignations from the executive." He 
explained that of these, five had been due to incumbents transferring within the territories, 
or resigning from government employment. The other four had been for personal 
reasons. 15 When asked to speculate in 1999 on why there was such a high turnover rate in 
executives for personal reasons, Dyck felt that the main reason was the time commitment 
involved.16 
The length ofDyck's repon is indicative of the increasing workload of the 
president's position. This was no doubt exacerbated by the constant turnover in 
executives, the law suit that the union was then engaged in with the employer, and the 
sheer size of the membership. Since the time that Franldin, Mcinnes, and others began to 
organize the union eleven years earlier, its membership had grown sixteen fold. Of the 
"President's Repon, NWTPSA Founh Triennial Convention, October 1978, 
Vol .l. Box-file S-2, UNW. 
16Dyck interview. 
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1,959 government employees paying dues to the union in 1978, 1,616 were signed 
members of the union. 17 It was with these realities in mind that the convention delegates 
decided to make the president's position a full-time one. No longer would the non-elected 
executive secretary treasurer be the most visible officer of the union; no longer would he 
be running the office in Yellowknife. For the first time in the union's history the executive 
secretary treasurer would have to personally answer to an elected member on a daily basis. 
During the convention's elections, it was determined that Peter Dyck would be the 
member that Ed McRae would answer to. The other table officers consisted of Ian 
Milligan and Darm Crook as first and second vice-presidents respectively. 11 
The 1978 convention was also significant in that it was the first convention that 
began to address issues of race and ethnicity. This emanated exclusively from the eastern 
Arctic where Inuit make up the overwhelming majority. Reporting for the Baffin regio~ 
RVP Eli Scott-Bradley informed the convention delegates that of the 335 territorial 
employees in that regio~ 260 were Inuit. Scott-Bradley cited a "lack of education" as 
keeping the Inuit from getting more involved in the union's affairs. "[M]any of these [Inuit] 
do not have any idea of what their rights as union members are," the R VP complained. 
Addressing the issue of language appeared to be significant in involving Inuit members in 
union aft'airs. Scott-Bradley reported that they had started to use an interpreter at their 
17S~retary Treasurer's Repon, Box-tile 5-2, UNW. Under the Rand Formula all 
~mployees pay dues, but only those who sign cards are members of the union. 
"Resolutions, Box-file S-2, UNW. Also Dyck interview. 
local meetings and were translating their minutes into Inuktitut.19 This was not just the 
case in Frobisher Bay. uA good amount of effort has been put into translating and we 
have a native stewart [sic] who does a good job of interpreting," the RVP for the 
Keewatin region reponed. " This has resulted in more interest shown by the natives. "90 
Where the union made efforts at the local level to reach out to its Inuit membership it 
encountered a degree of success. 
96 
As aboriginal membership gained, relations with the parent body continued to 
deteriorate. As before, the issue was related to the payment of dues to two organizations. 
At a meeting of the executive on 13-15 October 1977 the revelation of questionable 
dealings between the Alliance and the government greatly angered the component's 
leadership. Previously the employer collected dues from its employees and forwarded 
them to the NWTPSA, who would in tum send a cheque to the PSAC for its share. At 
some point prior to the meeting, Alliance vice-president Bill Doheny wrote to the 
government and, without informing the NWTPSA, requested it to begin sending dues 
directly to the Alliance which would then be responsible for sending the component its 
share. Serious discussion of immediate disaffiliation must have followed for the motion 
that was carried at the end of the discussion was "[t]hat the PSA stay with the PSAC until 
"RVP Report, Baffin Regio~ Box-tile S-2. UNW. 
90flVP Keewatin Report, Ibid. 
97 
we go to fall convention. '"1 
It appears the dispute over dues served more as an excuse to attempt to 
disaffiliate. Unlike earlier, this effort was not initiated at the local level, but rather at that 
of the executive. That the secessionist movement enjoyed strong support indicated that 
there were other unknown issues at work feeding ill feelings on the part of the component 
towards the Alliance. The dues issue might have been more of a "straw that broke the 
camel's back." Although new to the organization, Ed McRae functioned as the unofficial 
leader of the faction in support of breaking away from the PSAC which also included 
Charlie Kennedy and Michael Miltonberge~ ofFort Smith, and Ron McCagg of Fort 
Simpson.9J According to Dyck: 
There was a pretty vigourous [group] - this group of executive members, 
Ed McRae leading them sort of, that thought the PSAC was a stick in the 
mud, was taking money and blood out of us and giving us nothing in return 
and on and on; and we should be doing this all ourselves and so forth and 
instead of sending this money to Ottawa, we could buy the representation 
cheaper and better elsewhere.96 
91Minutes, FEM, October 13-15, 1977, Box-file 1-1. It is possible Fry was in 
some way connected to this incident as this is the last record of his participation in the 
union. This, however, as previously discussed, is only one of several possibilities. 
92Mj)tonberger is now a cabinet minister in the territorial government and not a 
friend of the labour movement. 
"Although Dyck remembers McCagg out of Fort Simpson, he is listed in CSR, 
Vol.Sl, No.4, December 1978, 32-33 as RVP for Central Arctic. It is quite possible that 
at one point he transferred from one to the other. 
"Dyck, interview. 
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Dyck himself supported staying with the PSAC. Croo~ surprisingly given his past 
attempt with the Hay River local, was curiously not decidedly on either side of the fence. 9s 
Quiet diplomacy prevailed in the end though, as no mention of the issue arose at the 
following convention. The subject of disaffiliation, however, would be a recurring issue. 
One factor that contributed to these ill feelings resulted ftom a lawsuit that the union and 
the government were involved in throughout 1978. 
On 6 March 1978 the union and the employer began negotiations for a new 
collective agreement. Within minutes of the start of the session, the government's chief 
negotiator and director of personnel Robin Bates ustormed out" of the negotiations 
because, according to the union, "he did not agree with the position taken by the 
Association that all items contained in the Collective Agreement were negotiable.,,. Four 
days later, on March 10, Bates distributed to employees a letter stating in pan: u .• .that on 
specific dates there would be increases in rental rates, and utilities, settlement allowances 
and removal assistance and other matters and conditions of employment to government 
employees. "97 
Bates' letter was inflammatory because these items were the subject of anicle 40 
of the collective agreement. which did not set out the actual rates to be paid, but 
"Ibid 
""NWT government backs off in union talks," News, 22 March 1977, 7. 
f¥1Jbid 
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established that they would be set through consultation between the employer and the 
union. 91 By proceeding to alter the terms of article 40 without the appropriate joint 
consultation, Bates was making those changes unilaterally. In an effort to combat these 
unilateral changes the union proceeded with a two-pronged counter attack. The first 
prong was to seek certification, through the PSAC, under the Canada Labour Code. The 
second prong was to seek an injunction from the courts prohibiting the government from 
unilaterally changing the collective agreement. 99 
Certification by the CLRB would effectively make the provisions of the NWTPSA 
Ordinance redundant by entrenching the union's rights within the Canada Labour Code. 100 
In a press release dated 20 March, Ed McRae explained that certification through the 
CLRB would guarantee to the union the right to file charges of unfair labour practices as 
well as the right to strike which the NWTPSA Ordinance did not. McRae alleged that 
Commissioner Hodgson, apparently having long since shed his pro-labour sentiment, had 
previously threatened that if the union did not "toe the line, n the government had the 
916
'Court order issued against NWT government," Sulijuq, Vol.1, No.7, March 
1978, I. 
99/bid 1; also "Certification being sought from CLRB for NWTPS"" News, 22 
March 1978, 7; and uNWT -PSA applies for certification," Slllijuq, Vol.1, No.7, March 
1978. The PSAC also filed a separate application to the CLRB to certifY the 68 
employees of the NWT Housing Corporation who were also covered under the collective 
agreement. See registered letter from CLRB to Barren-McBain, (law firm) Edmonton, 
and Davies and Company, (law finn) Vancouver~ 13. Box-file 15·10. UNW. 
100
"NWT-PSA applies," Sulijuq, L 
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option oflegislating terms and conditions. "By being certified under [the] CLRB," McRae 
stated, "we will be moving from a process of collective begging to collective bargaining in 
the truest sense of the words."101 But when the CLRB made its decision on the 
application in July, it ruled against the union, declaring that the union's members were 
uemployees of Her Majesty in right of Canada" and therefore not eligible for cenitication 
under the Code. 102 
The union's use of the couns was more successful. Justice Calvin Tallis of the 
Northwest Territories Supreme Court heard the union's application for an injunction to 
prevent the government from unilaterally raising rents on 1 S March 1978. He did not 
grant the injunction, but rather ordered the government not to make any changes to anicle 
40 of the collective agreement until a decision was reached on whether or not the items in 
the article could be arbitrated. Both sides then resumed negotiations on items other than 
those contained in anicle 40. Throughout negotiations, however, Bates repeatedly 
threatened legislation on rents. Finally, on Friday, 12 May, Bates handed a document 
across the table entitled "Memorandum of Understanding Between GNWT and 
NWTPSA," stating in pan: 
The parties agree that the subjects of rental and utility rates, rental 
conditions and private accommodation allowances are items for discussion 
101
"Cenification," News, 7. 
unRegistered letter, CLRB to Darren-McBain, 32; also "CLRB denies 
jurisdiction," Sulijuq, Vol. I, No.9, May-June 1978, 16; and Vince Hamer, ··coun Battle 
Continues: PSA Silent on CLRB Decision," News, 24 July 1978, 1. 
within the framework of Joint Consultation and do not form part of 
Collective Agreements between the Government of the Northwest 
Territories and the Northwest Territories Public Service Association. 103 
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Bates indicated that unless the union signed the document, negotiations would proceed no 
further. The union refused and walked out. •o. Within hours, legislation was introduced in 
the legislature to remove the items contained in article 40 from the realm of collective 
bargaining. 105 
The lightning speed with which legislation was rushed through indicated how well 
orchestrated preparations had been between Bates and his political masters in the 
legislature. Having the force of a court order in their favour, Bates knew that the union 
would never have signed what the judge in the ensuing contempt case described as 
"articles ofcapitulation."106 Forcing the union to walk out was the signal to the minister 
responsible for personnel~ Arnold McCallum, to serve notice of motion to amend the 
Public Service Ordinance, " ... to preclude the inclusion in any collective agreement .. . of 
matters affecting rental and utility rates, rental conditions, private accommodation 
103Judgement No. 4273, Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, 12 
December 1978, Box-file 23-6, UNW. 
105Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Te"itories: Debates, 65• Session, Sib 
Assembly, Official Report, Friday, May 12, 1978, 185; also Rhonda Snary, "PSA 
Negotiations Grind to a Halt," News, 17 May 1978, 1; and "Talks Halt," News, 17 May 
1978: IS. 
106Judgement No. 4273. 
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allowances."107 When the legislature re-convened on 16 May, the bill proceeded through 
first and second reading, with only two members objecting to the speed with which the 
legislation was proceeding. 101 The only "public" discussion that ensued was when Peter 
Dyck and Assistant Commissioner Mullins were allowed to answer questions by the 
members during committee of the whole. Government attorney Pat Flieger advised the 
legislature from the floor. The only amendment that was made to the bill was that it was 
made retroactive to September 1969.109 In the space of less than four working days the 
government was able to circumvent collective bargaining through legislation that side-
stepped both the union and the public, and flew in the face of Judge Tallis's court order. 
The union successfully sued the government for contempt. Justice Tallis' order 
did not prohibit the government from unilaterally altering the terms of article 40 of the 
collective agreement, it only delayed the passage of such legislation until it could be 
decided if the items in article 40 could be arbitrated. By proceeding with legislation 
regardless, the government was guilty of civil contempt. On 14 December Bates and 
Flieger were found guilty of actively counseling the government to violate Judge Tallis's 
order and each was fined $500.110 Bates had already announced his impending resignation 
107Legislative Assembly, 185. 
101/bid, 16 May 1978,268 and 17 May, 1978, 313-334. 
1(1l)/bid, 334-S, 364-S. 
110Judgement No. 4273. Also Doug Earl, "PSA, Gov't: Convictions Leave issues 
unresolved," News, 18 December 1978, l-2; and ':Government Officials Guilty," Su/ijuq, 
Vol.n, No.3, January 1979, 1. 
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the previous September, effective 1 January 1979, but had indicated at the time that he 
would stay on if need be to conclude a contract with the union. He had been hired as 
Director of Personnel three years earlier and was reponed to have told Deputy 
Commissioner Parker at that time that three years was how long he expected "the job" to 
take.111 It therefore appears that Bates was hired with a specific objective in mind: to 
drastically cut the amount of spending arrived at through collective bargaining. The 
government had begun preparations then for a final showdown with the union three years 
earlier with the recruitment of a hired gun. 112 
With Bates and Flieger convicted, the legality of the legislation itself was called 
into question. 113 The union wanted to pursue legal proceedings to ovenum the legislation. 
The PSAC, however, had different ideas. Panially motivated by a desire to improve the 
strained relations between the two organizations, the PSAC had covered the legal 
expenses of a private Edmonton lawyer. Upon the conviction ofBates and Flieger, this 
lawyer advised the union to continue and attempt to have the legislation overturned. Peter 
Dyck summed up the attitude of the lawyer, and some of his executive officers as well, 
including Dann Crook, as "take' em all the way. Bum ~em at the stake and let the chips 
11
"'Director of Personnel announces resignation for personal reasons," News, 1 
September 1978, 3. 
112 Although it is not known if the government paid the fines for Bates and Flieger, 
in the employer's eyes it was probably $1,000 well spent. 
1ll&rl, "PSA, Gov't," News, 1-2. 
fall where they may." According to Dyck though: 
... the Alliance stepped in and said, "well, you've achieved some of what 
you want to achieve ... you've proven that some people have been in 
contempt of[court], you're never going to get housing back, so why push 
the issue any further and blow your so called 'negotiation relationship' with 
the government right out the window?"114 
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Dyck continued that he and all the members of the executive were "very uncomfortable 
personally," that they felt powerless and "in the hands of lawyers." Under pressure from 
the Alliance, the NWTPSA discontinued the action. 115 The good will that the PSAC 
gained by covering legal fees evaporated. 
In December 1978 McRae made a recommendation to the PSAC which would 
have a long term impact on labour in the North. McRae advised the Alliance that the 
government was expected to take over the hospitals at Inuvik, Frobisher Bay, Hay River, 
Fort Simpson, and Rae, as well as establishing a health clinic at Fon Smith. He 
recommended that this situation should be studied and that a plan should be established for 
the incorporation of these employees into the component. 116 As it turned out, the 
complete devolution of health care to the Government of the Northwest Territories would 
extend well into the next decade, but in 1979 Stanton Yellowknife Hospital became the 
114Dyck interview. 
u'Letter, Ed McRae, Executive Secretary Treasurer, N'\VTPS~ to ~lr. J. Wylie, 
Executive Vice-President, PSAC, 13 December 1978, Box-file 23-3, UNW. 
lOS 
first, and therefore the model for the rest.117 
In total, Stanton employed approximately 200 workers: about I 00 nurses, nursing 
assistants, and orderlies; and another I 00 non-professional staff who would all become 
employees of the Government of the Northwest Territories I April 1979.111 The non-
medical staff at Stanton had been organized as local 362 of the National Component of the 
PSAC and had signed their first contract in March 1978.119 The nursing staff subsequently 
became members of this local as well. 120 In December the Alliance was advised that in the 
event the govem~ent was to take over the running of Stanton Yellowknife Hospital, the 
certificate issued to the PSAC by the CLRB would lapse as "successor rights" could not 
be invoked in a case where the succeeding employer was the territorial govemment.121 
The territorial government publicly agreed with Dyck that the nurses should become 
members of the NWTPSA. But in discussion with the nurses themselves, the government 
attempted to impose its own ·~company union" by encouraging the nurses to form their 
own "independent association," and even offered to pay the related legal costs. The 
117Crook interview. 
111
"Will YK. nurses join PSA?" News, 21 March 1979, 2. 
119uFirst Contract signed," Sulijuq, Vol. I, No.9. May-June 1978, 3 _ 
120J...etter, Peter Dyck. President, NWTPSA, to A. E. Stewart, President, PSAC, 6 
April 1979, Box·file 23-3, UNW. 
121Letter, Maurice Wright (attorney) to wlr. W. Hewitt ... \Vhite, 28 December 1978, 
Box-tile 23-3, UNW. 
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nurses voted unanimously to join the NWTPSA. 122 Publicly the union was optimistic with 
the devolution of Stanton and the addition of two new locals to the unio~ local I 0 for the 
non- nursing staff, and local II for the professionals. Sulijuq reponed to the membership: 
The absorption of all the hospital workers across the territories into the 
public service will swell the ranks of the N.W.T.P.S.A. by twenty percent. 
A spokesperson for the union said that this increase in membership will 
"increase the clout" of the union in all its dealings with the G.N.W.T.123 
Privately the union was not as optimistic. "I am somewhat nervous." Dyck wrote to 
PSAC president Andy Stewan, "about the position the employer took with respect to the 
Nurses and feel that even though we have been successful with this group we will have to 
go through the same exercise with the Nurses at all the other hospitals." 12" Given the year-
long law suit that had just been concluded. as well as the government's attempted 
sabotage of the union's effons with the nurses, Dyck' s distrust of the employer was 
understandable, albeit umecessary. When the 25 bed health center at F on Smith became 
operational later in the year, its employees were members of the NWTPSA.125 It would be 
another ten years, however, before the devolution of health was completed and in the 
interim the union concentrated on organizing outside the purview of the territorial 
government. 
1~etter, Dyck to Stewan, 6 April1979. 
123
"Stanton Hospital Joins PSA," S111j11q, Vol. m, No.I, September 1979, 1. 
124Letter, Dyck to Stewart, 6 April 1979. 
1256~ew PSA Members," Sulijuq, Vol.m, No.1. September 1979, 3. See also 
Annual~pon, 1979,33. 
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Relations between the NWTPSA and its own staff also began to come apart again 
about this time. Continuing its established tradition, the executive met on 10 February 
1979 and fired McRae after less than a year and a half in his position. 126 McRae retaliated 
by initiating legal proceedings, but the parties ultimately settled out of court, with one of 
the conditions ofthe settlement being not to discuss the specifics of the agreement. 127 
McRae's dismissal coincided with an article appearing in News of the North 
entitled "Union workers join United Labour Union."121 The ULU had just been certified 
by the CLRB to represent three of the four staff members of the NWTPSA. Although the 
original application had been for all four members, the fourt~ McRae, was excluded 
because of his e:r officio role on the union's executive. 129 Accusing the NWTPSA of 
unfair labour practices, McRae claimed he had been fired for organizing the union • s staff. 
McRae further alleged that the NWTPSA had taken exception to his involvement in the 
ULU late in 1978 when the CLRB application was first filed. He also claimed that Dyck 
had approached him at one point and told him that things could be "smoothed out" if the 
ULU idea was abandoned. Dyck refused to comment on McRae's accusations at the time, 
126Minutes, FEM, 10 February 1979, Box·file 1·8, UNW. 
127Dyck interview. Legally speakin& McRae was not fired. Subsequent to the out 
of court procedures, McRae was reinstated and them immediately resigned. See uPSA 
reinstates McRae - resigns," News, 19 March 1979, 5. 
121J>rawing on the northern identity of the new union, and probably more so 
McRae's sense of irony, its acronym was the name of a traditional Inuit knife used for 
skinning and butchering: ulu. 
tl'l~nion workers join United Labour Union," News, 9 February 1979, 7. 
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and when asked 20 years later about McRae's dismissal, Dyck did not mention the subject 
of the stafF organizing a union. 130 Without commenting on the details of the out-of-coun 
settlement, the former union president simply stated that: 
Ed McRae was let go. Very simply he was not taking the direction given 
him. through me, from the executive, and very simply didn't consider 
himself[to be one] who needed to take direction from anybody. It was an 
impossibility to me and him to work, to continue to work together ... and 
there [were] a couple of other issues that come to light that caused me-to 
take immediate action and suspend him subject to review by the executive 
with a recommendation for dismissal. 131 
McRae's organizing effons were likely the "couple of other issues" Dyck referred to, but 
given Dyck's silence, it is difficult to say. It is most probable, though, that had the 
organization of the ULU been the motivating factor in McRae's dismissa~ he would have 
been dismissed when the application to the CLRB was filed, rather that after its 
certification. An unnamed PSAC spokesperson 132 stated at the time that McRae was fired 
"for being disloyal and attempting to usurp authority from the PSA's elected members.n 
Alliance first vice-president Bill Doheny denied all ofMcRae's charges, stating that at one 
time McRae had informed the membership that the elected members had "sold outn the 
membership. Commenting on the formation of the ULU, Doheny indicated that it 
coincided with the president's position being made full-time, Ill implying that the catalyst in 
1»1»SA fires Ed McRae," News, 14 February 1979, 1-2 
131Dyck interview. 
132probably PSAC vice-president Bill Doherty. 
tlluPSA Fires," News, l-2. 
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the formation of the ULU was the president's daily presence in the office for the first time. 
Doherty was probably right. In responding to increasing work loads and responsibilities, 
the establishing of the president's position as full time was bound to create friction 
between the ele<:ted leader and the appointed staff person who now shared an office. 
Making the president full-time had the unintended effect of demoting McRae from the 
day-to-day de facto leader of the union, a demotion he was unwilling to accept. The 
departure of McRae signaled the beginning of a new era for the union in which an elected 
member of the union would be running the union's affairs on a day-to-day basis. 
Whatever the reasons were for his dismissal, McRae must be given credit for establishing 
the foundation upon which much ofthe union's future successes would be based. Among 
these were the success of Sulijuq and his foresight regarding the devolution of health care 
to the territorial government. 
The decade of the 1970s closed on the NWTPSA with a new executive secretary 
treasurer- James B. "Ben" McDonald of Ottawa. 134 The hiring of McDonald was 
significant for several reasons. First, he was a southern hire, breaking from the union's 
usual practice of hiring within the North. Secondly, although he had little previous 
experience in the labour movement, he brought with him an administrative background 
with the federal department of energy, mines. and resources. Finally, McDonald was a 
much more politically oriented individual, having canvassed for the NDP on election 
114Minutes, FEM, 31 May 1979, Box-file 22-3. 
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campaigns and having been previously employed as a field worker with the Ontario 
Federation of Students.135 McDonald not only brought a new face to the union~ but a new 
attitude. Being more progressive than his predecessors, the first innovation he made was 
the adding of two new regular sections to Sulijuq; one on women's issues, the other on 
international labour issues. Articles on the ongoing revolution in Nicaragua and the anti-
apartheid struggle in South Africa became more common in the union's paper. The hiring 
ofMcDonald in many ways represented the union's moving away from a parochial 
northern existence and into the mainstream of the Canadian labour movement. 
The union had evolved considerably from the signing of its first contract in 1970. 
It had almost quadrupled in size from 500 members in 1970, to 1,906 in 1980.136 During 
this period too, although they had not taken on any major leadership positions, Inuit had 
certainly become increasingly visible within the union. At the same time the union 
remained somewhat aloof from the labour movement in general; relations between the 
union and the PSAC reached crisis situations and then cooled off. Most significant for the 
union during this period were its relations with the employer. From a friendly point where 
the employer gave the union free flights in order to service its membership, tension 
between the union and government had become almost first nature. With a flare for 
understatement, the government described the change in the nature of the relationship with 
135Personal interview with Ben McDonald, 20 August 1999. 
u~Labour Organizations in Canada, 1970 and 1980. 
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its employees as "the development of a more formal employer/employee relationship than 
has existed in the past."131 The most significant advance during this period was in 
organizational development. The addition of new regions and accompanying R VPs 
facilitated greater local involvement by both native and non-native members. The 
establishment of a union press and a growing staff indicated that the union was increasing 
in its level of sophistication from the days that it was raffling bottles of liquor to purchase 
postage stamps. Although the turnover of both executives and leaders continued, the 
issue had been partially addressed by the end of the decade by making the president full-
time and seeking out a professional executive secretary treasurer from outside the limited 
confines ofthe Northwest Territories. The 1980s would be marked by a more stabilized 
relationship between the union and the territorial administration, but would see both a 
dramatic increase in membership and the expansion of the union into areas outside the 
purview of the Government of the Nonhwest Territories. 
131Anm1al Report, 1978, 76-77. 
CHAPTER3 
Tbe Union ofNortbem Worken 
The relationship between the NWTPSA and other labour organizations during the 
1980s can be roughly divided into three periods. The early period, 1980 to 1982/83, 
shows a paradoxical situation where on the one hand the union took a very active role in 
getting the Northwest Territories Federation ofLabour finally established, but on the other 
hand resumed attempts to disaffiliate from the PSAC. Also during this time the union's 
staff demonstrated themselves to be active and committed trade unionists. The middle 
period, 1982/83 to 1986/87, shows the union's intra-labour relations in a more balanced 
state, with relations with the Federatio~ the PSAC, its own employees, and even unions 
outside ofthe NWT to be positive. The latter part ofthe decade, 1986/87 to 1989/90, is 
highlighted by the 1987 name change to the Union ofNorthem Workers. This period 
shows a reversal from the early pan of the decade, with relations amicable with the PSAC, 
but increasingly deteriorating with the NWTFL. The union also temporarily allied itself 
with the territorial government in its battle with the Professional Institute of the Public 
Service of Canada. 
The common thread connecting these three periods is the continued growth of the 
NWTPSAIUNW, particularly its growth outside of government employment. As the 
PSAC facilitated this growth, relations with that organization remained positive. 
However, as the UNW grew into non-traditional areas for a civil service unio~ it was 
increasi~1gly perceived as a threat by other unions, particularly Local 802 of the United 
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Steelworken which used its influence within the Federation of Labour to distance the 
UNW from the broader northern labour movement. 
The founding convention of the Northwest Territories Federation ofLabour took 
place on 17 May 1980 at Yellowknife. Canadian Labour Congress President Donald 
MacDonald granted the organization its charter. Also in attendance were 47 delegates 
from 26 union locals representing 3, 230 northern workers.• The reporter who covered 
the event was not sure how effective the new organization was going to be, given its 
stated commitment to both business unionism and social unionism. "Some of its stated 
' purposes' are altruistic," he wrote, such as the one to "promote the cause of peace and 
freedom in the world .. . Some are practical, such as 'to aid and encourage the sale of union 
d od nl rna ego s .... 
Darm Crook proudly recalled being a founding delegate ofuthe Fed."3 Together 
with Cliff Reid of the Steelworkers' local at Pine Point, he read through the founding 
charter article by article. Despite the pleas of Donald MacDonald, the new organization 
quickly distinguished itself as unique among CLC affiliated federations as the NWTFL 
1Chris Mousseau, "Founding meeting: A voice for Northern labour," News, 23 
May 1980, A3 . Also'~ now has federation," Sulijuq, Vol. IV, No.2, June 1980, 4-S. 
Although it is not clear from the available literature if he was actually in attendance, Bill 
Berezowski, who originally came to Yellowknife in 1961 as the staff representative for 
Mine Mill, also claims to have been involved in the formation of the NWTFL. See Craig 
Harper, "Former union man recalls days gone by," News, 26 October 1987, 21. 
~ousseau, "Founding meeting," A3 . 
3Crook, interview. 
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refrained from supporting the New Democratic Party. "[D)elegate after delegate came to 
the microphone and stated they did not wish ''to be dictated to about how they should 
vote," reported News of the North.• 
Illustrating the ever-increasing imponance of aboriginal issues in the NWT, one of 
the major motions debated was to pressure the federal government to settle land claims. 
However, reflecting the overwhelming non-native membership of the northern labour 
movement, the motion did not "take sides," but rather only aimed to speed up the 
process, 5 thereby showing no firm support for the interests of aboriginal people on the part 
of the NWTFL. 
The Federation was also unique with regards to its overwhelming representation of 
public sector unions. While dominated by public sector workers, its top positions were 
held by mine workers. Of the original seven member executive, two were NWTPSA 
delegates, two were from other PSAC components, and one was from the National 
Association ofBroadcasting Engineers and Technicians. Only two of the executive 
members were from private sector unions: Phil Molby and ClitfReid, both ofUSWA 
Local 804 at Pine Point. Molby and Reid, however, were elected president and vice-
president respectively. 6 
4Mousseau, "Founding meeting," A3. 
5/bid. AJ. 
6~folby \vas elected in a second ballot, defeating Ed ~-feRae, who after leaving the 
employ ofthe NWTPSA landed a job with the city of Yellowknife and membership in 
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With the exception of the formation of the NWTFL, the early 1980s, at least prior 
to the 1981 convention, were a time of quiet for the NWTPSA. Even the resignation of 
Peter Dyck from the presidency in January 1981 attracted little attention.7 Dyck resigned 
because he wanted to take up a teaching position with the vocational college in Fort 
Smith. Also, he was simply not prepared to give any more of himself to the union. In his 
own words, he was "burnt out": 
I didn't see myself making a living in the labour movement and realized 
that the NWTPSA as it was then was quickly getting to a point and place 
where it had to be a much more active and open representative, speaking 
publicly - [a more] visual representative of the membership than I felt I was 
prepared to get involved in ... . I never ceased to be overwhelmed by the fact 
that it was a thankless job. 1 
As first vice-president, Ian Milligan took over from Dyck. 
another component of the PSAC. Undoubtedly his past experience with both the 
NWTPSA and Steel lost him votes. McRae was able to secure a seat on the federation's 
executive in August 1980 as RVP for the North Great Slave region when a by-election 
was held to fill the position after the incumbent left the North. From this point on though, 
McRae disappeared from the northern public record. See Mousseau, "Founding meetin&" 
AJ; ''NWT now," Sulijuq, 4-S; and, "McRae new Labour federation V-P," News, 8 
August 1980, AS. CASAW, as an affiliate of the CCU, was not eligible for membership in 
the Federation. 
'Neither the Yel/owlcnifer nor the Native Press reported Dyck' s resignation. It is 
unclear how the union reported Dyck' s resignation as the UNW archival collection is 
missing several issues of Sulijuq between June 1980 and November 1981, including any 
issues which would have reported on Dyck's resignation. While Dyck, in the August 1999 
interview remembers resigning in 1979, his letter of resignation was read to the 
membership of Local 6 on 2 February 1981, indicating that he likely resigned the previous 
January. See Minutes, Membership Meeting, Local6, Hay River, 2 February 1981, Box-
file 8-8, UNW. 
'Dyck interview. 
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Milligan • s term as president was a short one, lasting from Dyck' s resignation in 
January 1981 until the union's convention the following Thanksgiving. Milligan, for the 
most part, simply filled the position until elections were held. His report to the convention 
did little more than explain how he came to be president. 
Once again the executive secretary treasurer was the de facto leader of the union. 
McDonald's convention report was over 27 typed pages.9 In it he discussed the hiring of 
additional staff. the need for a procedure to prioritize bargaining proposals, and the 
restructuring of various locals. He also mentioned that many of the courses that the PSAC 
had offered in the North were cancelled due to the membership's lack of interest, and 
expressed a great deal of frustration with the Alliance's slowness in dealing with the 
backlog of grievances and arbitrations. 10 
McDonald's report presaged a short-lived disaffiliation attempt. Local9, 
representing the employees of the Yellowknife Correctional Centre, felt that the dues they 
were paying to the Alliance were wasted money and submitted a motion to the convention 
to disaffiliate. Although discussion of secession had arisen at both the local and executive 
levels in the past, it had never been the subject of a convention motion. The attempt had 
to be taken seriously because unlike a local or the executive, the convention had the legal 
authority to effect a break with the Alliance. Ironically, the motion originated from the 
'Report to the Fifth Triennial Convention, NWTPSA, J.B. McDonald, NWTPSA 
S* Triennial Convention, October 1981, Vol. 3, Box-file 6-4, UNW. 
10/bid 17-22. 
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same local where the union was conceived in the late 1960s - the correctional facility. 
Unpersuaded, however, the convention delegates held finn in their loyalty to the Alliance. 
Fred Lamb, the RVP for Hay River, moved for a recorded vote. 11 Ofthe 37 delegates, 3S 
voted to stay with the Alliance and two abstained, 12 clearly indicating the overwhelming 
support the PSAC continued to enjoy from its northern component. 
The convention elected Andrew "Fred" Lamb the NWTPSA's new president. 
Lamb had moved to the NWT from the Yukon five years earlier and was employed as a 
mechanical superintendent with the Department of Public Works and Highways in Hay 
River. In addition to his experience as RVP for Hay River, he had previously served as 
president ofLocal6. Lamb was joined on the executive by Roger Cousins, an adult 
educator from Frobisher Bay, as first vice-president; and Maureen Hall, an employee of 
the Department of Government Services in Yellowknife, as second vice-president. 13 
11General Resolution # 44, By-laws and Resolutions, NWTPSA S111 Triennial 
Convention, Vol. 4, Box-file 6-4, UNW. It should be noted, however, that given northern 
attrition rates and the high transiency among workers in the NWT, it is likely that there 
were few, if any, workers on staff at the jail in 1981 who were part of the original 
membership. 
12Agenda and Minutes, 24, 34, NWTPSA S* Triennial Convention, Vol.l, Box-file 
6-2, UNW. Dann Crook explained in his August 1999 interview that once a motion is 
placed on the agenda of a convention, the motion becomes the "property" of the 
convention, not the mover and seconder, explaining why the motion was not simply 
withdrawn. 
lli'Your New Executive,'' Sulijuq, Vo~ V, No.3, November 1981, 1. 
118 
Within less than a year disaffiliation was once again on the union's agenda. In 
April the PSAC met in convention and voted to increase the amount of dues payable to 
the Alliance by its components. This would cost the NWTPSA an additional $90, 000 a 
year, increasing its annual contribution to the parent body to almost a quarter million 
dollars.•• The dues increase was compounded by the deteriorating quality of service from 
the Alliance. Arbitrations were backlogged two to three years, and appeals on employee 
exclusions by five years. 15 On 19 July 1982 the executive authorized President Lamb to 
hire a lawyer "for the purposes of acquiring advice on disaffiliation. "16 Although the 
executive had not taken a stand on the subject of their relationship with the PSAC, this 
was a significant situation as for the first time in the NWTPSA' s history its top leadership 
called into question its component status within the Alliance. 
PSAC national president Pierre Samson responded 18 October 1982 with a letter 
to Lamb discouraging disaffiliation, stating that a smaller union is a weaker union. He also 
pointed out that the NWTPSA was welt served as a member of the Alliance should their 
employer suddenly become belligerent. Sampson's main point was that whatever decision 
14Minutes, Membership Meeting, Local Six, Hay River, 7 June 1982, Box-file 8-9, 
UNW. 
15Crook, interview. 
16Minutes, Quorum ofExecutive Conference Call, 19 July 1982, Box-file 23-19, 
UNW. By this time, in an effort to make the decision making more democratic without 
significant added expense, executive conference cans became a normal part of the union's 
decision making process. 
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the component made, it should be made by the members.17 In addition, PSAC vice-
presidents Darryl Bean and Jean Bergeron were dispatched to Hay River and Inuvik 
respectively to make the Alliance's presence felt among the membership and to counteract 
pro-disaffiliation arguments. 11 
Lamb struck two committees. The first was to report on the benefits of remaining 
a component of the PSAC, the second on the attributes of disaffiliation. It is unfortunate 
that the "Out repon" did not survive, for any attempt to analyse the financial relationship 
between the two organizations regarding money sent to the Alliance in return for services 
provided would have been contained there. The report advocating continued membership 
in the PSAC, entitled "Out of the Fat, into the fire ... ?'' raised many of the same points 
Samson had raised earlier. It rhetorically asked, "[c]ould the NWTPSA win a fight with 
the employer without the support of the PSAC if the GNWT was determined to win?" 
The report also noted that there had been a significant increase in the number of courses 
offered to NWTPSA members by the Alliance, as well as printing services, staff expertise, 
and a strike fund (if the NWTPSA ever succeeded in gaining the right to strike). "To 
disaffiliate," the report warned, "might even entice the employer to force even more 
disputes into the costly legal forum." The report stressed finances and services, stating at 
''Letter, PSAC President Pierre Samson to NWTPSA President Fred Lamb, 18 
October 1982, Box-file 19-23, UNW. 
11
"PSAC Executive Officers to \isit N\\'T," NWTPSA Weekly Newsletter, August 
1-9, 1982, 1; Box-file 8-25, UNW. 
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one point: "Our problem is purely financial; the solution should be the same." It 
concluded there was "no other umbrella organization that provides the services obtainable 
from the Alliance."19 
The reports were mailed out to local presidents and RVPs in mid-November with 
instructions to have locals brief their R VPs prior to the January full executive meeting. 20 
The executive voted on 16 January 1983. Often voting members, two abstained, and one 
opposed continuing affiliation, while the other seven voted to remain a component. 21 Once 
again, the NWTPSA affirmed its loyalty to the Alliance. 
Much ofthe expansion ofthe NWTPSA in the 1980s was due, rather ironically, to 
the government's attempts to reduce the size of its unionized work force. Continuing the 
implementation of the 1966 Carrothers Report recommendations, more municipalities 
within the NWT were incorporated throughout the 1970s. Jobs which had historically 
been performed by employees of the Government of the Northwest Territories became the 
responsibility of these communities, which received their funding from the ministry of local 
government. Similarly, some positions related to education previously performed by 
NWTPSA members were assigned to new local education authorities. As these workers 
19
"0ut of the Fat into the fire ... ? Report Favouring Continual Affiliation to the 
Public Service Alliance ofCanad~" Box-file 19-23, UNW. 
~nutes, Membership Meeting, Local Six, Hay River, I November 1982, Box-
file 8-9, UNW. 
21Minutes, Full Executive Meeting, 16 January 1983, Box-file 1-9, UNW. 
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beame the employees of agencies other than the government~ wages dropped~ benefits 
decreased~ and NWTPSA membership dues were no longer deducted. One sizable group 
that experienced this process was the employees of the Northwest Territories Housing 
Corporation. 
Established in 1972, the NWTHC was responsible for providing and servicing 
affordable housing for the people of the NWT through the establishment of local housing 
authorities. While remaining under the control of the territorial government and 
administered by a board of directors composed entirely of government bureaucrats and 
members of the NWT Council, the NWTHC was supposed to function as an independent 
crown corporation. 22 While initially the NWTHC employees received the de facto benefits 
of the NWTPSA collective agreement, they were never recognized as government 
employees. In fact, when the union unsuccessfully applied for certification under the 
Canada Labour Code in 1978 during its court battle with the government over rents, the 
application listed the 68 employees of the NWTHC separately. The CLRB refused to 
cenify any of the employees on the grounds that they were all "employees ofHer Majesty 
in right of Canada" and therefore not eligible for certification under the CLRB.23 Thus, 
while prohibited from being organized under the Canada Labour Code, housing employees 
were refused recognition as NWTPSA members. By 1980, as local housing authorities 
22Annual Report, 1972, 36-39; and 1973, 30-32. 
23Registered letter from CLRB to Barron-McBain (law firm}, Edmonton; and 
Davies and Company Oaw firm), Vancouver, 9, 13, 22, 32; Box-file 15-10, UNW. 
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came to take on more of the day·to-day operations, wages and benefits of housing 
workers fell considerably behind those of government employees. 
The union was aware of this situation. In July 1980 Barb O'Neill, R VP for Inuvik, 
was approached by an employee of the lnuvik Housing Authority inquiring as to the 
"feasibility and technicalities" of organizing the rnA's employees.24 In November, 
members of Local 6 raised questions as to the status of employees who had been 
transferred from territorial to municipal status.25 Then in February 1981 the PSAC office 
in Yellowknife received a letter from Linda Pernik on behalf of the Eskimo Point Housing 
Association stating they wished to become members. 26 The Jetter was forwarded to 
NWTPSA executive secretary treasurer Ben McDonald~ who informed her that similar 
requests had been received from workers in three other associations and that the PSAC 
was currently soliciting a legal opinion and would keep her posted. 27 Two weeks later, 
McDonald wrote to Commissioner John Parker complaining of the government's failure to 
recognize employees of housing associations, settlement councils, and education 
committees as government employees and therefore members of the union. 21 Parker 
24Letter, o~Neill to Dyck, 22 July 1980, Box .. file 16-2, UNW. 
25Minutes, Membership Meeting, Local Six, Hay River, 3 November 1980, Box-
file 8·8, UNW. 
26Letter, Linda Pernik (for the staff of the Eskimo Point Housing Authority), to 
PSAC, Yellowknife, 5 February 1981, Box-file 16·6, UNW. 
21Letter, McDonald to Pernik, 27 February 1981, Box-file 16-6, UNW. 
ar.etters, MacDonald to Parker, 12, 19, and 23 March 1981, Box-file 16-6, UNW. 
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responded to MacDonald by stating, "your claim is unsubstantiated. "29 
The union continued to receive requests from unorganized workers for assistance 
in unionizing. In January 1982 Fred Lamb received a letter from the Qarngnmaliryiit 
Federation of Housing Associations. in the Keewatin region, practically begging the 
NWTPSA to organize their staff as they fully appreciated just how underpaid and abused 
their workers were. The federation was candid in claiming that the treatment their own 
employees received was "barbaric" and that the cause stemmed from inadequate 
government funding.30 It is hard to imagine just how poorly management treated these 
workers given that it had taken the unorthodox initiative to unionize them. It is more 
revealing of the working conditions the territorial government created in the non-
unionized public service of the Northwest Territories.31 
In the spring of 1982 a plan to organize these workers was developed. In May, 
after a lengthy correspondence with Commissioner Parker which he found "'not very 
~etter, Parker to MacDonald, 16 April 1981, Box-file 16-6, UNW. 
~etter, Stephen Kakimat, Qarngnmaliryiit Federation ofHousing Associations, 
Keewatin, to NWTPSA President Fred Lamb, 27 January 1982, Box-file 16-6, UNW. 
31/bid., Also Lamb to Kakimat, 18 February 1982; and Kakimat to O'Connell, 11 
March 1982, Box-file 16-6, UNW. The city ofYellowknife, whose employees became 
members of the PSAC and certified with the Canada Labour Relations Board in 1977 were 
considered exempt ftom these etrons. The employees of the town of Pine Point had also 
been certified with the CLRB by this time and were aiso exempt. See Debates, 23 
November 1982, 682-687. 
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helpful, "32 PSAC lawyer Maurice Wright suggested that an official grievance should be 
filed for failure to deduct union dues. Anicle 3 7 of the agreement provided for a dispute 
mechanism - the grievance procedure. By grieving the issue, the union could counter 
government intransigence by taking the issue out of the government's hands by forcing it 
to binding arbitration. 33 The employees in question were in a "win-win" situation. If the 
arbitrator ruled in favour of the union, then the workers would be recognized as territorial 
employees and therefore NWTPSA members, entitled to all the provisions of the collective 
agreement. An unfavourable ruling, on the other hand, would make them eligible to 
organize under the tenns of the Canada Labour Code as the City of Yellowknife workers 
had done five years earlier. The union filed a grievance and referred it to arbitration on 3 
June.].& 
Fearing a ruling in the union's favour, the government preempted the arbitration 
process by legislation. On 2 November 1982, Minister of Finance Tom Butters and Public 
Services Minister George Braden introduced legislation to amend the Public Service 
Ordinance specifically to exclude employees of the NWT Housing Corporation, 
community education societies, education committees, band councils and settlement 
3~er, Maurice Wright (lawyer for the PSAC), to Commissioner John Parker, II 
March 1982, Box-file 16--6, UNW. 
33Letter, Wright to Ms. L.E. Czernenko, PSAC Legislative Officer, 13 May 1982, 
Box-file 16-6, UNW. 
34Letter, McDonald to Parker, 3 June 1982, Box-file 16-6, UNW. 
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councils from membership in the territorial public service. Although a bloc of Inuit 
members from the eastern Arctic in addition to lnuvialuit leader (and future premier) 
Nellie Coumoyea, opposed the bill, it passed and was given assent 25 November.35 "I 
think that it would necessarily foUow," wrote Maurice Wright following the passage of the 
legislation, '•that if they are not employees of the NWT, then they must be employees 
under Part V of the Canada Labour Code. "16 It would, however. be another year and a 
half before the CLRB began issuing bargaining unit certificates to these workers. By 
passing legislation to exclude what were originally 400 workers from union membership, 
the government inadvertently gave the excluded workers the protection of the Canada 
Labour Code, and with that, the right to strike, something territorial employees would not 
receive until 1996. 
The organization of these workers did not begin immediately, and in the interim, 
the NWTPSA focussed its energies on the NWT Federation of Labour. The NWTFL is 
structured so that individual locals rather than entire unions, are affiliated with it. The 
logic in this is that aside from the NWTPSAIUNW, most unions in the NWT have the bulk 
of their membership outside of the territories. Such is the case with other PSAC 
components and the Steelworkers. The NWTPSAIUNW is the only union to operate 
35Debates, 2 November 1982, 18; 24 November 1982, 744; 25 November 1982, 
790. See Appendix A, 2-26 November 1982, Chapter 14 of Debates for the full text of 
the bill. Ironically, one of the members supporting the bill was James Wah-Shee, one of 
the early executive members of the union. 
16Letter, Wright to Czemenko, S November 1982, Box-file 16-6, UNW. 
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exclusively in the Northwest Territories. Historically the largest union in the Nort~ it was 
no small feat when the union announced in April 1983 that all 12 of its locals had affiliated 
with the NWTFL, bringing in fifty cents a month in duesl' from each of its 1, 502 
members.31 According to Ben MacDonald, " 4the Fed' wouldn't have happened without 
the UNW' s support. "39 
The relationship that existed between the NWTPSA and the Federation at this time 
is complex. PSAC Regional Representative at the time Jim Brahmin described the 
relationship between the two organizations as reasonably good, with the NWTPSA 
contributing a lot of the dues, but not taking leadership positions. He indicated that the 
NWTFL was largely dominated by members of the United Steelworkers of America. 40 
While this was in fact the case, it has to be pointed out that in August 1982 the staff of the 
NWTPSA rejected the four member union created by Ed McRae, and became certified as 
members of the Steelworkers.~• Undoubtedly, as professional trade unionists, the staff 
saw the benefit and protection of being members of one of North America's largest 
unions, rather than a small, independent one. However, as committed trade unionists both 
37
"1000.4 affiliated," S11lijuq, Vol. IV, No.2, April 1983, 8; also ''NWTPSA First," 
Ibid, 10. 
31Labour Organizations in Canada, /983, 144. 
l9personal Interview, J. B."Ben" McDonald, 20 August 1999. 
topersonal Interview, James "Jim'' Brahmin, 1 September 1999. 
~•canada Labour Relations Board Order, 30 August 1982, Box-file 18-9, UNW. 
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on and off the job, these workers were generally perceived by both the public and the 
labour movement in general as NWTPSA rather than Steel. USW A Local 8646 would 
greatly improve the stature of the NWTPSA in the northern labour movement. 
In May 1983 assistant executive secretary treasurer Deborah O'Connell was 
elected president of the Federation. A long time labour and NDP activist originally from 
Ontario, O'Connell defeated Cliff Reid's bid for another term, arguing that under his 
leadership the Federation had kept too low a profile. Although a member of 
Steelworkers' local8646 and treasurer ofthe Steelworkers' Area Council,"2 as a senior 
ranking staff officer of the NWTPSA she was clearly identified with that organization. 
The Federation soon made headlines rallying labour's support for striking workers at Con 
Mine.43 
•2grian Mitchell, "Labor federation elects new boss," Ye//ow/arifer, 18 May 1983, 
A14. 
•:Jc'Labour federation urges support for striking steelworkers," Yel/ow/arifer, 31 
August 1983, Al. Not all of the NWTPSA's relations with other labour organizations 
were positive during this period. In the spring of 1983 the Teachers' Association 
attempted to "raid" the NWTPSA of its education-related members. primarily classroom 
assistants. NWTPSA President Fred Lamb described the attempted raid as "not based on 
any real concern for the well-being of these employee~ but based on the Association's 
imminent need to increase their revenues through an expanded membership." Executive 
Secretary Treasurer Ben McDonald concurred, stating that the NWTT A simply wanted 
the classroom assistants for"cannon fodder." Given the historic insistence of the teachers' 
leadership of setting themselves apart from the rest of the northern public service as 
"professionals," Lamb and McDonald were likely accurate in their assessment of the 
teachers· motives. [See "N\\'T Teachers' Association fails to \\in classroom assistants," 
Sulijuq, Vol. IV, No.3, July 1983; also McDonald interview.] 
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In terms of native issues, the NWTPSA had no major external achievements, but 
internal efforts were made. The most noticeable were the articles in Sulijuq in lnuktitut. 
Beginning in June 1980,44 the quantity of material in Sulijuq published in lnuktitut steadily 
increased so that by the mid-1990s the newspaper was in effect bilingual. This particularly 
nonhern feature distinguished the NWTPSA as unique among Canadian unions. 
In the spring of 1984 the union ran the risk of appearing insensitive to the needs of 
its aboriginal members [and potential members] by opposing the government's proposed 
"affirmative action"' policy. The purpose of the policy was to make native people a 
priority with regards to hiring, training opportunities, and internal promotions. 45 The 
union did not object to the government's adoption of a genuine affirmative action policy, 
freely recognizing the territorial civil service [and its union] was dominated by white 
males. Executive secretary treasurer McDonald applauded the principles of affirmative 
action, stating: "In the long run everyone will benefit ftom a good affirmative action 
programme .... "46 But with native people as the only targeted group, the union argued 
that the government was advocating preferential hiring , which it saw as completely 
different from affirmative action. The union argued for a policy that would target all 
"Sulijuq, Vol. IV, No.2, June 1980. 
45 
.. Affirmative Action Discussion Paper: We Need Your Views," Sulijuq, VoL V, 
No. 1, May 1984, 1. 
46J.B. McDonald, "Exec. Secretary's Report: Affirmative Action: A Controversial 
issue," Ibid, 3. 
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under-represented groups, in particular women and people with disabilities. "7 
The union's greatest achievement in improving the lives of aboriginal people was 
organizing workers excluded from union membership by the government's 1982 
legislation. It was ironic, perhaps hypocritical, that the territorial government 
implemented a preferential hiring policy towards native people in 1984 considering that 
the majority of people excluded in the 1982 legislation were Inuit. Employed by hamlet 
governments and local housing authorities for the most pan, in some cases these workers 
received pay and benefits 20 - 30 per cent lower than government employees. "The 
workers had low wages and poor working conditions," Lamb recalled. "They were at the 
pleasure and whims of the local elected politicians of the day."41 
Fred Lamb is credited with being the udriving force in getting these workers 
unionized." Organizing new members within the Alliance was the sole responsibility of 
the PSAC, so he approached the National Board of Directors and convinced them to 
finance an organizing drive.49 Initially using a piece meal strategy, union officials quickly 
realized that, given the unique reality of organizing in the Nonh, a systematic approach to 
organizing was required. The distances between communities were vast, and often the 
47uAffinnative Action: equal opportunity or racism," Ibid, 4-5; Also "President's 
Report: Affirmative Actio~" Sulijuq, Vol. V, No.2, July 1984, 4. It was not until later in 
the decade that the GNWT would target these groups. 
·~History -Part 2 of a series: Coming to your community soon: The UNW 
is more than just GNWT employees," Sulijllq, Vol. IT, No.3, September 1992, 10-14. 
49/bid 
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prospective bargaining units were small, in some cases consisting of only five or six 
individuals. 50 The first organized was the Inuvik Housing Associati.Jn on 4 August 1983. 
Aklavik and Cambridge Bay followed. 51 Because the PSAC held all certificates within the 
Alliance, the CLRB issued them to the PSAC which in tum assigned them to the 
NWTPSA.52 
Although given most of the credit for the successful organizing drive, Fred Lamb 
himself attributed much of the early organizing success to PSAC Regional Representative 
Jim Brahmin, who, "ran around the countryside in moccasins and mukluks" organizing 
hamlets and housing associations. 53 Brahmin, who organized primarily in the 
predominantly Inuit regions of the Kitikmeot and Keewatin, was struck by the natural 
sense of solidarity that existed amongst Inuit workers. "There seemed to be a real sense 
of solidarity amongst the Inuit workers and the Inuit people," Brohmin recalled. "It would 
either be a solidarity around joining [the union] or a solidarity around not joining." Either 
a very high percentage of workers signed cards, or none did.s. In most cases, the 
organizing drives were successful. According to Brohmin, the Inuit "understood the 
~cDonald, interview. 
516
'UNW History- Part 2," 10-14; also ·~egotiations Begin for Housing," Sulijuq, 
Vol. V, No. I, May 1984, 7. 
52personal interview, James "Jim" Brahmin, I September 1999. 
""UNW History - Part 2." I 0-14. 
54Brohmin interview. 
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general concept - solidarity, speaking with one voice, and negotiating. "55 
Brohmin recalled a typical organizing drive took ftom two days to a week. The 
biggest obstacle was the weather since most places he visited were accessible only by air. 
The signing of cards could be done in a couple of days. 56 In some cases the union was 
invited, but in other cases Brohmin went in "cold." People in the community often 
facilitated organizing, depending on the community's size. Mike Ilnik. an Inuit shop 
steward in Rankin Inlet did the initial organizing in some of the Keewatin communities. 57 
In other communities local members of the government bargaining unit helped out: 
In a place like Cambridge Bay, where it's a larger community, generally 
somebody who was already a member of our union would already know 
somebody that worked at the hamlet or the housing association. In a small 
place like Whale Cove I'd basically went in cold and just, basically just 
went over to the office and spoke to one of the people in the office and 
explained who I was and what I'd been doing and that person just got on 
the radio-phone and explained to the workers there was somebody here 
that would like to meet with them. The meeting took place. 51 
With the workers assembled, Brohmin, with an interpreter, would explain what unions 
were about, and talk about grievances and collective agreements. 59 
56/bid.; also Brohmin interview. 
57Brohmin interview. 
51/bid 
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Local community leadership often impeded organizing. According to Brohmi~ if 
a community leader did not feel there was a need for a union, the drive would not succeed. 
Brahmin's success depended upon local leaders. Ofte~ after arriving in a community, 
Brahmin would search out the foreman because in most cases he was the "natural 
leader.~ It was crucial to win over this individual because if a community leader did not 
support the union, few, if anybody else, would. As well. often when a new hamlet council 
was voted in. it would fire the workers and hire relatives. How the hamlet council viewed 
the union would have an impact on how the workers thought. "In many cases," Brahmin 
recalled, "whether or not the local community accepted the union entirely depended on 
what family wielded power and controlled the local council there. Sometimes they gave 
us thumbs up, sometimes we had to go back two or three times and convince them. "61 
Other factors also affected organizing. Whether or not there were existing 
contracts in a region affected getting units organized. If a union officer travelled in a 
region and supplied the organizer with a contact name, it proved helpful. lnuvik, with a 
long active membership in local three, was the first community to have its housing 
authority employees certified, and was also the first CLRB unit to negotiate a contract. 
Incidentally, the lnuvik Housing Authority was one of the few CLRB units which was not 
IIJ/bid 
61
"UNW History- Part 2," l 0-14. 
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predominantly aboriginal in its membership. 62 
By June 1985 the NWTPSA, in cooperation with the PSAC, signed collective 
agreements with the housing authorities oflnuvik, Aklavik, and Cambridge Bay, as well as 
the hamlet of Chesterfield Inlet. It was negotiating first collective agreements with the 
hamlets of Cambridge Bay, Gjoa Haven and Repulse Bay; as well as the Gjoa Haven, 
Repulse Bay, and Eskimo Point housing authorities. Applications were before the CLRB 
to represent the hamlet workers for Whale Cove and Rankin Inlet, in addition to the 
housing authorities of Baker Lake, Rankin Inlet, and Fon Smith. ..Ovenime, call out, 
standby, vacation travel, travel time, comparable wages and seniority, are but a few of the 
benefits won by trade unionists over the years that the above workers do not receive ... ," 
reported Jim Brahmin in June 1985.63 By January 1988 the NWTPSA, which had 
officially changed its name to the Union of Northern Workers the previous fall, had 
members in 16 CLRB units including the Yellowknife and lqaluit housing authorities, the 
Town of Hay River, and the Yellowknife Catholic school board. 64 Within the next four 
years the number of CLRB units doubled. 65 
62Brohmin interview. 
63Jim Brohmi~ "Regional Representative: Organizing Drive," Sulijuq, Vol. V, No. 
4, June 1985, 5. 
~'CLRB bargaining unit update," Sulijuq, Vol. 8, No.I, January/February 1988, 6. 
6 VNW History - Pan 2," 10-14. 
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Bob Yaremko, fonner director of membership services with the NWTPSAIUNW, 
negotiated early agreements for some of these CLRB units in the mid-1980s. He took 
great pride in the part he played in organizing and empowering these workers. "The most 
satisfying thing for me," he stated, "is to see how these members, most of whom are Inuit~ 
and for whom unionism was a new concept, are now running their own locals as Shop 
Stewards and Local Officers."" 
The cost of servicing CLRB units was expensive. Lamb worked out a deal with 
the Alliance to transfer a block of funding to the NWTPSA so that servicing could be 
done directly out ofthe Yellowknife office. In 1987 the NWTPSA hired Joe Ahrens as a 
service officer whose main job was to service CLRB units and organize new ones. 
"(G)one are the days," said Ahrens, "when a PSAC negotiator flew non~ hammered out a 
contract, and left .. .. After the contract's negotiated, we're still here to enforce it," said 
Ahrens, referring to the increased service available from the office in Yellowknife as well 
as the one opened in Iqaluit that year.67 The real beneficiaries of the markedly improved 
relationship between the NWTPSA and the PSAC were unorganized nonhem workers, in 
particular Inuit ones. The organizing of CLRB units continued throughout the later 
1980s. Credit must go to Lamb's leadership in initiating the organization of these 
workers, and in fostering positive relations with the PSAC, without whose assistance and 
66/bid, 10-14. 
61/bid, 10-14. 
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support this process would not have been possible. 
Despite Lamb's re-election in October 1984, the union continued to be dogged by 
transitory leadership.61 Over his previous three year term, Lamb had witnessed 14 
personnel changes in his executive. 69 Such a high turnover was not unusual, and previous 
executives had experienced similar problems. Asked to speculate on the high turnover 
during the mid-1980s, Darm Crook felt that it was probably the work load.70 With the 
exception of the president's position. which was full-time, the executives were all 
volunteers. Balancing a full-time job, unpaid union work, and personal and family lives 
proved too much for many members of the executive. Less than five months after being 
re-elected, Lamb resigned. In his last report in Sulijuq he stated his reasons for leaving as 
''for the most part personal. I feel that I need more time with my family, a luxury that the 
presidency doesn't allow."71 Darrn Crook guessed that Lamb simply could no longer take 
the pressure and stress. 72 Crook became the new president. 73 Although as first vice-
61Jo-Anne Wilson, "Convention Re-elects Lamb," Sulijuq, Voi.S, No.4, December 
1984, 1; also Crook, interview. 
69president's Report, NWTPSA 6111 Triennial Convention, October 1984, Vol. 2, 
Box-file 6-7, UNW. 
70Crook, interview. 
71Fred Lamb, "President's Report,'' Sulijuq, Vol. V, No.4, June 1985, 2. 
12Crook, interview. 
7:to'Dann Crook New President," Sulijuq, Vol. V, No.4, June 1985, l; also ··crook 
gets union post," Yellowknifer, IS May 1985, AlS. 
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president Peter Dyck should have assumed the presidency. he had no intention of returning 
to the office. He had allowed his name to stand for first vice-president at the 1984 
convention because he wanted to assist Lamb, not to take over in his absence. Upon 
Lamb's resignation, Dyck promptly resigned as well and the position fell to Crook, who 
brought to the presidency over ten years active experience with the union, having held 
every office at the local and executive level, except that ofNWTPSA president. 7~ 
Not all ofthe turnover in the union resulted from resignations. In 1985 Ben 
McDonald took a 13 month leave of absence. After six years as executive secretary 
treasurer he too cited "burnout" as his reason.75 To fill in for McDonald during his 
absence, the union hired Douglas Marshall, a store-front lawyer from Toronto. 76 
McDonald took the position ofExecutive Assistant with the Federation ofLabour.17 By 
this time Deborah O'Connell had left the presidency of the Federation and first vice-
president David Johnson, a warehouse worker and member of the PSAC, though not the 
NWTPSA, had assumed control.11 Thus when Crook took over as president of the union, 
7
•crook, interview. 
15Ben McDonald, "Exec. Secretary's Report," Ibid, 3. 
""Marshall Appointed," Ibid, 3. 
171n the fall 1986 issue of Sulijuq McDonald was interviewed in his capacity as EA 
for the Federation. See ··cLC Fights the Feds on Taxes," Slllijllq, Vol. S, No.7, October 
1986, 3. 
11The earliest mention of Johnson as NWTFL president is an article in the 
Yellowlmifer in March 1985 in which the Federation lends its suppon to the Steelworkers 
demand for an inquiry into a death at the Con mine a year earlier. See '~bor supports 
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many changes were happening in the northern labour movement. Still, the union's 
relations with other unions were the best they had been since its earliest days. Aggressive 
organizing solidified the bonds with the PSAC, and the union's top staff person was 
working for the Northwest Territories Federation of Labour. 
The period from late 198S through 1986 represents one of the most active periods 
for the NWTFL, with much of this activism emanating from the NWTPSA. The nature of 
this activity was different too. Whereas in the past, the Federation concerned itself mainly 
with local concerns, now "the Fed" became increasingly active in national labour issues. 
One example was the strike by the combined membership of the United Auto Workers and 
the Canadian Airlines Employees' Association against Pacific Western Airlines. In the 
North, the PSAC, as well as the NWTFL as a whole supported the strikers. 79 According 
to Jim Brahmin, it was the members of the NWTPSA who walked the picket line at the 
Yellowknife Airport. ,., think when there was a need," Brahmin recalled, "they 
[NWTPSA members] were there."10 
inquiry," 13 March 1985, AS. Although reported in the PSAC'sjoumal Argus as a 
member of the Alliance, it is not clear which component he was a member of other than to 
say it was not the NWTPSA. See .. UNW Convention: Name change sets progressive tone 
for UNW," Argus Joun1al, Vol. 22, No. 12, December 1987. 
~u-Ann Lovli~ "PWA strike attracts public servants," Yel/owlmifer, 27 
November 1985, A3. 
aosrohmin, interview. 
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When it became apparent to the Federation that certain Yellowknife businesses 
were performing work usually done by striking employees, the NWTFL called for a 
boycott of those businesses. Specifically mentioned was T.C. Enterprises, a collection of 
stores and restaurants owned by local entrepreneur Tony Chang. Two weeks after the 
Federation announced its boycott of Chang's establishments, as well as other businesses 
doing "scab" work for PW ~ the local chamber of commerce condemned the boycott as 
"discriminatory, predatory, and unworthy."11 It must have been working. 
Another example in which the NWTPSA distinguished itself as a leader within the 
NWTFL, was the strike by 1,080 members of the United Food and Commercial Workers 
against Gainers Meat Packing in Edmonton. The strike was given national prominence 
due to the notoriety of Gainers' owner: Alberta millionaire and hockey team owner Peter 
Pocklington. In late August 1986 when Pocklington arrived at Yellowknife Airport on 
business, about 20 picketers organized by the Federation were there to greet him. Many 
of them were NWTPSA members.12 As the strike dragged on into October the Federation 
ofLabour did its part in Yellowknife by forming an NWTFL Gainers Strike Support 
Committee. Chairing the committee was Doug Marshall, assisted by Ben McDonald, who 
•tLu-Ann Lovlin, "Labour seeks boycott of businesses," Yellowknifer, 4 December 
1985, 1; also Lovlin, "Chamber angry about boycott," Yel/owlmifer, 18 December 1985, 
I. 
12Cathy Jewison, "Saturday pickets: Labour group demonstrates against 
Pocklington," Yel/owlmifer, 20 August 1986, 1; also "NWTPS~" Update, 22 August 
1986, 1, Box-file 8-28, UNW. 
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though members of the Steelworkers, were identified by the local press through their 
coMection with the NWTPSA. The committee organized a local boycott of Gainers 
product~ hosted public meetings, and set up information picket lines in front of stores 
which continued to sell Gainers' products.13 In additio~ the committee raised funds for 
the striking workers. It ''adopted" 25 children of the strikers, raising $900 through a 
dance to purchase two Christmas gifts for each child."' Jim Brohmin remembered the 
NWTPSA, not the Federation, as responsible for raising approximately $20,000 for the 
striking UFCW members. 15 It is no wonder that Jim Edmondson, a political consultant 
contracted by the Federation in the spring of 1986 recalled the period as a time when the 
NWTPSA was pretty much running the NWTFL.16 It was only after the NWTPSA 
changed its name that relations with the Federation began to deteriorate. 
The name change to Union ofNorthem Workers occurred under the increasing 
likelihood that the territories would split into Nunawt and a western territory. Desirous of 
representing workers in both future jurisdictions, and not wanting to be identified solely 
with the western territory, the executive met in January to consider this, as well as the 
13Lu-Ann Lovli~ "Labour supports boycott," Yellowlmifer, 8 October 1986, B6; 
also Lovli~ "Support for Gainers' workers," Yel/owlmifer, 22 October 1986, A4; 
"NWTPSA," Update, 3 October 1986, I; "NWTPSA," Update, 10 October 1986, 1; 
"NWT," UpdDte, 31 October 1986, I, Box-file 8-28, UNW. 
"'~SA: Gainers strike support," Update, 28 November 1986, 1; also 
·~."Update, 5 December 1986, 1, Box-file 8-28, UNW. 
15Brohmi~ interview. 
"Personal interview with Jim Edmundson, 2 September 1999. 
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changing nature of the organization with the taking on of CLRB units. It referred the idea 
to the triennial convention scheduled for that fall. 17 In the interim, the union expended 
much of its energy and resources in servicing and supporting its CLRB units which 
brought with them unique challenges, specifically decertification bids and strikes. 
In the spring of 1987 employees of the Hamlet of Cambridge Bay applied to have 
the PSAC - and by extension the NWTPSA - decertified as their bargaining agent. 
Although the 1 S hamlet employees who were members of Local 7 had made a previous 
bid to have the union decertified, that attempt had fizzled out. This application, however, 
proceeded to a hearing. "They don't want much," Doug Marshall wrote to union 
president Dann Crook referring to the Cambridge Bay workers, "just a collective 
agreement. "11 In the two years since becoming members of the union, the hamlet workers 
had yet to receive the primary benefit of union membership - the right to collective 
bargaining . .. We were too slow," acknowledged Jim Brohmin. Insisting that behind the 
scenes there had to be government people involved in the decertification bid, he admitted 
the union had to take a large degree of responsibility as it took a year and a half to get a 
bargaining committee organized. In the meantime, the workers filed an application for 
decertification. Although the disgruntled workers were eventually convinced to withdraw 
11'~SA," Update, 23 January 1987, 1; also McDonald, interview. According 
to McDonald, Fort Smith RVP Wayne Cahill suggested the name Union ofNorthem 
Workers 
11Memo, Doug Marshall to Dann Crook, 6 Aprill987, Box-file 16-20, UNW; also 
Kathy Kohut, "Undecided workers keep union," News, 3 April 1987, A6. 
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the application, the message had been sent to the union that dues from CLRB units took 
greater efforts to be eamed.19 
CLRB units' ability to strike presented another challenge to the union. In 1986, 
employees of the Inuvik Housing Authority were still seeking a contract on par with 
government workers, while the employer sought to eliminate gains already won by the 
union over the past three years. After a year of negotiations, talks broke off and the 
fourteen employees walked out on 21 March.90 From the start, the NWTPSA and the 
PSAC supported the strikers financially. The NWTPSA donated $2,000 to the strike fund 
and $12.50 per day per person in strike pay. The PSAC paid the strikers $125.00 per 
week and contributed an additional $2,250 per month to the local to distribute to the 
strikers at its discretion. A strike support committee was formed under the slogan u A 
fight for survival."91 Importantly, the committee was not established in lnuvik, but rather 
Yellowknife with a much larger population, many of its residents being union members. 
The committee was composed of representatives from the Federation ofLabour, all three 
NWTPSA locals in Yellowknife, as well as members of the Steelworkers and the National 
"Brohmin, interview; also Kohut, "Undecided workers/' A6. 
9CUntitled article, Sulijuq, Vol. 7, No.2, April/May 1987, 1; also Craig Harper, 
"lnuvik housing workers ready to strike," News, 13 February 1987, 1; Kathy Kohut, 
••Inuvik housing workers go on strike," News, 21 March 1987, 1,14A; Darm Crook, 
"President's Report: PSA Members Set to Strike," Sulijuq, Vol. 7, No. I, February/March 
1987, 2. 
9"~'\\'TPSA Suppons First Strike," Sulijuq, Vol. 7, No.2, ApriL~1ay 1987, 1. 
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Association of Broadcast Engineers and Technicians. 91 
The strike lasted 12 weeks and demonstrated some of the fundamental differences 
between CLRB units and the main gov~~mment unit.91 Aside from the obvious right to 
strike, CLRB units could file complaints against the employer with the board, which could 
order the employer to grant redress. 94 The first of these complaint~ one of unfair labour 
practices, was filed on March 17, four days prior to the stan of the strike. On March 6 the 
IHA fired employee Derek Lindsay on the grounds of incompetence. Lindsay was 
president of Local 3 and the membership representative on the union's negotiating team. 95 
He was fired five days after the strike vote. When the CLRB finally heard the complaint 
April 30 it ordered the IHA to reinstate Lindsay and to compensate him for any losses. 96 
Such heavy handed tactics by the employer did much to generate support for the 
strikers both inside and outside the labour movement. In the first month of the strike 
nearly $9,000 was raised from unions, businesses, and individuals. "The employer's 
refusal to negotiate and the hiring of scab labor and a known union buster have made it 
~Strike Support," News, 22 May 1987, A6. 
91
"UNW History: Part 6 of a series: 25 years oflabour peace, S11/ijuq. Vol. 12, No. 
3, Fall 1993, (10-12) 10. 
94Brohmin, interview. 
""Inuvik Housing Authority;' Update, 3 April 1987, 1, Box-file 8-29, UNW; also 
Kathy Kohut, "Union files unfair labour complaint," News, 21 March 1987, A15. 
96
"Union Wins Unfair Labour Practice Complaint," Sulijuq, Vol 7, No. 2, 
April/May 1987, 3. 
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easier to win support for the workers," Darm Crook told News!North.97 That same month 
the Alliance published an appeal to suppon the striking lnuvik workers which was 
distributed to 1, 400 union locals across Canada. Money came in from throughout the 
North in large and small amounts. Local6 in Hay River contributed $2,000 to the cause; 
even the staff and clients at the Northern Lights Treatment Centre gave S 110.91 On April 
30 PSAC national president Darryl Bean, accompanied by Darm Croo~ flew to lnuvik 
and spent the day walking the picket line and offering support to the strikers before 
returning to Yellowknife for the NWTFL convention. 99 For a bargaining unit of 14 
members north of the Arctic Circle, the support that the strikers received was truly 
phenomenal. 
The second complaint that the union lodged with the CLRB ended the strike. On 
7 May the IHA made an otTer to the union which the negotiating team took back to its 
members who accepted it. The rnA then withdrew the already ratified contract and added 
two more stipulations: the union had to withdraw the unfair labour practice complaint 
regarding Lindsay, and it had to agree to the exclusion of four positions already in the 
bargaining unit. The union charged the IHA with bargaining in bad faith. The CLRB 
ruled in the union's favour and the employer was ordered to pay the workers' wages and 
97
"Strikers get funds," News, 24 April1987, A10. 
91/bid; also '&lnuvik Strikers Get Wide Support," Sulijuq, Vol. 7, No. 2, April/May 
1987, 6. 
gg.'PSAC National President Visits lnuvi~" Ibid, 3. 
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benefits, less any strike pay received, retroactive to May 7, the day the strikers would have 
returned to work had the IHA not bargained in bad faith. The IHA also had to pay the 
union the total amount it had paid out in strike pay .100 The NWTPSA had fought and won 
its first strike. 
Other strikes that the union fought in the late 1980s highlighted the unique cultural 
features of the union's membership. Unlike Inuvik, these other strikes took place in small, 
isolated, Inuit communities. The first was in Gjoa Haven, where 15 hamlet employees 
struck for one day in November 1987 after being without a contract since March 31 .101 
Jim Brohmin, along with Joe Ahrens and Dianne Strilaeff, conducted a strike preparation 
course with the workers there in September which included simultaneous translation into 
Inuktitut. 102 Brahmin recalled a particular moment near the end of the course that made 
clear the unique nature of union organizing in the Arctic: 
Through the interpreter I asked if there were any questions, and one of the 
workers, ... an elder in the back, put up his hand and asked a question to 
the interpreter. And I could tell ... that it was an important question, that 
1001
'NWTPSA," Update, 3 July 1987, 1, Box-file 8-30, UNW; also "Inuvik 
Housing Authority," Update, 19 June 1987, 2; "lnuvik Housing Authority Strike Ends," 
Sulijuq, Vol. 7, No.3, June/July 1987, 1; Kathy Kohut," Union to file complaint with 
minister," News, 8 May 1987, 87; Craig Harper," Labor complaint to be heard," News, 12 
June 1987, 86; Harper, nlnuvik housing strikers accept contract," News, 3 July 1987, 1. 
101
"Gjoa workers may go on strike," News, 28 August 1987, A10; also Craig 
Harper, "Gjoa strike stiU looms," Ibid, 7 December 1987, 15; also ··25 years," Sulijuq, 10. 
1~raig Harper, "Workers prepared for possible strike," News, 25 September 
1987, Al2. 
everybody's attention was focussed on my response. And the interpreter 
turned to me and said, 'He wants to know if we should bring our rifles'. 103 
Recognizing the cultural significance of fireanns, openly carried in the community, 
Brohmin realized it was time to review the importance of preventing picket line 
violence.•oc 
Cultural factors in northern labour relations were also highlighted when union 
president Darm Crook went to the community and walked the picket line with his Inuit 
brothers. With temperatures ranging from - 45 to - 48 degrees Celsius, Crook and 
145 
members of the bargaining unit took 20 minute shifts on the line. "On one of my shifts," 
he recalled, 04the Hamlet Mayor came up and tore a strip off me. He told me this wasn't 
the Inuit way of solving problems and this was all my fault. I told him, 'Sir, this is the only 
way. "'105 Although the one day strike forced the employer back to the bargaining table and 
won a contract without concessions on the union's part, it took the union and employer 
until the end of February the following year to reach an agreement. 106 
The strike by 20 employees of the Hamlet of Cambridge Bay almost a year later 
was almost a replay of the Gjoa Haven strike. Again, the workers had been without a 
contract since 31 Marc(\ negotiations broke down in mid-June, and by September efforts 
103Brohmin, interview. 
105&625 years,, Sulijuq, II. 
106/bid; also Brohmin, interview. 
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at conciliation had failed. The hamlet brought in the same negotiator that Gjoa Haven had 
employed the year previously, with the intention of reversing previous worker gains. 107 
Still, there were differences between the two strikes. The Cambridge Bay strike was 
spontaneous. The union did not have time to send a staff person in to conduct a strike 
preparation course. Instead~ one day after lunch in mid-September. as negotiations were 
ongoing. the workers, in a legal strike position, walked out on their own into - 40 degree 
weather. The tactic worked; within two hours a tentative agreement was reached and 
soon the 20 employees returned to work. 101 
Not all of the UNW' s CLRB units were small. isolated ones above the Arctic 
Circle. With the purchase of the NWT portion of the Northern Canada Power 
Corporation by the territorial government, the employees of the newly formed NWT 
Power Corporation became the newest and largest CLRB unit within the UNW with Ill 
members. Greatly facilitating the addition of these new members to the UNW was that as 
NCPC employees the workers were already members of the Alliance. 109 
107 Ibid; also Judy Shuttlewo~ "Conciliator appointed to resolve labor dispute," 
News, 21 August 1989, 1; Shuttleworth, "Hamlet strike looms," Ibid. S September 1989, 
I; Shuttleworth, "Conciliation fails," Ibid, 11 September 1989, 1. 
101
"25 years," Slllijllq, 11. 
·~a da Luz Senra, "Union may try to block NCPC transfer," News, 7 March 
1988. t-2; also da Luz Senra, "NCPC workers join UNW," fbi~ 14 March 1988. 3~ 
''NCPC employees to join UNW," Sulijuq, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1. 
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Also adding substantial numbers to the UNW throughout the 1980s was the 
territorial takeover of federally administered health care facilities. The addition of d1ese 
workers to the UNW made unexpected allies of the union and the government when the 
devolution of these responsibilities led to a I on& drawn out court case between the 
government and the Professional Institute ofthe Public Service of Canada (PIPSC). 
Although the territories had taken over responsibility for Stanton Yellowknife Hospital in 
1979, with the exception oftwo privately run hospitals in Fon Smith and Hay River, the 
bulk ofhealth care in the NWT in the 1980s was still administered by Health and Welfare 
Canada. This included a system of 3 7 community nursing stations, 8 health stations 
(essentially satellite nursing stations in very small communities) and two general hospitals 
in Inuvik and Frobisher Bay. 110 While the non-medical staff of these institutions were 
members of the National Health and Welfare component of the PSAC, the nursing staff 
were members ofthe PIPSC. In 1982 the federal government devolved the Frobisher Bay 
hospital to the Government of the Northwest Territories. In July, Alliance negotiator Tom 
Dinan met in Yellowknife with two employee representatives of the hospital: Terry 
O'Hara of the Health and Welfare Component, and Yvonne Peyton for PIPSC.111 A 
month later Ben McDonald was in Frobisher Bay meeting with members of both 
110Annua/ Report, 1916, 104. Frobisher Bay became lqaluit I January 1987. 
1111
'Frobisher Bay Hospital~" NWTPSA Newsletter .. 2-9 July 1982 .. 1, Box-file 8-25, 
UNW. 
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organizations. 112 The Commissioner made it clear to PIPSC that should the nurses wish to 
remain members, they would be allowed if the NWTPSA agreed, and if PIPSC could 
show the government that the nurses in fact wanted to remain members. PIPSC made no 
attempt to do this and the nurses became NWTPSA members. 113 
In 1986 the 32 federally employed nurses elsewhere in the Baffin zone were • 
notified that responsibilities for health care in that region were being devolved to the 
territories, and that as of September 1 they would cease to be employees of the federal 
government, but would be offered comparable positions with the new employer. The 
reaction ofPIPSC this time was substantially different than in 1982. It approached the 
government and requested enabling legislation to be recognized as the bargaining agent for 
the NWT nurses. They were refused on the grounds that they could not demonstrate they 
had the support of the nurses in this endeavour. 114 Even had PIPSC been able to 
demonstrate that the 32 nurses in question did in fact want to retain their membership, the 
government recognized the inherent difficulties in recognizing PIPSC as the bargaining 
112
"McDonald in Frobisher Bay,n Ibid, 1-9 August 1982, 1, Box-file 8-25, UNW. 
113Supreme Court of Canada, Memorandum of Argument of the Respondent, The 
Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, 23 December 1988, Box-file 18-9, UNW. An 
anicle in News/North at the time stated that PIPSC did in fact apply to represent devolving 
nurses in 1982, but if that was in fact the case, its efforts were half·hearted at best. See 
Canadian Press, "Nurses lose labor bi~n News, 20 August 1990, AI. 
114Factum of the Respondent, The Northwest Territories Public Service 
Association. in the Coun of Appeal ofthe Northwest Territories, 34, Box-file 18-10~ 
UNW. 
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agent for territorial nurses when Stanton and Frobisher Bay hospitals had been represented 
by the NWTPSA for seven and four years respectively. In response. PIPSC filed suit in 
the territorial Supreme Court, charging that the legislation that gave the NWTPSA sole 
jurisdiction to represent government workers other than teachers violated the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.115 
Initially PIPSC' challenge was successful. In September 1987 the NWT Supreme 
Court ruled that section 42 (1) of the NWT Public Service Act was .. inconsistent with the 
. 
charter of rights and freedoms. and of no force or effect." 116 The Government of the 
115Craig Harper. "Gov't workers have choice says coun." News, 25 September 
1988, I. To understand the remarkably different response of the PIPSC to losing members 
in 1986 in comparison to 1982, one must understand the nature ofPIPSC itself Loosely 
associated with the Civil Service Federation in the 1950s, PIPSC made it clear as early as 
1959 that it was an organization of "professionals" and wanted nothing to do with 
"unions." Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, as governments increasingly cut back 
wages and benefits of public servants, many members ofPIPSC became increasingly 
dissatisfied with their bargaining agent. Between 1975 and 1984 twelve applications were 
made to have various PIPSC bargaining units decertified in an effort to replace it with a 
more militant workers, organization. Seven of these applications were successful, most 
often with the Canadian Union ofProfessional and Technical Employees- itself having 
begun as a disgruntled faction within PIPSC -being the chief beneficiary of new members. 
Gene Swimmer points out in his article "Militancy in Public Sector Union," PIPSC has 
historically been the least "union like" organization of public servants. but as a result of 
this haemorrhage of membership was forced to become more militant. Seen in this light, 
the decision by PIPSC to challenge the GNWf, and by extension the NWTPSAIUNW, 
was as much an opportunity for the PIPSC to send a message to its membership that it 
was indeed willing to fight when challenged. [See Lemelin, Public Service, 60; also Gene 
Swimmer, "Militancy in Public Sector Union." in Co11jlict or Compromise: The Future of 
Public Sector l~rdustrial Relations, Mark Thompson and Gene Swimmer, eds., Institute 
for Research on Public Policy, Montreal. 1984, I 56.] 
116Harper, "Gov"t workers," 1. 
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Northwest Territories appealed the ruling and the case was heard by the Alberta Court of 
Appeal 8 March 1988, but a ruling was not handed down until later. 117 In the meantime, 
the federal and territorial governments proceeded with the devolution of the 130 
remaining nurses' positions in the Keewatin, Kitikmeot, Inuvi~ and Mackenzie regions. 111 
In July the appeals court ruled against PIPSC, re-affirming the Government of the 
Northwest Territories' right to certify bargaining units under section 42(1) of the Public 
Service Act. 119 PIPSC responded by taking the issue to the Supreme Court of Canada and 
the case was heard in 1990 with Canada's highest court ruling against it. 120 While Leo 
Panitch and Donald Swartz lament this ruling as an assault against the right to freedom of 
association, stating that the ruling effectively gave government the right to determine what 
union employees may belong to, 121 UNW president Darm Crook explained the ruling 
differently. According to Crook, the bargaining unit in question comprised government 
employees [other than teachers]. IfPIPSC wanted to be the agent for that unit, it could 
sign them up like any other union. It did not have the authority to define its own 
117 As there is no NWT court of appeal, such cases are heard in provincial courts of 
appeal. 
111Kirsty Jackson, ''Nurses' union moves to block transfer," News, 14 March 1988, 
1·2; also '~urses taking battle to court," Ibid, 4 April 1988, 3. 
n'Jackson, "PIPS loses in battle for nurses," Ibid, 8 August 1988, I. 
120Cooper Langford, l&Former nurses' union renews court battle," Ibid, 23 January 
1989, 2. 
121Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, The Assat~lt on Trade Union Freedoms: From 
Wage Controls to Social Colltract, Garamond, Toronto, 1993, 71-74. 
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bargaining units. 122 While all territorial nurses were paying dues to the UNW by 1988, the 
certainty of their membership in the UNW was not confirmed until the Supreme Court's 
decision. 
Meanwhile in Hay River~ H. H. Williams Memorial Hospital, privately owned by 
the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canad' operated entirely without unionized employees. 
Georgina Rolt-Kaiser, present-day president of the UNW, was surprised by this when she 
arrived there in 1984 to begin a part-time position at the hospital. "I asked if there was a 
union here," recalled Rolt-Kaiser. "I will never forget the answer I received: 'Union? 
Union? We don't require a union here. We're a family. We treat everybody fairly.' I will 
go to the grave with that," Rolt-Kaiser claims and asserted that church management 
played an important role in hospital culture and staff morale: 
I was not of the faith . . . . I gave it all my best. I worked sometimes 120 
hours in two weeks overtime. I literally worked ten hours, ten shifts in a 
row, sometimes twelve hour shifts because they were short. Come 
September, and we have six brand new RNAs come to beautiful H. H. 
Williams Memorial Hospital, all of the faith. I was not of the faith so I 
never had a full-time job. So here we are September, October, November; 
I turned around and there was another position opening, and of course I'm 
a part-time employee still- mind you I'm getting lots of hours, so no 
problem there- but I wanted a full-time job, and they're bringing another 
person up because of the faith. 123 
Not until she threatened to tile a complaint of discrimination based on religion with the 
Employment Standards Board was Rolt-Kaiser finally given a full-time position in 
122Crook, interview. 
123Personal interview, Georgina Rolt-Kaiser, 8 August 1999. 
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Organizing officially began 29 November 1988. Darm Crook. Jim Brahmin, John 
Findlay, and Joe Ahrens all worked on the drive. 125 Findlay and Crook were both long 
term residents of Hay River, which must have helped as they could approach prospective 
members not only as professional organizers, but also as neighbours. Still, religion 
remained an obstacle to organizing. "We still had the faith to deal with ... ," recalled Rolt-
Kaiser. "And we were all going to bum in hell, and it was really, really, pretty serious, 
because we're going against -we're looking at religious aspects here so it was quite 
contentious right from the stan. "126 Jim Brahmin recollected that in the beginning of the 
certification drive workers were split along religious lines. Although the church did not 
support the organizing drive, it did not play an active role in opposing it and many church 
124/bid Where the impetus to organize the hospital originated is difficult to 
determine. Rolt-Kaiser takes no credit, saying that in late 1988 or early 1989 someone 
else approached the PSAC and requested them to organize the hospital. However, 
according to an internal memo, the PSAC National Board of Directors authorized an 
organizing drive at H. H. Williams over a year earlier, so it is difficult to determine 
whether the drive was initiated by the employees or by the PSAC. [See Rolt-Kaiser 
interview; also Memo from Darm Crook to Mike McTaggart, re H.H. Williams Drive, 
undated, Box-file 16-3; also Fax to Jim Brahmin from Greg {no last name} PSAC, 
Ottawa, same file.] 
ru Ibid; also Brohmin interview. 
126Rolt-Kaiser, interview. 
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members eventually signed cards. 127 The CLRB issued a certificate on II May 1989121 
and Darm Crook commented that it was the longest organizing drive to date in the union's 
history. 129 
Distinguishing the newly organized UNW local 21 was that it was one of the only 
locals with an all woman executive. 130 Also, as a CLRB unit, it was closer in size to the 
NWTPC. 
The subject of CLRB units figured prominently at the NWTPSA convention in 
Hay River, 5-7 September 1987. The union now held 23 such cenificates. In addition, 
tentative discussions had begun regarding the possible transfer of City of Yellowknife 
workers ftom the PSAC's National Component to the NWTPSA, as well as the merger of 
the union with its Yukon equivalent.131 Similar discussions would come a few months 
later regarding the possibility of a merger of the NWTPSA and the teachers' union, 132 but 
121Brohmin, interview. 
121CLRB Cenificate Order for H. H. Williams Memorial Hospital and PSAC, 11 
May 1989, Box-file 17-16, UNW. 
129Stacey Campbell, "Hospital staff meets with union," News, S June 1989, I . 
1~olt-Kaiser, interview; also letter, John Findlay, PSAC Regional Representative, 
to Dann Crook, 6 July 1989, Box-file 17-19, UNW. 
131 James Lawrence, "New Name for NWTPSA, push for more members," Native 
Press, 18 September 1987, 9. 
1~emo to Dann Crook and Ben MacDonald from Doug Marshall, 15 February 
1988, Box-file 15-10, UNW; also Notes of meeting with officers ofNWTTAand UNW, 
topic of merger, undated, Box-file 16-1, UNW; and Crook, interview. An officer of the 
NWTT A broached the subject with Doug Marshall duri~g an informal conversation on 13 
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none of these ideas ever came to fruition. One of the dominant themes arising out of the 
convention was the push for more members, particularly in the private sector. 133 
In addition to the union's change of name, some other items of interest from the 
1987 convention concerned translation. elections, and relations with the PSAC. Joe 
Koonoo, a unilinguallnuktititut-speaking delegate from the north Baffin community of 
Pond Inlet was provided with a '~hisper translator" to enable him to participate in the 
proceedings. Through his translator he requested improved services for unilingual 
lnuktitut speaking members. 134 In union elections, Crook was acclaimed for another three 
years, with Dianne Strilaeff elected first vice-president. and Inuvik' s Jim Wilson elected 
second vice-president. 135 
Alliance president Darryl Bean addressed the convention. He spoke with hope 
regarding to the UNW' s future relations with the larger labour movement: 
You have been through your first strike - a long and bitter dispute with the 
Inuvik Housing Authority - and the road ahead looks difficult at best. But 
you have learned some valuable lessons over the last three years; you have 
learned who your fiiends are and you have identified your enemies. Your 
February 1988. This was followed up by a meeting between Darm Croo~ Ben 
MacDonald, and Kevin White representing the UNW; and AI MacDonald, John Rouble, 
and Blake Lyons for the NWTT A. Nothing progressed in this matter past this point. 
133Lawrence, ''New Name," 9; also Craig Harper, "Union wants to expand 
membership, News. 11 September 1987, A9. 
134/bid, 1. 
135Minutes, 120. 
friends are clearly the Public Service Alliance of Canada and the union 
movement in Canada. 136 
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Bean's words were ironic for within the next three year relations between the UNW and 
the NWTFL were strained to breaking point. As well, the UNW would again be 
considering disaffiliation from the PSAC. 
Less than two weeks after the close of the convention a column in the Native Press 
by Jim Evoy, a Yellowknife columnist, ushered in this process of growing alienation from 
other unions. Evoy had originally come to Yellowknife in 1983 as a representative of the 
Construction and General Workers' Union, an affiliate of the Laborers' International 
Union. The union essentially functioned as an employment agency, working together with 
Employment Canada in recruiting Dene workers for the Norman Wells pipeline project. 137 
Work on the project lasted until July 1985, at which time Evoy's position became 
redundant and the union subsequently closed its doors. 131 Evoy left the North temporarily, 
but n~t before having established a rapport with Native Press writer, and later editor, Lee 
136
"A Positive Note for the UNW," Sulijuq, Vol. 7, No.4, Convention 87 edition, 
(no date) 8. 
137
"Union Rep explains pipeline work," Native Press, 2 December 1983, 14. In this 
capacity, Evoy was commissioned by the Department of Indian Aft"airs and Northern 
Development to write a report on Dene participation in the pipeline project. [ See Frances 
Abele, Gatheri11g Stre11gth, {Arctic Institute ofNorth America: Calgary, 1989} l 02n.] 
131Lee SeUeck, "No Jobs now for labourers, says Evoy," Native Press, 12 July 
1985, 10-11; also "No More Union," Ibid, 20 September 1985, 3. Selleck later 
distinguished himself for his coverage of the Giant mine strike and the the murders 
associated with it. He subsequently coauthored a book on the subject. See chapter one. 
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Selleck.139 Evoy returned to Yellowknife the following year as a columnist for the paper. 
Titled "Pat on the bac~ kick in the butt," Evoy's 18 September 1987 column was 
nothing less than a declaration of war on the UNW. Accusing it of doing a poor job of 
representing territorial workers, he encouraged the union to fight its own battles and stay 
out ofthe private sector. 140 Describing the UNW as solely a government union, he made 
no mention of its 23 CLRB units. Despite UNW statements to the contrary in both 
News/North and the Native Press, 141 Evoy charged the union with having designs on the 
membership of other unions. "The concept of&One Big Union' has already alened some 
of the more vocal trade unions to suspect raiding," Evoy wrote. 1" 2 Ifthis was in fact the 
suspicions of other nonhero labour leaders, none of them stated it at the time. Evoy 
implied that the UNW' s push for an expanded membership was sabotaging an already 
existent effon to organize workers in the Nonh: 
A small group of dedicated people have been trying to get some seed 
money to look at the possibility of forming a Nonhero General Workers 
Union. Rumours had pointed to a founding convention next year. Now it 
appears that they have been scooped by a public service union with an 
13
'Between 2 December 1983 and 20 September 1985 Native Press ran nine 
articles on the union and its panicipation in the Norman Wells pipeline project. In every 
article where the author is named, Selleck is the writer. Evoy is cited is every article. 
140Jim Evoy, "Pat on the bac~ kick in the butt," Native Press, 18 September 1987, 
8. 
141Harper, "Union wants," A9; Lawrence, "New Name," 9. 
14~voy, "Pat on bac~" 8. 
Ottawa parent body that never really paid them much attention in the 
past.l43 
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Evoy concluded by suggesting that the UNW would be better off giving its money to this 
effort and staying out of the private sector. 
Evoy's assertions are suspect. Who were these "dedicated people" who were 
going to organize the unorganized - something the NWTPSA together with the PSAC had 
been doing for the past four years - after a founding convention the following year? 
Likely, these people did not exist. Evoy's motivations in attacking the UNW are 
completely unknown, but it is possible that he was attempting to carve himself a niche in 
the nonhero labour movement. 
Evoy was not without his friends in the labour movement though. In the same 
issue in which he fired his broadside at the UNW, there appeared a letter titled .. Thanks 
for interest in working people. " 144 The letter expressed its gratitude to the Native Press, 
and Evoy in panicular, for taking an interest in labour issues. It was signed "Femand 
Deneault, Member ofthe Executive, Local802, U.S.W.A .. " 145 That Deneault's letter 
appeared in the same issue in which Evoy attacked the UNW is likely not coincidental. 
Since the completion of the Norman Wells pipeline in 1985, Evoy was a union man 
143/bid, 8. 
144Femand Deneault, "Thanks for interest in working people," Native Press, 18 
September 1987, 22. 
145 Ibid, 22. Local 802 represented the Steelworkers at Con mine. 
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without a union card writing for a non-unionized newspaper. Deneault's letter gave Evoy 
the appearance of popularity among blue collar workers. 1" Over the ensuing months 
Evoy was able to impress the leadership of the NWT Federation of Labour enough-
Deneault being its vice-president - to be hired as part-time executive assistant, in March 
1988. 147 From that point on. UNW relations with the Federation would steadily 
deteriorate. 
Shortly after coming on staff with the Federatio~ Evoy returned to the topic of 
establishing a new union for unorganized workers in his column in March 1989. 
Addressing his comments to construction workers, and ironically lambasting existing 
construction workers' unions for their "fixation on bank balances and shiny suits," Evoy 
dismissed public sector and mining unions as not "geared up to help."1"' The UNW 
responded to Evoy's comments- five weeks later. Agreeing with Evoy that workers must 
be organized to protect their interests, Ben McDonald9 S letter of response in the Native 
Press was nothing less than a sales pitch for the UNW: 
... workers need look no further than the Union of Northern Workers. 
Although this union once only represented employees of the Government 
of the Northwest Territories, this is steadily changing. For the past few 
1
"Wben Deneault ran for the Western Arctic NDP nomination in June 1988 he was 
described in the press as having been in the North for 17 years, a former president of 
Local 802, and a current vice-president in the Federation of Labour. See "Deneault joins 
NDP race," Native Press, 10 June 1988, 2. 
147
"NWTFL hires part-time staff," Sulijuq, Vol. 8, No.2, March/April 1988, 9. 
141Ttm Evoy, "Foolin' with northern workers," Native Press, 31 March 1989, 22. 
years we have been taking on more and more non-GNWT bargaining units. 
Presently we are at more than 20 of these groups. And within the last year 
we have increased our organizing staff by three positions, and these people 
are travelling throughout the NWT working towards the sign~up of ever 
more workers into the union movement. 
It seems foolhardy for a group of workers trying to organize 
themselves to try to start a union of their own. Why not join the largest 
and strongest union in the North? We have the resources and the desire to 
take on the job ... 
We need one big union for all the various sorts of working people 
in the NWT: public or private sector, professional, clerical, construction. 
whatever. There's strength in numbers. The best nucleus for this powerful 
and representative organization is the UNW. 1"9 
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The reason it took McDonald five weeks to respond was that at the UNW' s full executive 
meeting on 21 May the union's leadership committed itself to organizing workers 
employed in retail operations, hotels. and government contracting. 150 McDonald used 
Evoy's column to initiate the organizing drive. 
That Evoy did not respond to McDonald's rallying cry suggests that he used his 
connections with Local 802 of the Steelworkers, as well as his recently acquired staff 
position with the Federation of labour, to instigate something resembling the first labour 
battle north of sixty. It began with a letter from John J. Davis, president ofLocal802. 
Instead ofbringing his concerns to UNW president Crook. Davis wrote to Federation of 
Labour president Dave Johnso~ enclosing a copy ofMcDonald's May 271etter in the 
Native Press, and stating to Johnson: "We view this aggressive stance as dangerous to the 
1491. B. McDonald, '4Good column Ji~ y'all sign up, hear?" Native Press, 27 May 
1989, 12. 
·~euer, Darm Crook to Darryl Bean, 13 January 1989, Box-file 16~1. UNW. 
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House of Labour and request your support and intervention:·m The following day, again 
ignoring the UNW, Johnson wrote directly to PSAC president Darryl Bean, requesting 
him to review "the enclosed documents [a copy of McDonald's letter, and presumably a 
copy of Davis' letter] related to a rather controversial tum of events in the NWT." and 
asked him to intervene. 152 Bean's reply two days later simply told him not to worry as the 
UNW was not raiding anyone. 153 This was followed by a letter from Crook to Davis to 
the same effect. 154 
The planned organizing drive by the UNW among retail, hotel, and government 
contracting workers never got off the ground, though it is doubtful that the efforts of 
Evoy, Johnson and Davis had an impact on the matter. What was revealed through this 
series of letters were two important factors that would continue to grow in the next 
decade and significantly divide the northern labour movement. The first was a 
demonstrated hostility on Evoy's part towards the UNW. The second was he shared this 
hostility not only with the leaders of Local 802, but also with the top officials of the 
Federation of Labour. There was certainly a willingness, if not enthusiasm, by both 802 
and the Federation to embarrass the UNW, rather than confront the union and 
constructively deal with the issue. That the latter route was not taken is also related to the 
151Letter, Davis to Johnson, 30 May 1988, Box-file 16-1, UNW. 
15~etter, Johnson to Bean, 31 May 1988, Box-file 16-1, UNW. 
'"Letter, Bean to Johnston [sic] 2 June 1989, Box-file 16-1, UNW. 
154Letter, Crook to Davis, 16 June 1988, Box-file 16-1, UNW. 
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fact that there was no issue to be resolved. Aside from McDonald's rhetorical use of the 
old Wobbly term uone Big Union," at no time had the UNW made any overtures of 
raiding any union's membership. 
This willingness to embarrass the UNW was not an isolated incident. The 
following February, Deneault, acting in his capacity as vice-president of"the Fed," filed a 
report with that organization's executive stating that he had been approached by members 
of UNW locals who wanted to leave the UNW and join another union. Again, at no point 
was the UNW approached in an effort to attempt to address the workers' concerns, nor 
was the union even advised in advance that such a report would be filed. If the purpose of 
Deneault's report was to infuriate Crook, it was successful. 155 More likely, it was just 
another attempt to embanass the UNW. 
Darm Crook generally viewed the growing conflict between the UNW and the 
NWTFL in the late 1980s as essentially one of personalities between Evoy and himself. 
"Some players," he stated, "just don't get along together." It should be remembered 
though that at the time, Johnson, not Evoy, was president of the Federation. Former 
NWTFL consultant Jim Edmondson concurred that a difference of personalities existed 
between Evoy and Crook, and that relations between Johnson and Crook were good until 
the hiring ofEvoy. Johnson, however, himself a member of the PSAC, was sandwiched 
between his vice-president, Deneault, and his assistant, Evoy, who were both 
155Letter, Crook to Deneault, 10 February 1989, Box-file 16-2, UNW. 
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demonstrably hostile to the UNW. 
Not surprisingly, Johnson became increasingly hostile to the UNW himself 
Edmondson believes that there was a deliberate effort on the pan of Johnson and Evoy to 
put a distance between the two organizations. "It was all papered over with the standard 
union protocol and jargon," says Edmondson. "Participants in the conflict would try to 
characterize it as white collar versus blue collar, but that didn't really adequately capture it 
because Johnson was a warehouseman .... " That Crook and his two predecessors, Lamb 
and Dyck were all highways employees, further diminishes this artificial white versus blue 
collar characterization of the conflict. However, reality did not deter Evoy from 
attempting to perpetuate this mythology to distance the UNW from the rest of northern 
labour. ''Evoy would always try to characterize it as 'the Fed' trying to represent the 
interests of 'real working men', whereas the UNW represented wimpy, effete, white collar 
workers .... "156 It is too simple, though, to place responsibility for the growing division 
between the UNW and the rest of the northern labour movement solely on Evoy's 
shoulders. Evoy simply capitalized on an historic trend that had been developing in 
northern labour and throughout Canada since the 1960s. 
Though once the largest and strongest union in Canada, the Steelworkers had been 
steadily declining in inftuence since public servants acquired collective bargaining rights. 
As thel980s began, Steel was the country's second largest union with 203,000 members; 
1
"Edmondson, interview. 
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the PSAC was fourth, with 155,000. By 1990, however, Steel had dropped to sixth place 
. 
with a total membership of 160,000 - a net loss of over 40,000 members in a ten year 
period. The Alliance, although having dropped to fifth place, had recorded a net gain of 
over 7,000 members in the same period. Steel was losing prestige. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the Northwest Territories. Having 
inherited the organizing legacy ofMine Mill in 1968, the Steelworkers had since done no 
organizing to speak of in the North. As more and more northern mines closed between 
the late 1960s and 1987, Steel's membership declined. The loss of Giant mine to CASAW 
in 1976, and the closure of the Tungsten and Pine Point mines in 1986 and 1987 
respectively,l 57 left Loca1802 at Con mine the only substantial Steelworkers' local 
remaining in the North. The only additions to Steel's membership in the NWT were small 
bargaining units such as Local 8646, ironically representing UNW staff. Contrasting with 
a shrinking Steelworkers' presence in the North was the massive growth of the 
NWTPSAIUNW during this period. Continued devolution from the federal government, a 
successful court case ensuring the membership of devolving nurses, and, most importantly, 
aggressive organizing of unorganized workers into CLRB units resulted in a membership 
that grew from 1,906 in 1980 to 3, 279 in 1989.151 The Steelworkers' diminishing 
numbers, coupled with the continued growth of the UNW must certainly have led to 
157NWT Data Book: A Complete Information Guide to the Northwest Territories 
and its Communities, Outcrop, 1986, 188-89, 216-217. 
l"Labour Organizations in Canada, 1980, 117; and 1989, 104. 
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friction resulting from resentments on the part ofLocal802 and an increasing 
overconfidence on the part of the UNW. This division, combined with a weakening 
influence within the Federation of Labour and a resurgence of hostility towards the PSAC, 
would characterise the UNW' s place in the northern labour movement in the 1990s, and 
be a contributing factor in the union's eventual division. 
In summarizing the activity of the NWTPSAIUNW in the 1980s, the common 
theme which emerges is committed, aggressive organizing. The decade began with the 
union working closely with the United Steelworkers specifically, and the Canadian labour 
movement generally, in organizing the Northwest Territories Federation of Labour. While 
volunteer NWTPSA officers were active with the Federation from its stan, it was really 
with the organization of the component's staff as Local 8646 ofthe Steelworkers that the 
NWTPSA became, somewhat mistakenly, identified as a leading force in the Federation. 
The nonhem public service union truly distinguished itself in the organizing of non· 
government workers throughout the decade. Although the actual organizing work was 
most often carried out by the professional staff of the PSAC, it was the statesmanship of 
Fred Lamb that brought about the commitment of the Alliance to embark upon this 
endeavour. PSAC staff were assisted in all these efforts by both the leadership and staff of 
the NWTPSA. Sometimes it was a single Inuit shop steward assisting in organizing 
hamlet workers in the Keewatin, another time it was the executive secretary treasurer 
meeting with hospital workers in Frobisher Bay. When the union organized hospital staff 
in the president's home town, he too stepped into the fray. The joint organizing of non-
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government workers by the Alliance and its component was so successful that the union 
almost doubled in size during this period. However, as the union's success at times 
seemed unstoppable, it began to make others in the labour movement jealous. The seeds 
of divisions were sewn that would germinate towards the end of the decade. They would 
bloom in the 1990s. 
CIIAPTER4 
Divisions 
The period 1990 to 1996 saw the leadership of the Union ofNorthem Workers 
increasingly alienated. This alienation was witnessed in the union's relations with the 
Federation of Labour, the Public Service Alliance, and, most importantly, its members. 
Friction between the UNW and the Federation was further exacerbated by the election of 
Jim Evoy to the presidency of the NWTFL in 1991. Evoy made common cause with 
Local 802 of the Steelworkers, and increasingly CASA W Local 4, which strained the 
already poor relations between Evoy and UNW president Darm Crook. Concurrently, the 
establishment of UNW regional vice-presidents as full-time officers led to a movement 
within the union's top leadership not only to consolidate greater power for itself, but to do 
so in a union independent of the PSAC. The executive tried funher to professionalize 
itself by attempting to establish the first and second vice-presidents' positions as full-time. 
Thwarted in these efforts by the 1993 convention, the union's leadership became 
increasingly contemptuous of its own rules. As the leadership fought its own members, 
who in tum sought support from the Alliance, it became increasingly weakened as it lost 
officer after officer. Taking advantage of the weakened unio~ the government was able 
to push through a contract that divided the union east against west. In the absence of 
experienced leadership, this division was allowed to fracture the union permanently. 
The spring 1991 NWTFL presidential election epitomized deteriorating relations 
between the UNW and the Federation. The two candidates were Ben McDonald and fun 
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Evoy. u(W)hat had been kept within bounds," commented flm Edmondso~ "really heated 
up." It became a very personal conftict between the two candidates, with Evoy winning 
"hands down."1 Several factors ensured Evoy's victory. One was the suppon of 
Steelworkers Local802. The Federation's office adjoined 802's; Evoy, Johnson, and 
Local 802 officials met on a daily basis. Secondly, Evoy had the suppon of outgoing 
president Johnson.2 Lastly, Evoy was a "much more experienced, and much, much, more 
ruthless political campaigner."3 Evoy's campaign style likely mirrored his leadership style 
and did not bode well for building a united labour movement. Dann Crook recalled: 
"When Jim Evoy became president, it staned to fall apan. "4 
Personality conflicts and issues of leadership style played important roles in 
keeping the UNW and the Federation of Labour apan during this period. Crook accepts a 
measure of responsibility for this, claiming that he could be just as intransigent as Evoy. 
To illustrate this, Crook recalled a meeting, the subject of which he could not remember, 
involving the Federatio~ the UNW, the PSAC, tnd the Steelworkers: 
Jim Evoy staned raving and ranting. He was just like a madman 
sometimes. And of course I wouldn't back down or take his shit, so he 
canceled the meeting- because he couldn't have his way ... [With) Jim 
Evoy, it was his way or no way. And of course, you gotta say I was that 
'Edmondson, interview. 
2Jim Edmondson, personal correspondence with author, 11 June 2000. 
3Edmondson, interview. 
"Crook, interview. 
way with him then. I wasn't gonna take his way or no way. so I stood my 
ground and said, "Well, it's our way, period."' 
Ben McDonald concurs that Crook shared Evoy's leadership style. Referring to his 
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former boss as "very Machiavellian." McDonald described Crook as "very much a control 
person.'...s With regards to Evoy's leadership of the Federation, both McDonald and fellow 
UNW staffer Scott Wiggs, concur: '~It was a one man show. "1 Little consultation 
occurred between the NWTFL and the UNW, despite two UNW representatives on the 
Federation's executive. 1 
NWTFL politics and personality conflicts were not the only issues pushing the 
UNW and the Federation apart. In June 1991 the Canada Labour Relations Board issued a 
bargaining certificate for the UNW (through the PSAC) to represent the 31 first line 
supervisors at Con mine. As supervisory staff, they were excluded from membership in 
the much larger bargaining unit at Con which represented the 268 members ofUSWA 
Local802.9 The UNW was now directly involved in the mining industry. This led to 
'Ibid 
~cDonald, interview. 
'McDonald interview; also personal interview, Scott Wiggs, 17 August 1999. 
'Wiggs, interview. 
tuunion signs up its first mining supervisors," Press Independent, 2 June 1991, 3; 
also "UNW snags first line supervisors at Nerco mine," Press Independent, 28 June 1991, 
3. The supervisors at Con were organized into Local 23 which was reponed to have 22 
signed members and 9 Rand deductees. (See Membership Listings, Minutes, UNW Full 
Executive Meeting, 9-12 January 1993, 4-S.) For membership numbers for Local802 see 
Ronna Bremmer, ''Nerco Con miners give strike mandate to union," News, 18 June 1990, 
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fiiction when the territorial government began to revise the territorial Mine Safety Act. 
According to Darm Croo~ the Federation of Labour organized the three union locals 
involved in mining in the NWT - Steel 802, CASAW 4, and UNW 23 - to work on the 
issue. The UNW sent a member ofLocal 23 along with North Great Slave RVP Scott 
Wiggs.10 
The Federation refused to allow Wiggs to participate on the grounds that he was 
not a mine employee. The UNW responded that they would choose their own 
representatives and the result was the Federation barred the UNW from participating in 
the meetings. When the government established a committee to review the proposed 
legislation, all three unions were invited to nominate representatives. Bill Schramm and 
Fern Deneault, presidents ofCASAW 4 and Steel802 respectively, announced that they 
were boycotting the process, as one of the employee representatives was from one of the 
increasing number on non.unionized mines in the NWT. Schramm's and Deneault's 
AI. 
1
°Crook, interview. For purposes of servicing and political representation, the area 
north of Great Slave Lake is divided into two regions. Employees of the GNWT in 
Yellowknife other than correctional and hospital workers, are assigned to Samba K' e 
region. All other members, including those in the surrounding Dog Rib communities are 
members ofNorth Great Slave region. Although Crook remembers Wiggs as a service 
officer at this time, he was R VP until resigning his position in order to take over the staff 
position of director of membership services in 1995. [See Wiggs, interview; also uTalbot 
joins UNW stat(" Sulijuq, Vol. 14, No. 1, February 1995, 3.] Interestingly, CASAW, as 
an affiliate of the CCU, was not affiliated with the Federation ofLabour, but this did not 
stop the two organizations from cooperating with each other on issues of common 
concern. 
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position was that this individual~ by virtue of not being a union member, was in fact a 
representative of management. While Steel and CASAW boycotted the proceedings, the 
UNW agreed to participate.11 In response, 802, CASAW, and the Federation all publicly 
asked the UNW to withdraw its representative from the committee, even to the extent of 
organizing a protest demonstration of about 50 picketers outside the UNW building. 
Deneault gave a "blistering speech on the UNW's breaking of solidarity," referring to the 
UNW as "a renegade government union representing a handful of shift bosses. "12 "What 
we're facing here," continued Deneault, "is treachery within the ranks of organized 
labour." 13 Crook's response was that it was the other unions that broke solidarity when 
they refused to allow the UNW to participate in labour's preparations for the hearings. 14 
11Ronna Bremmer, "Unions, gov't fight over safety committee," News, 24 
February 1992, AJ; also Karen Lajoie, "Mine Safety Act Committee: UNW takes union 
seat in Law Review;• Press Independent, 28 February 1992, 10. Supponing Schramm's 
and Deneault's position was that Jim Bacon, the employee representative from the non-
unionized Lupin mine between YeUowknife and Coppermine (K.ugluktuk after 1996) on 
the central Arctic coast was having his expenses paid for by the mine. See Marina Devine, 
"Unions resolve differences over mine safety committee," Press Independent, 20 March 
1992~ 3. 
•:zavnion ofNonhem Workers criticized for taking seat on committee: UNW 
broke union solidarity says Steelworkers local president," Press Independent, 6 March 
1992, 1; also Francis Thompson, "Steelworkers, CASAW march against UNW," 
Yellowknifer, 4 March 1992, 1, A27. 
13
"Mine Safety is everyone~s concern," News, 2 March 1992, AS. 
••vmon of Northern," 1; also Crook interview. Deneault countered that the 
UNW stopped participating in the meetings because they were too busy with coUective 
agreement negotiations. (See Francis Thompso~ "Steelworkers, UNW continue battle 
over safety," Yellowknifer, 11 March 1992, 3. 
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While both Crook and Wiggs saw the conflia over the Mine Safety Act as one 
with the Federation of Labour, 15 both News/North and the Press Independent portrayed 
the conflict as between the UNW on one side, and 802 and CASAW on the other. 
Publicly the Federation remained conspicuously absent from the debate, appearing only to 
ask the UNW to withdraw &om the committee. The Press Independent credited Evoy 
with engineering the resolution to the intra-union conflict by organizing a meeting between 
the three unions and working out an agreement in which all three would participate on the 
committee as long as SO per cent of the committee's representatives were union 
members. 16 Whether the government accepted this condition is not clear because the 
discussion disappeared from the public record at this point. Darm Crook insisted that 
Steel and CASA W boycotted the entire process, despite Evoy crediting them in helping to 
draft the new legislation. 17 However the issue was ultimately resolved, it was quickly 
overshadowed by the strike at Giant mine. 
Royal Oak Mines, under the leadership of CEO Peggy Witte, acquired Giant in the 
late 1980s and immediately adopted a belligerent style of labour relations. Workers' lunch 
boxes were searched as they left the property, pin-ups were tom down, and job and shift 
assignments were changed arbitrarily. More important for CASAW, the new management 
15Crook interview; also Wiggs interview. 
16Devine, "Unions resolve." 3. 
17Crook, interview. 
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was trying to break the union financially. Arbitration is an expensive process which 
usually requires employer and union to share its costs. By forcing all grievances to 
arbitration, regardless of their nature and the ability to solve them at the first level, the 
company was clearly attempting to break the union by overwhelming it with unnecessary 
legal fees. 
In the spring of 1992 the employer and the union attempted to negotiate a new 
contract. In May the membership ofLocal4 ignored the recommendation of its 
bargaining committee, and voted 83 per cent to reject Royal Oak's otTer. In an effort to 
prevent sabotage by miners exiting the property, Royal Oak locked out the workers May 
22 - one day before the mine strike officially began. 11 
The conflict between CASA W and Royal Oak Mines was the longest strike in the 
history of the Northwest Territories, and among the most violent in Canadian history. 
With the employer's decision to keep the mine running with replacement workers and 
some union members crossing picket lines, the strike quickly became violent. On 14 June 
a riot at the mine's main gate resulted in eleven injured people. FoUowing the riot, 
sporadic incidents of violence between Pinkerton guards and strikers were reported, as 
well as mysterious explosions and power failures. On 18 September an underground 
explosion killed nine men.19 After a lengthy investigation and trial, CASA W member 
1
'Devine, "Hell," 24. For more complete accounts of the Giant mine strike see 
Selleck and Thompson, Dying for Gold, and Staples and Owen, The Third Suspect. 
19Jlevine, '~ell," 24-2S. 
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Roger Warren was found guilty on nine counts ofmurder.20 
From the ~ suppon for CASAW tiom the broader labour movement was 
limited. Though not a CAW local, the Canadian Auto Workers sent in a strike 
coordinator,21 and despite the absence of affiliation, the Federation ofLabour quickly 
assumed a leadership role. Initially quite supportive, 22 the UNW became more ambivalent 
as the strike wore on, particularly after the 18 September murders. Officials worried that 
people would tum against the union movement in general. In one instance the UNW had 
a rock thrown through its office window. 23 UNW representative Scott Wiggs stated, "We 
didn't agree with their [CASAW's] tactics," hastening to add that the UNW supported 
them and sent members whenever there was a march or rally, but Wiggs did not feel the 
UNW played any significant role in the Giant strike.24 Lee Selleck contends that even· 
20Selleck, Dying, 313. 
21Devine, uHell," 25. Shortly after the strike ended in 1994, CASAW merged with 
the CAW. [See "CASAW joins auto workers,·· News, 6 June 1994, A3.] 
ZZWithin the first week of the strike the UNW had joined in a boycott of a local 
radio station that was perceived by first vice-president Dianne Strilaeff to be broadcasting 
'~balanced and sensationalist" coverage. Crook was quick to criticize Royal Oak for 
bringing in strikebreakers, and as late as 18 September. the day of the fatal bombing, 
blamed the company for the violence associated with the strike. (See Trish Saywell, 
"Journalists on edge over strikers' threats: Strikers accuse CJCD of bias," Yellowlolifer 29 
May 1992, 8; also Trish Saywell and Francis Thompson, '1loyal Oak advenises for 
replacement workers at $13 per hour," Yel/owknifer, 3 June 1992, AS; and Darm Crook, 
[letter] ''Labor unions don't condone violence- Crook," Yellowlcnifer, 18 September 
1992,9. 
23Devine, "Hell," 2S. 
24Wiggs, interview. 
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before the murders., "[t]ime and vandalism at Giant" eroded support for CASAW from 
other unions, in particular the UNW. Corrections worker, and future RVP, Dave Talbot 
was one UNW member who often lent his support on the picket line and at 
demonstrations, but stopped doing so as a result of picket line discussions with CASA W 
executive member AI Shearing. "I knew AI Shearing for close to twenty years, and I 
spoke to him quite a lot out there," said Talbot. "He discussed things with me at the 
picket line that eventually led me, because I was a peace officer, to feel that I shouldn't go 
out anymore." Shearing was later convicted along with fellow CASA W executive 
member Tim Bettger of setting the two explosions prior to the 18 September blast. 25 Acts 
ofvandali~ violence, and talk ofviolence probably did more to discourage members of 
the UNW from more actively supporting the strikers. 
Direct aid to CASAW from the UNW was ambiguous. Aside from running an ad 
for CASAW fund-raising t-shirts,26 Sulijuq ran one article encouraging donations and 
advertising the "adopt-a-family" program that had been established by the CASAW 
Ladies' Association for Strike Support [CLASS] to alleviate the financial burden on 
strikers' families.27 Interestingly, the photo that accompanied the article was one of 
25Selleck, Dying, 318. Both Shearing and Bettger resigned their positions on the 
executive prior to being charged, largely through the intervention of the CAW's Hemi 
Mitic. Seep. 179. 
26Sulijuq, Vol. 11, No.3, September 1992, 19, Box-file 9-11, UNW. 
11For additional information on CLASS and the "Adopt-a-family" program see 
Tina Cresswell, "Strikers wives ask other unions for help," Yellowknifer, 16 October 
175 
Steelworkers' Local 8646 [UNW staft] picketing the mine, rather than UNW members, 
suggesting that UNW rank and file played a limited role in supporting the striking 
miners. 21 The UNW executive was very sparing in its suppon. Although they allowed 
CLASS to set up an infonnation table at the I 993 convention, a motion at the August 
I 993 executive meeting to contribute SS,OOO to CASA W was quietly tabled until after the 
strike at which time it became redundant. 29 Support was forthcoming from some UNW 
locals. Local 11 [Stanton Yellowknife Hospital] distinguished itself in raising funds for 
food and Christmas presents for the strikers' families. 30 In addition, Local 1 in 
Yellowknife and LocalS in lqaluit, made significant contributions of$2,000 each.31 
As the strike at Giant dragged on, the Federation of Labour experienced its own 
setbacks. Not all UNW locals were supponive ofCASAW. Likely it was Evoy's 
prominent leadership role in the strike that in spring 1993 led Local 2 in F on Smith to 
1992, 11. 
211
'Longest Strike in NWT History," Sulijuq, Vol. 12, No.2, Spring 1993, 8, Box-
file 9-12, UNW. One member of8646, UNW Service Officer and one-time president of 
local 802, Bob Robertson, was arrested at one point for attacking a bus bringing in strike 
breakers. After the strike it was learned that Robenson was in fact an RCMP informer. 
Whether he was acting as an agent provocateur, or was recruited later by the RCMP is not 
clear [see Selleck, Dying, 91). 
~inutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 14-15 August 1993, 19, 22. 
»'Unions respond to needs of striking Giant families," Yel/owknifer, 6 November 
1992, AS. 
nDevine, ''HeU.." 25. Also, there is a photo in Selleck's book of a 20 September 
1992 news conference at the CASAW headquarters. On the wall above Jim Evoy's head 
is a chan of contributions with UNW Local 1' s contnbution listed. 
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unanimously vote to disaffiliate from the NWTFL. "(T]he members present," stated Fort 
Smith RVP Keith Dowling, "felt that the ravings ofMr. Evoy are something they could do 
without. "32 Subsequently other UNW locals also disaffiliated from the Federation. 33 
The Workers' Compensation Board of the NWT also provided a forum for the 
UNW to strike out at Evoy. On 8 February 1993 an anicle appeared in News/North about 
an unnamed interest group campaigning to have Evoy removed from the board.~ 
Originally appointed to the WCB in summer 1989,35 the position provided Evoy with a 
substantial supplement to his salary as Federation president. While some board members 
were reponed to make as much as $60,000 annually in WCB honoraria, Evoy admitted to 
bringing in between $30,000 and $35,000.36 Although the identity of the anonymous 
interest group was never revealed, in all likelihood it was the UNW. The same day the 
article appeared the UNW executive held a teleconference and defeated a motion to 
suppon Evoy's bid for another term on the WCB.37 Largely due to the effons of the 
UNW executive, Evoy was off the WCB and his income was substantially reduced. 
32Minutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 17-19 May 1993, 14; also Fon Smith 
RVP Report, UNW 9* Triennial Convention, September 1993, Box-file 7-6, UNW. 
33McDonald, interview. 
~Jody Ireland and Ronna Bremmer," Evoy concerned about interest group's 
agenda," News, 8 February 1993, A28. 
3
'"WCB appeals tribunal," News, 7 August 1990, AS. 
16Ireland and Bremmer, "Evoy concerned," A28. 
3~nutes, Quorum Call of the Full Executive, 8 February 1993, 2. 
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Replacing him was UNW Local 21's Vivian Stevely.31 
Stevely was a nursing assistant at the hospital in Hay River. She had moved there 
from Saskatchewan in 1989 and had been a member of several different unions since 1977. 
Prior to her appointment to the WCB, she had served as president of Local 21 and was the 
Yukon and NWT member for the PSAC National Board of Directors. 39 
With the conclusion of the Giant mine strike, and the appointment of Stevely to the 
WCB, relations between the UNW and the Federation continued to deteriorate. Probably 
tiustrated with Evoy' s failure to consult with his own executive, and thereby allowing the 
UNW to have input into NWTFL decisions, the UNW executive no longer saw the need in 
maintaining the position of federation ofLabour Liaison Officer and eliminated the 
position in January 1994.40 In May the UNW executive amended its standing policy of 
having an open invitation to the Federation president to attend all full executive meetings 
by limiting the invitation to once a year.41 Largely due to the conflict between the 
leadership of the two organizations, the position of the UNW within the NWTFL had 
gone full circle; from being a founding member of the organization in 1980 to practically 
3"~Vivian Stevely: A Strong voice for workers on WCB," Sulijuq, Vol. 13, No. 1, 
February 1994, 1-2; also "Evoy is not among them: Todd names three to WCB," Press 
Independent, 19 February 1993, 3. 
3t.'Vivian Stevely," 2; also ''Nonhem Local takes on first challenge and Winsf AU 
in a Day's work," Alliance, Vol. 4, No. S, September·October 1991, 16. 
~nutes, UNW Full Executive Meetin& 15-16 January 1994, 54. 
41Minutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 14-15 May 1994, 72. 
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controlling it in the mid-1980s, by the mid-1990s the distance between the UNW and the 
NWrFL had never been greater, despite the fact that over 80 per cent of the Federation's 
members were members of the UNW.42 
Internal relations within the UNW also began to deteriorate during the 1990s. 
Much of this was related to the increasing determination of the UNW' s leadership to do 
away with volunteer officers at the executive level and establishing a full-time salaried 
leadership. Until this time the only elected officer on salary was the president. The most 
contentious item at the UNW's 1990 convention was the motion to make the RVPs' 
positions full-time, taking on the additional roles of service officers. The proposal 
included the provision of offices and support staffwhere necessary, and estimated salary 
and benefits for the new professional executives at $70,000 each. Members elected to 
these positions who had been making more in their bargaining unit job would be paid the 
higher amount. 43 To cover these additional costs a dues increase of approximately $80 per 
member annually was necessary. 
Like the membership, the executive was not united on the issue. While second 
vice·president Jim Wilson believed it was a more democratic alternative to the hiring of 
service representatives and stafF members, others disagreed, including first vice-president 
42Jn 1994 the NWrFL had a membership of7,100. Ofthose, 5,769 were members 
of the UNW, thereby constituting 81% of the Federation's ranks. [See Labour 
Organizations in Canada, 1994, 111 & 189.] 
4J«tJN"W Wall Pay RVPs," Su/ijuq, Vol. 9, No.3, November/December 1990, 1, 
16, Box·file 9·9, UNW. 
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Diane StrilaeR: who advocated the hiring of more service representatives and maintaining 
the RVP's role as a political and voluntary one. Strilaetr contended that under the existing 
system, R VPs were better able to represent members because they worked with them, and 
not for them, out of an office, and "separate from the membership. "44 The motion was 
initially defeated, dividing the delegates almost in half. Later the motion was reconsidered 
and carried. 45 The union began to implement the decision in May 1991. By 1993 the only 
R VP still on a volunteer basis was the former Cambridge Bay region, now known as the 
Kitikmeot. 46 
An issue not addressed in the debate was competence. By adding the 
responsibility of service officer to the R VP' s job description the executive was no longer 
simply a political body, but one which had to carry out professional responsibilities. In the 
44/bid., l, 16. 
45Minutes, UNW 81111 Triennial Convention, September 1990, Vol. 1, Box-tile 7-1, 
UNW; also uUNW Will," 1. 
46James Hrynshyn, 4JNW reps go full-time," News, 6 May 1991, 9; also Director 
of Finance and Administration Report, Minutes, UNW 10111 Triennial Convention, 14, 
compliments of Georgina Rolt-Kaiser. Despite the addition of these officers, the union 
continued to hire more statf. While the Kitikmeot R VP position remained a volunteer one 
to the time that Nunawt members left the UNWin 1998, oddly enough, in spring 1994, 
while still pursuing a full-time vice-president for Nunawt, the UNW hired a service officer 
for the Kitikmeot instead of bringing the last RVP on full-time. [See "Kitikmeot gets full 
time Service Officer," Sulijuq, Vol. 13, No.2, April 1994, 7.] It is not clear from the 
available documents, but about the same time the R VPs were made full-time, the staff of 
the UNW was restructured, eliminating the position of Executive Secretary Treasurer. 
Many of the executive secretary treasurer's responsibilities were made the job of the new 
Director of Finance and Administration. Ben MacDonald took over the job of Research 
and Public Affairs Officer. 
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pas~ service officers had been hired based on experience and training. Popular election, or 
in many cases acclamation. removed the element of competence as a requirement for the 
job. 
Granting a salary to R VPs also indicated another flaw in professionalizing the 
executive. Generous remuneration changed the incentive to seek union office. For 
individuals employed as nurses. adult educators. prison guards. and highways workers, 
election to RVP would represent a substantial increase in pay. Even if a candidate's 
motives sprang entirely from a genuine commitment to the labour movement, the 
handsome salary and benefits left the individual open to accusations of self-serving 
motives. 
Further effons to alter the UNW' s leadership structure were also made. In 1993 
the executive attempted to implement three significant changes which would have serious 
long-term effects for the union. These included secession from the PSAC, the 
establishment of the first and second vice-presidents' positions as full-time, and enhanced 
powers of the executive. All these endeavours would ultimately fail. 
The impetus to secede from the Alliance came from the executive. Citing the 
historic complaint of dues paid versus services received, the leadership met in January and 
discussed a motion to break from the Alliance and affiliate with the National Union of 
Public and General Employees. The motion was unanimously referred to the fall 
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convention. 47 Though not a member of the executive until later that spring. Josie Gould 
explained that the executive as a whole "felt that the PSAC was not doing enough ... not 
owning up to their obligations to the UNW." The executive felt that the UNW could "go 
it alone. "41 They were not advocating going it alone entirely though, as the motion 
referred to the convention also included affiliating with NUPGE. However, NUPGE and 
the PSAC were two very different bodies. The first had a tradition of a loose federation of 
mostly provincial government employees' unions in which components have a 
considerable degree ofautonomy.49 The Alliance, on the other hand, had historically been 
dominated by federal civil servants, and UNW president Darm Crook was of the distinct 
impression that the Alliance National Board ofDirectors wanted it kept that way. 50 The 
Alliance also exercised a great deal of authority over its components. This can be seen in 
the over 20 "housekeepingn motions that the executive forwarded to the convention ftom 
its meeting in May. Anticipating a successful withdrawal bid, the proposed by-law deleted 
any reference to the Alliance. In cases where a by-law gave the Alliance the ultimate say in 
47Minutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 9-12 January 1993, 30-32. 
41Gould, interview. 
4~'About NUPGE," www.nupge.ca 
SOCrook attributed a statement to PSAC vice-president Nicole Turmel which 
illustrates this perception. During a PSAC National Board of Directors' Meeting in which 
the fate of three UNW officers was being debated, Crook alleges she stated: "If we want 
to continue to have our organization controlled by federal government public sector 
employees, we cannot allow these people to hold office in a component executive" [see 
Crook, interview]. Whether or not she made the statement is not as important as is that it 
shows how Crook perceived the relationship between his union and its parent body. 
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union affairs, the proposed rewording named the UNW, not NUPGE, as the final arbiter. 51 
The latest attempt at disaffiliation was more an issue of power than dues and services. 
This is seen by the "Report on the Joint UNW IPSAC Meetings Regarding UNW 
Affiliation to PSAC, June 2, 3, and 18, 1993", addressed at the UNW's August executive 
meeting. These joint meetings dealt with various issues of concern to the UNW, including 
the arbitration backlog, membership education. and component autonomy. Despite largely 
getting what it wanted from the PSAC, the UNW committee members at these joint 
meetings - Crook, Dowling, and Wilson - still recommended disaffiliation. The 
executive adopted the committee's report unanimously, reaffirming its commitment to 
secession. and its move to establish the first and second vice-presidents' positions as full-
time ones. 52 Both these issues were referred to the upcoming convention. 
Prior to the disaffiliation vote, Alliance president Darryl Bean .. took the hotseat for 
several hours" and addressed the convention delegates' questions and concerns. The 
promise of posting an adjudications officer in Yellowknife to deal with the backlog of 
arbitrations, and the guarantee of two PSAC education courses annually in each of the 
UNW's eight regions were enough to convince a slight majority of delegates to reject the 
51Minutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 17-19 May 1993, 54-57. 
~nutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 14-15 August 1993, 2-11. According to 
Crook's report to the convention the only issue resolved ftom the joint meetings was that 
ofPSAC membership education. All other issues were still outstanding. [See President • s 
Report, UNW 9* Triennial Convention, September 1993, Box-file 7-6, UNW.] 
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pull-out. 53 Of 48 delegates, 19 still voted to disaffiliate. Of those who voted to stay with 
the PSAC, many complained that there had been no consultation on the subject prior to 
the convention and that they had only been informed of the issue a few months after the 
January executive meeting,,. most likely by way of an article written by Dowling in S11lijuq 
extoUing the virtues of disaffiliation. 55 The vote was conducted by secret ballot, 56 
uncommon for a convention resolution. Usually in the case of contentious resolutions a 
roll call vote is taken so that each delegate's vote is a matter of public record; secret 
ballots are generally employed in the election of officers and delegates, bestowing the 
protection of anonymity upon those casting ballots. While it was no secret that a large 
portion of the executive supported leaving the Alliance, there was at least one newer 
member of the executive who was not comfortable in publicly disagreeing with the 
leadership over the issue. According to Josie Gould, prior to the convention she had 
written a letter to Crook in which she disagreed with disaffiliation. This greatly angered 
Fort Smith RVP Dowling, who wanted Crook to revoke Gould's membership. She called 
536
'Convention 93," Sulijuq, Vol. 12, No.4, November 1993, 5. Increasingly in 
the 1990s articles in Sulijuq went unsigned. It is assumed opinions expressed in such 
pieces were done so at the behest of the union's top leadership. 
,.Liz Crompton, '~ stays with national union," Northern Star, 8 September 
1993, 1; also Ronna Bremer,~ to study translation costs services for members," 
News, 13 September 1993, 3. 
'!Jceith Dowling, "The Future ofthe UNW," Sulijuq, Vol. 12, No.3, Falll993, 5. 
56Minutes, UNW Cj'J Triennial Convention, September 1993, Vol. I, Box-file 7-5. 
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Darryl Bean personally and suggested he attend the convention, 57 which he did. Bean 
convinced the convention to continue affiliation. 
Also originating at the January 1993 executive meeting was the motiCin to establish 
the first and second vice-presidents as full-time positions. The issue was initially presented 
to the convention delegates as enhanced service for the membership; one VP would take 
charge ofNunavut while the other would be responsible for the remainder of the 
territories. When it became likely that the vote would be defeated, it was amended to 
make only the first vice-president a salaried position responsible for Nunawt. Possibly 
because of the accompanying dues increase. or perhaps due to lack of consultation with 
the membership, both motions were defeated. 51 Significantly, opposition to the motion 
was led by lqaluit's Charlie Ruttan. Complaining that the estimated $76,000 salary could 
not be justified when some members in the Baffin region made less than $40,000, Ruttan 
was confident that the UNW did not need a full-time officer for the job. "Ordinary 
members have been spreading the UNW's message for years in the Baffin. We have a high 
profile," Ruttan told the delegates asking them to defeat the motion. 59 
51Gould, interview. Talbot also contacted Bean and made him aware of the 
impending secession attempt. 
"Minutes, UNW gdl Triennial Convention, September 1993, Vol. 1, Box-file 7-S, 
UNW. 
~·convention 93," 6. 
After the convention, Sulijuq reported to the membership: 
Convention delegates were not in the mood for a dues increase. This was 
clear during the debate over adding a paid Vice-President for the Nunawt 
area. The main duties of this officer would be to protect the UNW' s right 
to be the exclusive bargaining agent for employees of the future Nunavut 
Government if that is the wish of those employees.60 
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Sulijuq was guilty of revisionism. Disregarding the fact that the original motion put to the 
delegates was to establish two fiall·time vice·presidents, the paper depicted the failure of 
the motion solely as a loss for the Nunawt members. It ignored opposition to the 
proposal as rejection of another high paid executive position, and instead portrayed it as 
simply membership aversion to another dues increase. Curiously, the final clause in the 
paragraph quoted above -"if that be the wish of those employees" - implied that the 
purpose of the new position was to find out what the wishes of the Nunawt members 
were regarding union membership in a post·division Nunavut. The real purpose of the 
position, however, was to guarantee that the UNW remain the exclusive bargaining agent 
in Nunawt after division. The first vice-president's job was to persuade the eastern 
membership to stay with the UNW. It was never the purpose of the position to gather 
information, but rather to disseminate pro.UNW sentiment in Nunawt. The executive had 
already committed itself in principle to keeping the union together after division at its 
January 1993 meeting. 61 Both Crook and Gould confirm that the purpose of the position 
601
'Convention 93." S. 
61Minutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 9-12 January 1993, 4. 
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was to get the Nunawt workers "on side. "62 While not explained as such to the 
convention delegates, it was defeated all the same. The executive, however, refused to let 
it go, resulting in greater division between the union's leadership and its members. 
One of the less contentious convention motions was one to improve translation 
services for members whose first language was not English. Although the origins of the 
motion are unclear, given the decided apathy that it encountered following the convention, 
the issue did not outwardly appear to have any particularly vociferous proponents. The 
convention decided that each local would have a single vote on the matter and that 
provided a majority of locals agreed, a dues increase would be implemented to cover 
related costs of expanded translation services. Voting was to take place prior to the next 
convention in 1996.63 That the executive waited until the last minute to poll the locals 
could have been a contributing factor in the eventual break-up of the UNW, but that is by 
no means certain. 
Taking up a substantial portion of the convention was a large collection of 
resolutions collectively entitled "Executive Affairs," something new to the union's 
convention proceedings. Some of these motions sought to define the responsibilities, 
salary and benefits of the first and second vice-presidents if the positions were made fi.aU-
62Crook and Gould, interviews. When the executive decided to go ahead anyway 
and installed Wilson as a full-time officer in Nunawt, the first vice-president was quite up 
front about his responsibilities: "I will promote the benefits of staying in the UNW." [See 
"Nunawt gets new officer," Sulijuq, Vol. 14, No. 1, February 1995, 4.] 
618remer, "UNW to study," 3. 
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time. Other resolutions were aimed more at enhancing the powers of the executive. One 
example was a motion to empower the executive to determine who could attend full 
executive meetings as observers. In the past. the practice was an open door policy for 
local presidents with advance notice. As minutes of executive meetings did not generally 
circulate at the local level, observers were one way in which locals could be informed as to 
the activities of their leaders. The motion would have further reduced the ability oflocals 
to monitor executive decisions. Another motion put forward by Dowling and Wilson was 
aimed at keeping R VPs informed of the activities of locals in their region by mandating 
locals to advise their R VP in advance of all local meetings and agenda items, as well as 
keeping the RVP informed of all grievances. Other motions sought to give RVPs 
authority to move motions at any local meeting in their region, regardless of the R VP 
being a member of the respective local, and to require local presidents to provide written 
quarterly repons to their R VP. The executive did not do as much homework in lobbying 
delegates to support these motions as it did in preparing them; all of the motions were 
defeated. 6ie 
Collectively these motions are what Talbot referred to as an attempted "power 
grab" on the part of a faction ofthe executive he referred to as "the old boys' club." This 
group was comprised ofFon Smith RVP Keith Dowling. first vice-president Jim Wilson, 
64~finutes, UN\V 9* Triennial Conventio~ September 1993. Vet 1, Box-file 25, 
UNW~ 
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and union president Darm Crook. 65 For the most part, the motions attempted to make 
local leadership accountable to the R VP rather than local membership. Combined with the 
executive's attempt to restrict local presidents' access to full executive meetings, this 
suggests that the union's leadership did not trust the judgement of the volunteer local 
leaders. That these motions were overwhelmingly rejected indicates the distrust was 
mutual. 
Oespite this growing mistrust, Crook and Wilson were both re-elected. Elected to 
second vice-president was .Kitikmeot R VP David Kaiogana66 of Local 20 in Coppermine, 
the first Inuk to serve on the union's executive. His nominator, Adam Egotik, also of 
Local 20, was prophetically ironic in nominating Kaiogana: "Nunavut is coming up. I 
nominate Brother Kaiogana as 2'nd Vice-President as pan ofNunawt. We don't want to 
be left out."67 
65Talbot, interview. Josie Gould referred to the same group as "the brotherhood" 
and also included Keewatin R VP Ken Stewan among their ranks. That it was a 
"brotherhood" is clear. Women were not made to feel overly welcome, especially if they 
questioned the dominant position of the executive. Prior to her resignation from the 
executive in spring 1993 after being excluded from union membership by the employer, 
fonner Somba K'e RVP Pam Murray was investigated by the executive for unknown 
"disciplinary reasons." Her successor, Josie Gould, observed problems relating to issues of 
gender and power as characteristic of the union's leadership at the time. u At one time we 
had a brotherhood," stated Gould, u and heaven help if it wasn't the right woman; heaven 
help her. They knew that they were tough on her. I wasn't the right woman, and my 
predecessor (Murray) wasn't the right woman." See Gould, interview. 
66/bid, 96-101. 
""Convention 93," 6. 
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Antagonism between locals and the executive started to develop well before the 
1993 convention. In April ofthat year Darren Linaker, president ofLocal2 in Fon Smith 
resigned his position. In a letter to Dann Crook he explained his resignation as a protest 
against the ways in which the Fort Smith RVP was exercising his office: 
I feel our R VP is trying to unduly control and influence local 2 proceedings 
and I am resigning in protest of this influence .... I find it intolerable that 
our R VP is trying to undermine the proceedings of UNW volunteer 
members of this region and need I remind you that this union was built and 
maintained by volunteer members. 61 
Linaker' s letter gives a context to the conflict which subsequently developed between 
Dowling and Local 12 president Paul McAdams. 
Following the convention, McAdams ran against Dowling for RVP.69 Dowling 
won handily, probably because he had a better understanding of election rules and 
procedures.70 Shonly after his victory, Dowling attended the executive meeting of Local 
"Letter, Darren Linaker to Darm Crook, 2 April 1993. Reading file, appended to 
Minutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 14-15 May 1994. The reading file is the 
collection of documents -letters, reports, etc. - that is circulated among the executive 
prior to its meetings and is subsequently appended to the minutes of that respective 
meeting. Linaker' s letter was not entered into the reading file until it was over a year old, 
begging the question, why? The answer was likely to avoid discussion of the topic until it 
was no longer relevent. 
690nly the three table officers and the PSAC convention delegates are elected at 
conventions. R VPs are elected by the membership in special regional elections. 
70Jtollowing his defeat, McAdams wrote to Crook to complain that unlike 
Dowling, he was not aware that he could have his campaign literature enclosed in the 
balloting package that was mailed out. [See letter, McAdams to Crook, 18 November 
1993, Reading file, UNWFull Executive Meeting, 14-15 May 1994.] Crook responded 
that the committee chair overseeing the election had informed him that both candidates 
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12. McAdams, still smarting from defeat, instructed Dowling to leave which the RVP 
refused to do. In a subsequent letter of complaint to Crook, Dowling related that 
McAdams then grabbed him by the ear and neck and physically threw him out of the 
classroom where the meeting was taking place. Upon reentering the room to retrieve his 
keys and jacket, Dowling continued. McAdams assaulted him again, saying, uDidn't I just 
throw you out? ... When I talk to you boy, you listen. You're not coming in here," 
whereupon McAdams again threw Dowling out. The R VP lodged an official complaint 
with the union. 71 
In what appears to be an unrelated incident, McAdams' supervisor, also a member 
of the union, filed a complaint against the local president for harassment. McAdams had 
called him either "Dutch Boy" or "Dutchie" and used '~highly offensive language." By 
taking his complaint to the union instead of simply disciplining his subordinate, the 
supervisor was able to deny McAdams the benefit of the grievance procedure guaranteed 
by the collective agreement. These actions, combir.:ed with his assault on Dowling, 
resulted in the executive removing him from office, fining him SSOO, and suspending his 
membership for five years. 72 Such stiff punishment was likely handed out with the 
were advised that they could have campaign materials included in the balloting package. 
Crook added McAdams should have known this already because as a local president he 
should have a familiarity with the bylaws. Such provisions, however, were never a pan of 
the bylaws. 
71Letter, Dowling to Crook, 2S November 1993,/bid. 
~eport of Disciplinary Committee," Ibid, 96-l 00. 
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intention of punishing dissent more than the actual offences. McAdams appealed the 
membership suspension to the PSAC National Board ofDirectors and the appeal was 
upheld. Darm Crook initially held the position that, although McAdams' PSAC 
membership was reinstated, his UNW membership was not. After consulting legal council 
however, Crook reversed his decision and accepted the PSAC's authority. 73 Having only 
recently failed in its attempt to disaffiliate from the Alliance, upholding McAdams' appeal 
was salt in the wound for the would-be secessionists. What began as a conflict, most 
likely of personalities, between the Fort Smith R VP and a local president, resulted in the 
PSAC National Board of Directors overturning a decision of the UNW executive. 
Although conflicts between the executive and union members were generally kept 
behind closed door~ in January 1995 an article appeared in News/North with the title, 
"UNW rift opens in Fort Smith."74 The article, based largely on accusations made by 
McAdams, reponed that Dowling had been forced to resign from his government position 
in Fort Smith because he had falsely represented his credentials on his employment 
application. Although the circumstances surrounding Dowling's resignation were not 
confirmed, Dowling had resigned his position with the employer. McAdams questioned 
whether Dowling was still entitled to hold his position on the executive. ulf you lose your 
73Minutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 13-14 January 1995, 2; also letter, Bean 
to Crook, Reading File, Ibid; also Minutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 15-16 May 
199S, 31; and letter, Austin Marshal, lawyer, to Crook, 19 April 1995, Reading File, Ibid. 
74P. J. Harston, 'VNW rift opens in Fort Smith: Regional VP loses job, but stays 
on union exec," News, 16 January 1995, AIO. 
192 
job with your employer," McAdams asked somewhat rhetorically, "wouldn't you lose 
your position on the UNW executive?'' Crook's response was that regardless of 
Dowling's employment status, he was still a member of the union and would continue to 
hold office until the end of his term as R VP. 75 As far as Crook was concerned, that was 
the end of the subject. It was not. McAdams, in a letter to the editor the following w~ 
encouraged News/North to "dig deeper" on the subject of UNW executive salaries and 
benefits. 76 
McAdams was trying to draw the media's attention to the executive's decision to 
go ahead with a full-time officer for Nunavut. The weekend prior to the story appearing 
in News/North, the executive held its regular meeting in Yellowknife. While the topic of 
Dowling's status was not discussed, Crook resurrected the subject of a paid first vice-
president: 
Nunawt is quickly becoming a reality. The UNW must gear up in an effon 
to maintain our current membership in that area. We must determine what 
type of structure the Nunavut [and for that matter the Western Arctic] 
members want if they are to remain in the UNW. To that end, I will be 
15/bid, A10. Beginning with the establishment of the president's position as full-
time in 1978, the union routinely negotiated clauses into their collective agreements that 
members elected to fuU-time positions with the union would be seconded from their 
position with the employer. Upon completion of their term of office, barring re-election, 
the employee would return to his or her position with the employer which they had been 
seconded ftom. Although Dowling was on the union payroll when he resigned from his 
position with the government, he was still a government employee until his resignation, at 
which time he ceased to be seconded ftom a UNW bargaining unit. 
76paul McAdams, "Dig deeper on UNW story, reader says," News, 23 January 
1995, A7. 
recommending that the UNW take our First Vice President, Brother 
Wilson, on full time and that he be located in Iqaluit.17 
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Crook's motion was referred to the finance committee which recommended that Wilson 
be seconded to the union full-time for the remainder of his term of office with $126, 923 
budgeted for salary and benefit~ $113, 968 for travel, and $20,000 for moving expenses. 
The executive approved the proposal in a roll call vote with only Nonh Great Slave R VP 
Dave Talbot opposing the motion. Wilson, not seeing a conflict of interest, voted in 
favour of the motion. 71 Georgina Rolt. 79 R VP for Hay River and one of the three R VPs to 
abstain on the matter, was later criticized by one of her local presidents for not casting a 
udefinitive" VOte.10 
On 26 January, Peter Chatfey, president ofLoca16, wrote Rolt "with regards to a 
few union matters which have evolved over the past few weeks." In addition to his 
concern over the R VP abstaining on the matter with Wilson, Chaffey was also concerned 
that the executive was implementing a decision that the last convention had turned down. 
"It is the understanding of this executive that a similar motion to create a 1• Vice 
President's position was defeated at the last convention held in Yellowknife in 1993. 
"President's Repo~ Minutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 13-14 January 1995, 
5. 
11/bid, 8. 
"Rolt married in 1995, hence references to her after that time are with the 
hyphenated Rolt-Kaiser. 
IOJ.etter, Peter Chatrey, president, UNW Local 6, to Rolt, 26 January 1995, Hub 
file. 
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Assuming this is correct, can the FEM [Full Executive Meeting] disregard convention?" 
The final issue Chatfey addressed was ''the extremely negative publicity the UNW has 
received with regards to the recent resignation of an executive member from his employer 
due to allegations of falsifying a resume." Echoing McAdams in the News/North article 
ten days earlier, Chatl'ey asked, "[c]an someone legally hold an executive position if not an 
employee of a bargaining unit?.,11 
Rolt forwarded the matter to Crook. who, as president, was responsible for 
interpreting the by-laws. Regarding Dowling's employment status, Crook responded that 
although an officer of the union must be a member in good standing at the time of being 
elected to that office, "[t]here is nothing in the Bylaws that stipulates that an RVP must 
maintain hislher employment relationship with the employer from which he/she is 
seconded."12 According to Dave Talbot, Crook's position had reversed itself. Recalling a 
discussion he had with Crook prior to the situation with Dowling, Talbot had mentioned 
to Crook in an hypothetical manner that if he [Talbot] was ever to become UNW 
president, he would immediately sever his ties with the employer, feeling that a union 
president could not do a fully effective job knowing that eventually he would be returning 
to a subordinate position with the employer. Talbot alleged that Crook's response to his 
musings was that if that were to ever happen, he would have to resign as president. 
11/bid 
nr.etter, Crook to Chaffey, 14 February 1995, Hub File. 
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"There was no ifs, ands, or buts about it," recalled Talbot, "if I gave up my job, I would be 
out of a position."13 Assuming the accuracy ofTalbot's statement, why would Crook 
make such an "about face" with Dowling? The simplest answer is personal loyalty, 
lending greater credibility to Talbot's and Gould's allegations of an "old boys' club." 
Crook's letter did not address the issue of a full-time vice-president in lqaluit, but 
the follo.wing week News/North did." In an article entitled "UNW moves toward 
Nunawt," reporter Ronna Bremer outlined the union's plans to establish Wilson in lqaluit 
that coming spring . Bremer stated that the union was assigning Wilson to lqaluit in order 
to "find out what members in the Eastern Arctic want when the NWT divides." Again, 
Wilson's role was depicted as one ofinfonnation gathering, rather than one of 
campaigning for a single union in the NWT and Nunawt after division. Bremer stated 
that Wilson had been seconded from his job with public works in Inuvik, 15 but no mention 
was made of the over one quarter million dollars the executive had allocated for the 
project. Meeting with the combined executives ofLocals 6, 21, and 22 on 27 February, 
Crook tried to convince the leadership of the three Hay River locals of the correctness of 
his actions. Not proving very successful, Crook did inform the Hay River leadership, 
without providing any particulars, that Dowling was currently the subject of an RCMP 
llyaJbot, interview. 
14Ronna Bremer, "UNW moves toward Nunawt: Seeking direction from Nunawt 
members," News, 20 February 1995, A16. 
15/bid 
investigation (a charge the Fort Smith R VP later denied) and that Wilson· s position in 
Inuvik was being "surplussed," and that as a result, on 30 March Wilson would be laid 
oft: 16 bringing to two the number of executive members without membership in a 
bargaining unit. 
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The membership of Local 6 met on I March and passed three directives to the 
union's executive, asking it to uphold the decision of the last convention regarding paid 
vice-presidents; cease and desist from implementing the position in Iqaluit until after such 
action was approved at the union's next convention; and, immediately relieve the Fon 
Smith RVP ofhis duties.17 Although Loc:al6 member and union president Darm Crook 
was in attendance at the meeting, he was unable to convince a majority of the membership 
to defeat any of the above motions." Ten days later, having received no response from 
the executive, Chaffey sent a six page letter to them. Stating that he had "received no 
satisfaction from either our R VP, nor President Crook," the local president outlined his 
concerns and asked the executive to convene an emergency meeting to implement the 
directives. ChatTey copied the letter to the presidents of the other 21 locals and sub-locals 
in the UNW, in addition to PSAC National Director for the Yukon and NWT Vivian 
Stevely and PSAC president Darryl Bean.19 
16Letter, Chaffey to Full Executive, 13 March 1995, Hub File. 
~nutes, Membership Meeting, UNW Local6, 1 March 1995,4-5, Hub File. 
11Cbaffey to Fun E.~ecutive, 13 March 1995. 
19/bid 
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Not to be outdone, Crook followed with a letter to the presidents of all the union's 
locals giving his side of the story. Crook avoided the issue of membership in a bargaining 
unit, and instead focused on the "rumours and innuendos" surrounding Dowling's 
resignatio~ stating that it was the union's job to defend Dowling.90 Given Dowling's 
background as a labour leader, that he resigned his position instead of enlisting the aid of 
the union to defend him begs the questio~ why? The answer is somewhat moot as the 
primary issue for Local6 from the start was not the circumstances surrounding the RVP's 
resignation, but rather the same one McAdams raised in January - how could Dowling 
continue to be a member of the executive if he was no longer a member of a UNW 
bargaining unit? Crook then went on to address Local6's suggestion that the executive 
was undennining a decision of the union's previous convention by establishing Wilson in 
lqaluit. It was his position that this action was "clearly different" than the motion that was 
defeated at the 1993 convention because Wilson's full-time status was only to last until the 
end of his term of office; there was no accompanying dues increase, and; only the first 
vice-president's position was being made full-time.91 Crook's arguments fell on deaf ears 
for the membership ofLocal6; on 26 April it voted to refer its directives to the PSAC.92 
~etter, Crook to all local presidents, 31 March 1995, Hub File. 
91Jbid 
~nutes, Membership Meeting, UNW Local 6, 26 April 1995, Hub File. 
According to Dave Talbo~ he also had concerns about Dowling and Wilson retaining their 
positions on the executive and took his concerns to Alliance president Darryl Bean, who, 
according to Talbot, agreed with him whole-heartedly. [See Talbot, interview.] Former 
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At this same membership meeting a motion was entertained to approve a dues 
increase to cover additional expenses related to increased translation services for the 1996 
convention. 93 As mandated by the previous convention, the executive established a 
committee in January 1994 to facilitate the process. When the committee made its first 
repon in May, it reponed its progress as slow; it was having problems acquiring 
information and getting the suppon of locals - only one had agreed to participate. By 
September it still only had three locals participating and was forced to change its terms of 
reference. 96 Such limited support is surprising given that of the 22 locals and sub-locals, 9 
were located in the area that would become Nunawt, where lnuktitut is commonly 
spoken. It might have been that the leadership of the locals did not feel greater translation 
services were needed. or it might have been that the average member did not attend 
conventions. Poor communication between the committee and the locals could also have 
been a factor. Whatever the reasons, for purposes of economy and expediency, the 
committee ultimately proposed a temporary dues increase of approximately $1.92 per 
member per month for twelve months in order to provide only Inuktitut translation 
services at the next convention. Each local was to vote separately on the proposal which 
UNW president, and at the time president of Local 9, Jackie Simpson, stated that her local 
was ~~quietly in agreement" with Local6 and directed their RVP. Dave Talbot, to inquire 
as to ~hy the officers in question had not been removed form office. [See Simpson, 
interview.] 
93/bid 
96Letter, Crook to all local presidents, 9 March 1995. 
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required a two thirds majority. 95 When the locals finished voting. the proposal was 
defeated." When the proposal was brought up at the 26 April membership meeting of 
Local 6, it was overwhelmingly defeated. 97 Reponing on the meeting the following week, 
Hay River~s community newspaper, the Hub, indicated that the members were not against 
translatio~ but rather a dues increase at the same time that the union was spending money 
on setting up Wilson in lqaluit. 91 
As the issue of translation services seemed to fade away, the concerns ofLocal6 
did not. On 8 August Darryl Bean wrote to Chaffey, as well as Local21 president Donna 
Heslop who had also expressed similar concerns. Bean indicated that having component 
officers who were not members ofPSAC bargaining units was a violation of the PSAC by-
laws. Bean suggested four possible routes the UNW executive could take. Since the 
applicable officers were no longer eligible for membership in the PSAC, Bean reasoned 
they could no longer be UNW members. His first suggestion, therefore, was for the 
officers in question to be required to resign. The second option was for either the Alliance 
National Board of Directors or its Executive Committee to include the officers in question 
95/bid. 
"''Questions that are important in any language," Sulijuq, Vol. IS, No. 1, Wmter 
1996,9. 
97Minutes, Membership Meeting. UNW Local 6, 26 April 1995, Hub File; also 
Sandi Stanway, ''Local 6 members oppose motion to increase dues," Huh, 2 May 199S, 
13. 
91Stanway, "Loc:al6," 13. 
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as members of the PSAC. Bean was quick to point out that this was an option that he 
could not personally support. Option three was to allow Dowling and Wilson to retain 
their positions until the next UNW convention despite their ineligibility for PSAC 
membership. The final option was to allow the officers to keep their positions until the 
next PSAC convention (assuming they were re-elected in the interim) at which time the 
UNW could seek to change the PSAC by-laws accordingly. Should the UNW executive 
opt for options three or four, Bean pointed out, that choice would have to be approved by 
the PSAC National Board of Directors. The Alliance president closed by informing 
Chaffey that he was sending a copy of his letter to Crook and requesting that he be 
notified by September 1 5 as to which option the UNW executive would pursue.99 In a 
conference call 7 September the UNW executive chose option four with only Nonh Great 
Slave R VP Dave Talbot voting against it. 100 Option four, however, turned out not to be 
an option. Meeting 27 September the PSAC National Board ordered Wilson, Dowling, 
and lnuvik R VP Angus Crane removed from office. 101 Crane had resigned his position 
with the government after being assured by Crook that he would be able to keep his 
"Letter, Bean to Chaft"ey, 8 August t 995, Hub File. Although Bean did not name 
Heslop as the other correspondent in his letter to Chaffey, in its deliberations over the four 
options the UNW executive only made reference to Bean's letter to Heslop, not Chaffey. 
[See Minutes, UNW Full Executive Conference Call Meeting, 7 September 1995, 7.] 
1~nutes, UNW Full Executive Conference Call Meeting, 7 September t 995, 7. 
101S. M. Stanway. "Three UNW members ousted from union,'' Hub, 24 October 
1995, 4; also Mark Sproxton, ''Union to determine officers' fate: Decision to come down 
October 14-15,n News, 9 October 1995, A 17. 
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position on the executive.102 On 2 October Bean sent Crook a memo ordering the 
immediate removal of the three officers. The UNW president complied the next day. 
With Wilson gone, the Iqaluit operation was put on hold permanently. David Kaiogana 
moved into the position of first vice-president, 103 and Jackie Simpson, a Yellowknife 
corrections worker, was sworn in as second vice-president. uM The dismissals resulted in 
the loss of three experienced officers, one on whom the union had placed its hope of 
retaining the Nunawt membership after division of the territories. 
On 12 October attorney Adrian Wright, representing Crane, Wilson, and Dowling 
wrote to Crook requesting the reinstatement of the three deposed officers. Arguing that 
the PSAC could not define UNW membership, Wright also pointed out that Crook, prior 
to their resignations, had assured the three that they could keep their union positions. 
Should his clients not be reinstated, advised Wright, they would commence proceedings 
against the UNW for lost salaries and benefits, in addition to costs, which Wright 
66Conservatively" estimated at a quarter of a million dollars.105 Wright's position 
contradicted an earlier letter by the UNW's own lawyer who advised them that as a 
•cnoould and Talbot, interviews. 
acostanway, "Three UNW," 4. 
1ocMinutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 4-5 March 1996, 1; also Personal 
interview with Jackie Simpson 19 August 1999. 
105Letter, Adrian Wright, lawyer, to Croo~ 12 October 1995, Reading File, UNW 
Full Executive Meeting, 14-15 October 1995. 
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component of the PSAC the UNW could not act independently of the Alliance.106 It was 
this advice that had been behind the reinstatement of McAdams' membership as well as 
the decision to obey Bean's order to dismiss the three officers to begin with. When the 
threat oflitigation was presented to the UNW executive in October 1995, Josie Gould and 
Dave Talbot moved to refer Wright's letter to the union's own legal counsel. The motion 
was defeated and the executive instead authorized Crook to negotiate a settlement with 
the three officers according to an arrangement that the executive had approved in 
committee of the whole. 107 
How much Dowling, Wilson, and Crane were paid is unclear. Although he does 
not remember with any certainty, Talbot recalls that the three former officers were paid 
about $20,000 each through a trust established by the deposed officers. Agitated by both 
the pay out to the officers and the way in which it was done, as well as other ongoing 
union matters to which he took exception, Talbot went to the police. Although the 
RCMP disregarded his concerns, 101 Talbot's actions were supported by the membership of 
1~er, Austin Marshall, lawyer, to Crook, 19 April1995, Reading File, UNW 
Full Executive Meeting, May 15-16. 
107Minutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 14-15 October 1995, 51-52. 
''Committee of the Whole" is the PSAC equivalent of an in camera session. No minutes 
are kept and no business can be transacted. Therefore, when the UNW executive gave 
authority to Crook to negotiate a settlement according to terms "approved in 'Committee 
of the Whole"', it was in effect violating its own procedures. [See Rules of Order for 
PSAC Meetings. Third Edition, Public Service Alliance of Canada, Ottawa, 1984, 18-20]. 
•otr.etter, Talbot to "Whom it May Concern," 14 January 1996, Reading File, 
UNW Full Executive Meeting, 4-S March 1996; also Talbot, interview. Since joining the 
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his fellow correctional workers in Local 9.109 
Talbot's complaint to the RCMP was overshadowed on 17 February 1996, when, 
just prior to the commencement of contract negotiations, the territorial government 
introduced legislation to amend the Public Service Act. With division only three years 
away, the government wanted a balanced budget by that time and reduced labour costs 
were part of that agenda. Given the quantity of newspaper coverage on internal divisions 
that had appeared in the press over the previous year, it was no secret that the union was 
already divided. The government also had the element of surprise, taking the union 
completely unaware. The speed with which the legislation was adopted was reminiscent 
of the 1978 legislation which removed rents from the realm of collective bargaining in a 
period of four days. Introduced without warning on a Friday afternoon, the amendments 
executive in late 1994, Talbot had consistently opposed Crook and the rest of the 
executive on matters pertaining to Dowling and Wilson. Following the dismissal of the 
three officers, several complaints were lodged against Talbot by various members of the 
union, in one case for an incident taking place three years earlier. In all cases these 
complaints resulted in Talbot being disciplined by the executive. Talbot has no doubt that 
Crook was engineering a campaign against him. Talbot also accused certain UNW staff 
members oftaking partisan positions in some of these conflicts. Following Talbot's 
complaint to the RCMP, he was again disciplined by the executive, ordered to pay a fine 
of$500 and to submit an undated letter of resignation. Talbot appealed to the PSAC 
National Board of Directors and was upheld. [See Talbot, interview; also Minutes, UNW 
Full Executive Meeting 14-15 October 1995, 34-39; Minutes, 4-S March 1996, 23-26; 
letter, Talbot to "Whom it May Concern," 14 January 1996; Reading File, 4-S March, 
1996; Minutes, 25-26 July, 16-17; and Appendix D, "Investigative Report in the Matter of 
a Complaint Under the Alliance Constitution and the Union ofNonhem Workers' By-
laws)" Reading File, 25-26 July 1996.] 
ussimpson, interview. 
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were given assent the following Wednesday. 
Commonly referred to as ''Bill Two", the legislation fundamentally altered the 
nature of territorial collective bargaining. Replacing binding arbitration as the ultimate 
contract dispute settlement mechani~ the bill gave employees the right to strike. 
However, it severely limited those rights. One of those limitations required the Minister of 
Personnel and the union mutually to decide which workers would be deemed essential and 
therefore prohibited from striking prior to the commencement of strike activity. The bill 
also sought to exclude 30 .. 3 5 per cent of the government bargaining unit from union 
membership. no 
The union did what it could during the three days that the bill was given 
consideration. Members of the Yellowknife locals rallied at the Legislative Assembly and 
lobbied MLAs; other locals sent petitions to the legislature. Darm Crook met with 
members of the Assembly and some minor changes were made, but the bill ultimately 
110finance Minister John Todd insisted the number was closer to 19 per cent. Mark 
Sproxton, "Changes to act threaten UNW: Bill could eliminate 30 per cent of members-
Crook," News, 19 February 1996, A24. The union also published several articles in the 
following Sulijuq, Vol. IS, No. 1, Winter 1996. Bill Two received more attention than 
any other topic in an issue of Sulijuq. See Darm Crook, "Dear UNW Member," 1; ''Bill2 
is bad news for public employees," 4; "New exclusion rules designed to rob workers of 
security" 4-S· ·~o one wants to strike" s· "Who can't strike" S· also "Public Service 
, ' , , ' t 
Act," Statutes of the Northwest Territories, 19-20, 22-29; and "Pushing it through: 
Minister of Finance wants new public services act approved today,n Yel/owlrnifer, 21 
February 1996, 3. 
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passed with only four members voting against it. 111 The union had lost the battle over Bill 
Two before it even began. The executive appointed second vice-president Jackie Simpson 
to coordinate a full-time fight-back campaign. 111 Although no one opposed the strategy, 
the campaign never materialized and within a month Simpson had other duties. 
On 24 April, in a studio interview with CDC North, Dann Crook announced his 
resignation as president of the UNW. 113 Questioned in 1999 about the reasons for his 
resignation, Crook stated that after eleven and a half years as president, "[t]hings were 
starting to get to me that should never get to me. They were wearing on me. I was taking 
them home. n While maintaining that there was no substance to Talbot's complaint to the 
RCMP, Crook cited it as a factor in his decision to resign. u And when you fight that, 
you're fighting the employer, you're trying to represent the membership," recalled Croo~ 
" ... I guess when he [Talbot] started his campaign I decided I don't need this . ... If I stay 
here and fight it I'm gonna get bitter. So I pulled the pin." Perhaps with a certain irony, 
Crook concluded the interview: 
The organization can and wiD survive as long as the leaders always 
remember to take the direction of the convention. If convention, even if 
you don't like the direction personally, but if convention gives you a 
111Croo~ Goul~ Rolt-Kaiser, and Talbot interviews. Also Dann Crook interview 
with CBC North, 24 April 1996. 
11~nutes, Quorum Call of the UNW Executive, 20 March 1996. 
113Croo~ interview, CBC North, 24 April 1996. 
direction, take it and follow it and the organization will survive. That's the 
governing body and you live within it - the organization will progress. ••• 
Crook had been president a long time. A committed northern unionist long before 
becoming president, Crook was a founding member of the Northwest Territories 
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Federation of Labour. He saw his union rise to a preeminent role within that organization, 
and also decline to almost pariah status. He continued with Lamb's initiative of 
organizing CLRB units, aggressively organizing workers outside the employ of the NWT 
government, and leading them in their first strikes. He brought greater stability to the 
executive by professionalizing the R VP positions, and attempted to do the same with the 
other vice-presidents' positions. These efforts., compounded with his attempts to retain 
executive members who were no longer eligible to retain their executive status, however, 
increasingly alienated the membership and brought the intervention of the PSAC. Crook 
had served the union well, but his length of time in office - 11 years - had distanced him 
from the membership. Union staffer Scott Wiggs was sorry to see Crook go, but also 
recognized that he had been president ua long time" and that his actions were "getting a 
little out ofcharacter."11 ' Crook's tenacious retention of Dowling, Wilson, and Crane 
until forced to let them go by the National Board; his poorly disguised contempt for the 
1993 convention decision to keep the first vice-president a volunteer position; and his 
gross manipulation of the rules of order in compensating the above named departing 
•••croo~ interview. 
11
'Wiggs, interview. 
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officers all did much to diminish the union's integrity at a time when it most needed the 
support of its members. 
With Crook's departure, first vice-president David Kaiogana was in line to become 
the first Inuit president ofthe North's largest union. This was not to happen. After 
discussing the matter with his family, Kaiogana decided to step down from union office 
rather than assume the presidency. 116 Simpson was sworn in initially as first vice-president 
in May, and then president in late August when Crook~ who had been on vacation until 
the~ officially ended his term of office. 111 Simpson's first task as acting president was to 
oversee a contract vote with the government, the first one since NWT employees had 
gained the right to strike. While the actual negotiations were completed prior to Crook's 
resignation, the contract remained to be ratified. 111 
Just as the contract package was being mailed out for members to vote o~ the 
executive lost another member. In late May long-time Keewatin RVP Ken Stewart 
resigned his position and moved to Ontario, leaving the RVP's position vacant until after 
the next convention. 119 The departure of Stewart was a loss for the eastern membership 
116Simpson, interview. 
11
'Director of Finance and Administration Report, Minutes, UNW 1011a Triennial 
Convention, September 1996, 11-12. Compliments G. Rolt-Kaiser; Also President's 
Report, Minutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 25-26 July 1996, 8. 
111Croo~ interview. CBC North. 
11~nutes, UNW Full Executive Meeting, 25-26 July 1996, 6; also Minutes, UNW 
to* Triennial Convention, 31 August- 2 September 1996. Under "Reports ofRegional 
Vice Presidents," Keewatin is listed as "Not Represented." 
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and brought to six the total number of experienced officers the union had lost in the 
preceding seven months. With the last convention prior to the division of the territories 
approaching, and a proposed contract with the potential to divide the union along east-
west lines to be ratified, the union was not in a good position. 
The employer's final offer was not generous. Like public sector unions 
throughout Canada, the UNW had been forced to endure steadily decreasing wage and 
benefit packages throughout the 1990s.120 In 1992, in a conciliatory gesture to the 
employer, the union's membership had accepted a two year contract with no wage 
increase in the first year, and 1.8 per cent in the second. The1996 offer, mailed out in late 
May, eliminated vacation travel assistance [VT As], a subsidy employees received to offset 
the high cost of northern travel. By attacking this benefit, the employer attempted to 
divide the union's membership along east- west lines. In the West, where the majority of 
members were located in the major urban centres of Yellowknife, Hay River, Fort Smith 
and Inuvik - communities all accessible to the South by road - the loss of VT As was 
merely unfortunate. In the East, however, where there were no roads, the loss of VT As 
was significant. lqaluit MLA Ed Picco summed up the division of East and West over 
VT As accordingly: u[W]hen you have a roads [sic], although its nice to have a VT A you 
have the opportunity to drive out, well my friends in the east, air travel is not a luxury, it is 
•»t:or a full discussion of the attack on public sector unions in Canada in the 
1990s, see Panitch and Swartz, Assault. 
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a necessity."121 Picco described the government's attempt to split the union using VTAs 
as a smart "chess move."122 It capitalized on existing divisions within the union and kept 
its opponent divided. With the majority of votes in the West~ but the most drastic cuts 
being made in the East, Baffin R VP Andrew Johnson also saw the government's offer as 
an attempt to divide the union.123 The leadership recommended the membership reject the 
offer and began holding strike preparation meetings, 12" but when the votes were finally 
counted, the contract was accepted. Although the western communities predictably 
accepted the offer and the Nunawt ones rejected it. Crook stated that voter tum·out was 
very high in the West. while quite low in the East. In addition. the vote count in the East 
was much closer.125 Acting president Jackie Simpson refused to give a break-down of 
voting patterns, saying only that more than fifty per cent of the affected members cast 
121 Address by Ed Picco to the UNW 1 O* Triennial Convention, Transcript of 
Proceedings, 152, compliments of Georgina Rolt-Kaiser. 
122/bid 
123Mark Sproxton, ·~ says yes to gov't contract offer," News, 8 July 1996, 
AlO. 
124Mark Sproxton, ·~ members unsure on contract: Civil servants have until 
JulyS to make up their minds, News, 10 June 1996, A16. 
125Croo~ interview. Interestingly, Crook pointed out that Fort Simpson, in the 
western part of the NWT, broke the pattern and rejected the otTer. 
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ballots. 126 It was later reported that 62 per cent voted in favour of the contract, 111 setting 
in motion what would result in the division of the UNW into two separate unions. 
Prior to the ratification vote, Nunawt members had experienced a series of losses 
within the union. In addition to the loss of the vote on expanded services in lnuktitut, 
each of the three regions ofNunawt lost an executive officer. The first was Wilson in the 
Baffin. The loss of the Kitikmeot's Kaiogana- the only Inuit member of the executive 
and the only one fluent in Inuktitut - resulted in the executive reverting to an '4all white" 
composition. Stewart's resignation left the Keewatin unrepresented on the executive. 
Thus, by the time the convention came up at the end of August, the UNW was sorely 
lacking in experienced leadership, particularly in the eastern Arctic, which was still 
smarting from the latest collective agreement vote. 
Unbeknownst to most members at the time, the 1996 convention was to be the 
birthplace of a new, independent Nunawt union. In the words of Jackie Simpson, the 
Nunawt delegates "had a plan - they had a political action .. . they were determined to 
become their own union."121 Current president, and at the time Hay River RVP. Georgina 
Rolt-Kaiser, remembered the 1996 proceedings as "the convention from Hell." She added 
that the efforts of the Nunawt delegates to establish their own union were not expected in 
116Sproxton, "UNW says," AlO. 
117Mark Sproxton, "East - west disagree: Effects ofUNW contract worry Iqaluit 
chamber," News, IS July 1996, Al9. 
121Simpson, interview. 
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the West9 despite advance warnings from Kitikmeot RVP Marvin Sierks. Rolt-Kaiser 
stated9 "Basically they came out of nowhere in 1996 and ... wanted to separate."129 
It is not known when the decision was made on the part ofNunawt union leaders 
to attempt to secede. Reviewing the minutes of the UNW executive meetings between 
1993 and 1996, one finds no hint of a growing secessionist movement within the union. 
On the rare occasion that the executive faced any dissent, it came from western 
communities: Fort Smit~ Hay River, and to a much lesser extent Yellowknife. In January 
1993, when the executive committed itself to remaining one union after the division of the 
Territories9 the vote was unanimous. Even as late as the July 1996 executive meetin& the 
last one prior to the convention, there was no hint of a desire from the eastern leadership 
to break away. If the eastern Arctic membership had grievances with the leadership of the 
union, their R VPs were certainly not making the executive aware of them, or at least not 
in any official capacity9 which it was their responsibility to do. At a special executive 
meeting the previous April, Baffin R VP Andrew Johnson, who was to lead the break-away 
movement, reserved his anger for the PSAC National Board of Directors for ordering the 
dismissal of Wilson. 130 
1~olt-Kaiser, interview. 
1~VP Baffin Report for Convention, UNW Special Full Executive Meetin& 31 
April 1996. The report was reproduced verbatim in the convention minutes under ••R VP 
Reports." 
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Conflict between east and west began as soon as the convention was called to 
order. The first item ofbusiness was the seating of the Hay River and North Great Slave 
delegations. Because of complications with the delegate selection process for these 
regions, elections had to be re-run after the deadline, thereby requiring the affected 
delegates to be seated by the convention. 131 What would nonnally be a routine procedural 
motion became the first round in what was to be the fight for Nunawt. Because both 
regions in question were western ones~ not seating them would mean significantly fewer 
western votes, making the chances of a successful Nunawt secession more likely. 
Immediately, Johnson rose on a point of order, insisting that the seating of late delegates 
was an emergency motion and required a two thirds majority vote. Johnson's point was 
not accepted by the chair, and the convention proceeded to vote on the seating of the 
delegates. 132 Using the recent contract vote as justification, Local 4 delegate Mike 
Constantineau of Rankin Inlet was especially vitriolic towards his brothers and sisters in 
the West: 
You in the West sent us a clear message when you voted on your last 
agreement. What is good for you is not necessarily good for us. We 
accept your message and this is our response. If we cannot count on you 
to look after our interests then we must take control and look after 
ourselves. .. . In time I am sure we will forgive you for what you did to us, 
131Crook, Gould, and Rolt·Kaiser, interviews. 
13~utes, UNW 1 o• Triennial Convention, 31 August .. 2 September 1996, 4. 
because we know you were fooled into betraying us . ... By not seating 
these delegates we are putting ourselves on equal footing with the West. 133 
Adding to Constantineau's was the voice ofHunter Tootoo, also ofLoc:al4, claiming, 
"We are a voice that is not paid attention to."134 Despite the efforts of the eastern 
delegates, the late delegations were seated. us 
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With procedural formalities taken care of, the Nunavut caucus proceeded with its 
"political action." Enlisting the support oflnuvik's new RVP Dave Kaufman as seconder, 
at the first opportunity Johnson moved the following emergency resolution: 
Whereas Nunawt will become a new Territory on April 1. 1999; and 
Whereas the needs of employees in Nunawt are unique and "different" 
from those in the "Western" Territory; Therefore be it resolved that the 
UNW operating within the Constitution of the PSAC and the UNW 
Bylaws, accept the principle of, and shall actively support the creation of a 
separate component of the PSAC representing the workers in Nunavut. 136 
Darm Croo~ curiously one of the recently seated delegates for the Hay River region, 137 
argued that the motion should not be entertained because it was not in fact an emergency 
resolution. All motions going to convention must be submitted within a certain time frame 
prior to the convention. In order for a motion to be placed on the agenda after the 
133 Transcript ofProceedings, 3. 
134/bitJ, 5. 
135Minutes, UNW 1 o* Triennial Convention, 31 August - 2 September 1996, S. 
136/bid, 21. 
u7Even more curious v;as Crook's status as a delegate for Local21, H. H. 
Wdliams' Memorial Hospital. Crook was a member of Local 6 . 
. , 
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deadline, it could only be done so as an emergency resolutio~ meaning that something 
constituting an emergency had occurred since the deadline. Only then, with the approval 
of two thirds of the delegates, could the item be placed on the agenda. 131 Crook's point 
was that there was nothing constituting an emergency relating to the motion: 
Nunawt, we have known it was coming for 10 years. Each and every 
Local in that region had plenty of time and opportunity to submit 
resolutions to this convention through the proper time frames and channels 
for consideration. . . . I don't think Brothers and Sisters, that this should be 
accepted as an emergency resolution because there was time to put it 
forward. 139 
Had Simpson followed Crook's advice, her decision would have without doubt been 
challenged, and, ovenumed anyway. 
Once the motion made it onto convention floor, it enjoyed wide-spread support 
among both eastern and western delegates. Perhaps the new R VP for Fort Smith spoke 
for the western delegates when he said:·· ... these people in Nunawt, should have, and do 
have the right to decide their own destiny, and aJI we are doing here with this motion is in 
fact supporting that very important principle."140 When the issue was put to a roll call 
vote, the motion was overwhelmingly endorsed by the convention delegates with only 
Crook and one other Hay River delegate opposing it. One delegate from lnuvik 
131Crook, interview. 
1»x'ranscript ofProceedings, 75. 
•..orranscript ofProceedings, 78. 
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abstained. 141 The way had been cleared for the creation of a new union to represent 
Nunawt workers. Like the Northwest Territories itself. the Union ofNonhem Workers 
was to divide along lines of east and west. 
The ·~political action" that the Nunavut delegates had uorchestrat~ planned, and 
plotted" was a complete success in spite of, rather than because of the questionable tactics 
employed. The creation of what would eventually become in the fall of 1998 the Nunawt 
Employees' Union was born not through any long determined struggle on the pan on 
Nunawt workers, but rather through the suppon they received from their brothers and 
sisters in the west. Josie Gould, active in the union since 1970. the year Keith Mcinnis 
and Harold Franklin signed the NWTPSA's first collective agreement with Stuan 
Hodgeso~ put the decision to divide the union into its proper perspective. ''We were in 
agreement to it, but they didn't know we were in agreement to it. They weren't taking 
any chances. "142 Events throughout the 1990s contributed in bringing about the split in 
the UNW. The continually degenerating relationship with the Federation ofLabour 
demonstrated that ultimately personalities were more powerful than principles in the 
nonhem labour movement. Words like usolidarity" and "one big union" were terms that 
had long disappeared from the lexicon of not only the UNW, but the nonhem labour 
movement in general. This was funher seen in the ongoing battle with the Public Service 
141Minutes, UNW 10"' Triennial Convention, 22-23. 
142Gould, interview. 
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Alliance of Canada. The UNW' s failed bid to separate from the Alliance was another 
example of the abandonment of these principles. That the Alliance had to step in and 
overturn decisions of the UNW executive after being petitioned to do so by UNW 
members on more than one occasion indicated that while the executive took care of the 
interests of the leadership, it was the Alliance that took care of the concerns of the 
membership. Significantly the Nunavut secessionists made no attempt to break away from 
the PSAC. From the perspective of the locals, it was the executive that could not be 
trusted. Added to this was a poorly timed and executed vote on Inuktitut translation 
services whose failure could only distance east and west, and a contract vote intentionally 
designed by the employer to split the membership along the same lines. Into this widening 
chasm was thrown a crisis in leadership. In less than a year the UNW lost seven of its top 
leaders, their positions being filled with inexperienced leaders or not at all. This leadership 
vacuum was acutely felt in the area that would become Nunavut, where the first, second, 
and two regional vice-presidents were lost in rapid succession. With little experienced 
leadership to guide the eastern membership through these perceived affronts, and little 
experienced leadership in the union as a whole, the Nunavut Employees' Union was born 
as much out of a dual crisis of leadership and credibility as it was out of the questionably 
enlightened attitudes of the delegates at the 1996 convention. Many might view the 1996 
contract, and the failure of the union's membership in the western ponion of the 
Nonhwest Territories to support the Nunawt membership through strike action, as the 
ultimate cause of the union's bifurcation. However, this must be considered in the context 
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of a union leadership conspicuously sparse in the eastern Arctic and increasingly lacking in 
credibility throughout the Northwest Territories. These problems had their origins in the 
heightened efforts to professionalize the executive throughout the 1990s. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Trade unionism has been present in the Northwest Territories since shortly after 
the northern economy began to make the transition from the fur trade to resource 
extraction. Since organizing the Negus mine in 1944, until it merged with the United 
Steelworkers of America in 1967, the International Union ofMine, Mill, and Smelter 
Workers enjoyed a monopoly in representing the interests of an organized, imported, non-
aboriginal workforce. Mine Mill played an important role in the economic, social, and 
political lives of these workers. When the division of the Northwest Territories into an 
eastern and a western territory seemed imminent in the early 1960s, Mine Mill provided 
the federal government with input designed to ensure democracy for all northerners, and 
fair and just treatment of aboriginal people. 
As government activities in the North evolved in the post-war period, providing 
for the needs of a largely aboriginal population increasingly competed with resource 
extraction as a priority of Ottawa. This led to the further importation of large numbers of 
non-aboriginal workers fi'om the South to fill the positions of an ever-growing northern 
civil service. By the early 1960s the number of civil servants in the North exceeded the 
number of miners. Overwhelmingly employed by the Government of Canada, northern 
civil servants, like their southern counterparts, were without the benefit of labour unions. 
The year 1967 was pivotal in the labour history of the Northwest Territories. As 
Mine MiD went through the mechanics of merger, passage of the Public Service Staff 
Relations Act granted collective bargaining rights to federal employees. These workers 
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promptly began to exercise these rights as members of the Public Service Alliance of 
Canada, an apolitical business union of federal employees organized largely by government 
department into 14 semi-autonomous component unions. The StaffRelations Act, 
however, did nothing for the small number of northern workers employed by the newly 
restructured Government of the Northwest Territories. In 1967, in the wake ofthe report 
of the Carrothers Commission on government in the Northwest Territories, the federal 
government moved the territorial capital from Ottawa to Yellowknife and devolved 
increasing numbers of federal employees to territorial employment. The number of staff 
employed by the territorial government grew exponentially. As employees of the 
Northwest Territorie~ these workers were without a union. 
Territorial employees quickly perceived their employer as, if not malevolent, then 
certainly not trustworthy, and they began to organize themselves. Significantly, the 
impetus came not from recently devolved members of the PSAC. but rather the 
Yellowknife correctional staff, one of the few territorial departments that predated the 
Carrothers Commission. The former federal employees were quick to rally around the 
prison workers, who clearly recognized the need for a larger organization with the 
resources and clout necessary to represent and service territorial public servants. The 
PSAC was the logical choice. It already had a northern membership and a loyal following 
of former members. Moreover, PSAC supported and assisted the efforts of these early 
nonhero a~vists. The Nonhwest Territories Commissioner, an "old union man" himself: 
also encouraged them. Worker transiency presented itself as a hurdle to signing up 
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members, but as there was no minimum number of signed members legally required for 
recognition [in fact as there was no legislation governing the organization of territorial 
civil servants at all] Commissioner Stuan Hodgeson recognized the Northwest Territories 
Government Employees' Association in 1969, despite its inability to sign up a majority of 
employees. He passed enabling legislation that changed the organization's name to the 
Northwest Territories Public Service Association and granted it exclusive bargaining 
rights for government employees other than teachers. The following year the NWTPSA 
became a component of the PSAC, and with the assistance of Alliance negotiators, signed 
its first collective agreement with the commissioner. Thus, while the push to organize 
northern civil servants in the late 1960s came from northern workers themselves, the 
process was greatly facilitated by both unique northern realities and the active support of 
the Public Service Alliance of Canada. 
As the northern state apparatus grew in both size and level of sophistication 
throughout the 1970s, so too did the union representing its employees. Issues pertaining 
to union staff and leadership in particular continued to present challenges to the 
NWTPSA. With an all-volunteer executive scattered across Canada • s north, rapid 
changes in leadership remained common. Regional vice-presidents came and went, as did 
vice-presidents and presidents. The high turnover rate among the executive was caused by 
promotions, transfer~ and resignations within the civil service. As well, some resigned 
from the executive for personal reasons, with work load figuring greatly in the equation. 
Establishing the president's position as full-time in 1978 stabilized the incumbency of that 
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position. Turnover in union staff, specifically the position of executive secretary treasurer, 
was also high. Originally the only full-time staff position, it was typically filled in the 
North by candidates from other unions. Between 1970 and 1979 the position was held by 
five incumbents, each successively fired by the union. The last of these left behind the 
legacy of a unionized staff and a regularly publishing newsletter. His successor, a 
southern hire with a more academic background, brought with him a level of 
sophistication that was representative of the union throughout the 1980s. 
In addition to leadership and staff matters, native issues increasingly gained 
importance throughout the union's history. In the 1970s the Berger Inquiry attracted 
mixed responses from the NWTPSA. Of more immediate concern, at least with eastern 
locals, was the use of Inuktitut. With an increasing number of Inuit civil servants, the use 
in lnuktitut among eastern Arctic locals increased from the 1 970s on. This trend 
continued into the t 980s. As many of the new CLRB units were in the eastern Arctic, 
increasing numbers of Inuit workers were brought into the labour movement. Inuktitut 
continued to rise in importance. The union's journal, Sulijuq, was almost completely 
bilingual by the end of the 1980s. The union's failure to approve a dues increase in order 
to provide improved Inuktitut translation services at its 1996 convention may well have 
been a contributing factor in the union's break-up. 
Despite the increasing attention to aboriginal language. the union enjoyed no 
success in recruiting aboriginal people to leadership positions above the local level with 
the exception ofDarm Crook, a Saskatchewan Metis. Although James Washec held the 
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position ofR VP for the Fort Smith region on the union's first executive, he quickly left 
the organization to pursue his political career with the Indian Brotherhood of the 
Northwest Territories. From that time until the election of David Kaiogana as Kitikmeot 
RVP in 1990 the union's executive remained "lily white." When Kaiogana left the 
executive in the spring 1996, the union reverted to its "all white" status. 
The 1980s were the union's "golden age." Native people were increasingly 
organized during the period. Stability within the offices of both the presidency and the 
executive secretary treasurer allowed both staff and executive actively to participate in the 
northern labour movement. Elected executive officers, as well as union staff, played 
significant roles in founding and leading the Northwest Territories Federation of Labour 
through much of the 1980s. Through the Federation, the NWTPSA actively participated 
in union activism not simply in the North, but in labour struggles of national importance 
such as the Gainers and Pacific Western Airlines strikes of the mid-1980s. 
Most significantly, the 1980s saw the NWTPSA branch out from solely 
representing territorial workers. In close cooperation with the PSAC, the union 
aggressively organized employees of hamlets, towns, and housing authorities into 
bargaining units certified by the Canada Labour Relations Board. Additionally, employees 
of the newly re-structured Northwest Territories Power Corporation and the privately 
owned H.H. Williams Memorial Hospital became members of the union, forming its two 
largest CLRB units. Unlike their brothers and sisters employed by the Government of the 
Northwest Territories, members ofCLRB units enjoyed the right to strike, and by 1987 
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the union had fought, and won. its first strikes with the support of the Federation of 
Labour and the active involvement of the Public Service Alliance of Canada. The role 
played by the Alliance in organizing and servicing of CLRB units was vital. Without the 
aid of the PSAC, the northern component would have remained solely a territorial 
government employees' union. 
The later 1980s witnessed deteriorating relationships with other labour 
organizations. Most significant among these were increasingly strained relations with the 
Federation of Labour. As the NWTPSA represented the most dynamic union in the North 
during the 1980s, it changed its name in 1987 to the Union ofNorthem Workers to reflect 
its changing nature. At the same time, the United Steelworkers of Americ~ at one point 
the North's largest union, was dwindling in size and importance. Corresponding 
resentments - an artificial "blue collar versus white collar'' divisiveness fed by elements of 
USWA Local 802 and the Federation of Labour's executive assistant- distanced the 
UNW from the broader labour movement and contributed to the union's decreasing 
participation in the Federation. This trend continued into the 1990s. A bitter campaign 
for president of the Federation resulted in the election of an autocrat and proven enemy of 
the UNW. This was foUowed by the dispute over the Mine Safety Act, and the strike at 
Giant mine, resulting in UNW locals starting to disaffiliate from the Federation. 
Dominating the 1990s was the attempt of the UNW' s elected leadership to 
professionalize. From 1978 until 1990, the only full-time elected officer of the union was 
the president, since 1984, Darm Crook. By a narrow margin, the 1990 convention 
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decided to combine the political role of regional vice-presidents with service 
responsibilities and add several more full-time officers to the union's executive. On the 
one hand, with the creation of a new highly paid political elite, both union staff and 
executives ceased to play a prominent role in the labour movement, and organizing of new 
bargaining units fell off drastically. On the other hand, the salaried positions led to greater 
stability of the executive, with RVPs remaining on the executive for considerably longer 
periods. But it also led to divisiveness within the union. Whereas in the past the position 
was typically filled by acclamatio~ the potential for bitter contests within the membership 
for lucrative incomes developed. Such was the case in the 1993 R VP contest in Fort 
Smith. The executive attempted to expand the number of full-time officers further at its 
1993 convention by adding the first and second vice-presidents to the UNW pay roll. This 
endeavor, as well as the most concerted effort to date to secede from the Alliance, and an 
attempt to further consolidate power within the executive were all defeated. The 
subsequent decision of the executive to add the first vice-president to the pay roll 
regardless, compounded by the president's decision to allow the Fort Smith RVP to retain 
his position despite no longer being a member of a union bargaining unit, flew in the face 
of established democratic practices of the union and set in motion a series of events that 
culminated in the break-up of the union. By the time the PSAC National Board of 
Directors ruled on the Fort Smith RVP, he had been joined by two other executives who 
bad ceased to be union bargaining unit members. Their dismissal and subsequent pay-out 
under questionable circumstances led directly to the resignation of the president and the 
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newly elevated first vice-president and was followed closely by the resignation of the 
Keewatin R VP. The net loss of over half the union's full executive in slightly more than 
six months left the union critically weakened at a particularly wlnerable time. 
The coincident failure to approve increased Inuktitut translation services for the 
1996 convention is illustrative of the arrogance and political short-sightedness of the 
executive. Waiting until the last minute to hold the vote indicated that it was not a priority 
of the executive. Asking the membership for a dues increase at the same time that it was 
allocating over a quarter million dollars for a position it had already been told was not 
wanted was a slap in the face to the membership. While it appears that the issue was not a 
factor in the ultimate decision to split the union, it was an optimum opportunity for the 
executive to campaign for, and actively show their support for one united union after the 
division of the territories. lnsteacL the executive passively awaited the results while 
defending their own increasingly questionable decisions. When the membership rejected 
the dues increase, it was neither a rejection of the Inuit's right to participate in union 
affairs in their own language, nor a rejection of the executive's leadership, but rather an 
acknowledgment that if the leadership could find over a quarter million dollars for the first 
vice-president, it did not need more money to finance translation services. 
The greatest source of division leading to the union's break-up was the 1996 
acceptance of the territorial government's contract offer. Government negotiators 
employed a ruthless, and successful, strategy of divide and conquer. Immediately 
preceding negotiations, territorial legislators changed the rules of collective bargaining 
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overnight, eliminating binding arbitration and replacing it with the right to strike. It then 
dared the union to exercise that right. Strudured so as to be barely acceptable in the more 
populous West, the government's final otTer was met with a combination of apathy and 
anger in the East. The union's leadership, recognizing the divisive nature of the otTer, 
urged the membership to reject it. With the exception of one local in the West, only the 
membership in what would become Nunavut heeded the leadership's advice. Without the 
right to strike until only months earlier, the majority of members in the West were less 
sure, largely because they had less to lose by accepting the offer. The agreement was 
ultimately ratified because the leadership failed to convince its members to stand together 
in solidarity. Nunawt secessionists capitalized on this to fonn their own union. They had 
learned their lessons well from previous attempts to secede from the PSAC. 
Secession from the Alliance increased in popularity since the mid-1970s when 
Darm Crook first proposed it as president ofLocal6. Always at the heart ofthe issue was 
dues paid versus services received. The message conveyed in these attempts was that if 
the component did not get its way, it should quit. Larger, less quantifiable issues such as 
solidarity and strength in numbers were better comprehended by the people who led the 
union to its greatest successes in the 1980s. Professional union staffers, who understood 
and pradiced the essential skills of building solidarity through dialogue and grass roots 
organizing were pushed aside in the 1990s by a highly paid elected leadership that no 
longer earned their pay cheques the same way their brothers and sisters did, and in several 
cases were no longer even members of unionized bargaining units. Barring rare 
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exceptions, the priorities of this new sroup were focused more on issues of regionalism, 
parochialism, and power. The executive suffered from the syndrome of being "big fish in a 
small pond." When leadership of the Federation ofLabour fell into the hands of an 
individual better versed in these qualities than themselves, the response of the UNW 
leadership was not to work for democratic: reform, but to increasingly withdraw. 
Similarly, when the Alliance was perceived as not providing for its nonhem component, 
the response was to attempt to disaffiliate. It is no wonder then that the eastern delegates 
chose a similar option at the 1996 convention following the ratification of the collective 
agreement. That the leader of the Nunawt secessionist movement was one of the last 
remaining members of the "old boys club" was poetic: justice. 
Some might argue that disaffection with the Alliance was a function of perceived 
regional disparities, that the NWTPSAIUNW was an isolated, nonhem component, 
neglected by disinterested southern union bosses. This was not the case. Whenever the 
union required assistance, it was forthcoming from the Alliance. Whenever an attempt 
was made to disaffiliate, it was defeated by members of the union. When members felt 
aggrieved by their own leaders, it was the PSAC they turned to for redress. If there were 
those who perceived themselves to be neglected, northern workers, they were never able 
to convince enough of their brothers and sisters into channeling such feelings into concrete 
action. 
By the 1990s proponents of disaffiliation were found within an executive 
increasingly alienated from its membership. The greater the distance increased between 
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the executive and the locals, the more arrogant the UNW leadership became. 
Compounded by a full-time president who had been an incumbent for over eleven years, 
the executive increasingly saw itself not as the upholders of the rules. but as an infallible 
body. Whe~ in 1993, the executive attempted to subordinate local leadership, the 
undemocratic direction the union was taking became apparent. 
There was never a general uprising of the membership against .. the brotherhood." 
In all likelihood, the average member did not care about union matters until the collective 
agreement came up for ratification. Even the~ many members, particularly in the East, 
did not bother to vote on it. That any members challenged the executive on the decisions 
it was making between the 1993 and 1996 conventions was an aberration. In the instances 
where issues were raised, members were almost always forced to take their concerns to 
the PSAC, indicating both a frustration with the UNW leadership and a belief that the 
Alliance could and would take corrective measures. When members requested action 
from the parent body regarding UNW executive decisions, they got action. The most 
dramatic example of this was the dismissal of the three officers in 1995. When UNW 
members were disregarded by their own leaders, the PSAC stepped in to defend 
democratic trade unionism. 
In 1967 a handful ofNorthwest Territories government employees began to 
organize a union and soon called upon the PSAC for help. The Alliance responded and 
the union which emerged - the Nonhwest Territories Public Service Association- took 
root not only in Yellowknife, Hay River, and Fort Smith, but also Frobisher Bay, Rankin 
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Inlet~ and Cambridge Bay. It was not inevitable that the union would divide when the 
territories did. It did so because the growing professionalization of the union's leadership 
structure not only increasingly divided the membership ftom its leaders~ but its leaders 
from the Alliance. Significantly, when efforts were initiated to establish a separate union 
for Nunawt workers, there was never any question that it would be a component of the 
Public Service Alliance of Canada. The PSAC had served northern workers, east and 
west, since the capital of the Northwest Territories was Ottaw~ Stuart Hodgeson was still 
"an old union man," and Local 802 at Con mine was Mine Mill 802. The Alliance would 
continue to represent northern workers, east and west. 
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APPENDIX I 
Esecutive Omcen of tbe Union of Northern Worken from 1993 
Convention to dose of 1996 Convention 
President DarmCrook Convention 1993 to 23 
August 1996 
Jackie Simpson 23 August 1996 to close of 
1996 convention. 
Fint Vice-President Jim Wtlson Convention 1993 to 
September 1995 
[dismissed] 
David Kaiogana 
October 1995 to May 1996 
[resigned] 
Jackie Simpson 
May 1996 to 23 August 
Donna Heslop 1996 
23 August 1996 to close of 
1996 convention 
Second Vice-President David Kaiogana Convention 1993 to 
October1995 
Jackie Simpson March 1996 to April 1996 
Vacant April 1996 to July 1996 
Donna Heslop July 1996 to 23 August 
1996 
Vacant 
23 August 1996 to close of 
1996 convention 
Regional Vice-Presidents 
Bamn Andrew Johnson Convention 1993 to close 
of 1996 convention 
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Fort Smith Keith Dowling Convention 1993 to 
September 1995 
[dismissed] 
Vacant September 1995 to March 
1996 
Don Hendry March 1996 to close of 
1996 convention 
Bay River Georgina Rolt-Kaiser Convention 1993 to close 
of 1996 convention 
Inuvik Angus Crane Convention 1993 to 
September 1995 
[dismissed] 
Dave Kaufinan October 1995 to close of 
1996 convention 
Keewatin Ken Stewart Convention 1993 to July 
1996 [resigned] 
Vacant July 1996 to close of 1996 
convention 
Kitikmeot Marvin Sierks Convention 1993 to close 
of 1996 convention 
North Great Slave Scott Wiggs Convention 1993 to 
December 1994 [took 
position ofDirector of 
Membership Services] 
Dave Talbot January 1995 to close of 
1996 convention 
Somba K'e Josie Gould Convention 1993 to close 
of 1996 convention. 
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